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INTRODUCTION 
The problem of animal awareness lies at the interface of science 
and philosophy. As a starting point for the study of phenomena such 
as awareness, mind, consciousness, etc., we hardly have any reference 
other than our own human experience and in the context of a non-
dualistic ontology this can be justified. In philosophy and psychology 
it appears to be very difficult to give direct operational definitions of 
terms such as consciousness, etc. So we might expect this to be even 
more difficult in the study of animals. A detailed knowledge of animals 
and their behaviour is necessary in order to be able to say something 
about their subjective experiences, and to prevent us from excessively 
projecting human experience on animals. 
Descriptive terms dealing with the nature of animal awareness, 
like intelligence, consciousness, etc., are normative as well (Hodos 
1982), and therefore the study of animal awareness has wide-ranging 
moral implications for our own conduct towards animals (Griffin 
1981a; Midgley 1981); some of the reluctance in recognizing the ques-
tion of animal awareness as legitimate and "scientific" might be ex-
plained this way. The question of animal awareness implies the ques-
tion of the human-animal relationship. 
DEFINITIONS 
Terms such as awareness, self-awareness, self-consciousness, 
etc., indicate that there is a gradual scale of awareness rather than 
distinct "states" of awareness. Each species, and each individual 
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animal within a species, can display different elements of awareness at 
different times. Roughly s~eaking, though, the development from 
lower to higher animals will coincide with an increasing degree of 
awareness. And, as higher degrees of (self-) awareness are achieved, 
the more basic forms remain present and functional; they are recapitu-
lated in the development of young individual mammals. 
First of all, there is the level of the "un-conscious" or pre-con-
scious for bodily, e.g. physiological processes, or the maintenance of 
homeostasis in general. This level is present in all living beings. In con-
scious life, as opposed to unconscious life, the most basic property 
seems to be awareness: "a feeling of causal relationship with the exter-
nal world" (Whitehead, cited by Griffin 1977). This feeling, according 
to Whitehead, implies discrimination of the quality of the environment 
(harmful or beneficial) and a sense of location. Down to the lowest 
forms of life, there are signs of this sort of awareness, be it ever so 
vague and unspecified. Directly linked to this is the concept of self-
hood: "all animals have attained self-hood, since they exist, have a 
will to survive, and have also needs and interests" (Fox 1983a). 
Accepting the idea that perception is basically an "emotional" 
phenomenon, a "feeling," as Whitehead argues, awareness as defined 
above is not necessarily equivalent to mental capacity. Awareness 
might be accompanied with the experience of some form of mental im-
ages; but by mental capacity is meant the ability to abstract informa-
tion from external reality in such a way that the dependence of the in-
dividual on the environment decreases. "Mind" in this context is more 
than just the presence of mental images (Gallup 1982, personal com-
munication); it is the capacity to "use" these images in a flexible, adap-
tive way (Griffin 1981b). 
Hodos (1982), in a recent review of the concept of intelligence, 
defines intelligence as a qualitative characterization of an organism's 
behavioural responses to pressures from the environment, rather than 
as a "specific intellectual faculty." Being intelligent implies the ability 
to fulfill purposes, but Hodos' definition stresses the fact that, e.g., a 
rabbit's purpose might be very different from human purposes. 
Along with a growing ability to abstract information about exter-
nal reality and manipulate the environment instead of being manipu-
lated, a sense of individuality develops as well. Thorpe (1966) refers to 
self-awareness as individual recognition, of self and others, as a 
"self." Self-awareness, more than awareness, is the "understanding 
that I can be the object of another's attentions" (Clark 1981), the abili-
ty to see the "self" as another "other" in the environment. While the 
world in a primary state of self-hood is predominantly subjective, 
without discrimination between self and other (Fox 1982), the presence 
of self-awareness in an animal implies its ability to have a relationship 
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with its own body and with its environment, culminating in the exper-
ience of an "I" that is not identical with its body nor with its environ-
ment. "Self-awareness is the animal's ability to abstract and to form a 
conceptual framework of its environment, so that it can perceive itself 
and its actions in relation to the environment" (Wood-Gush 1981). 
Self-awareness can become more explicit, and result in still a 
greater freedom from the environment when self-conscious elements 
increase; implying the ability to focus attention (Griffin 1981a) or the 
ability to manipulate ideas (Thorpe 1966). Self-consciousness implies 
the existence of some sort of introspective ability, the direct exper-
ience of the self as self, as a causal agent, not being dominated by sen-
sory brain processes (Thorpe 1966; Sperry 1982). Maybe a clue is that 
the word "con-scious" comes from the latin verb scire meaning 
"knowing." So "conscious" means "also-knowing": an act performed 
by a more or less self-conscious being is accompanied by a knowledge 
of the relativity of the act: its reasons, its purpose, etc. This might be 
most clearly manifested in the ability to make plans, to act purposeful-
ly, or the presence of time-awareness. When consciousness of self in-
creases, then also do the scope of "understanding" and the degree of 
freedom increase: self-reflectiveness implies the ability to recognize in-
dividuality in others due to the fact that other and self are of the same 
kind (Clark 1981). Moreover it becomes possible to manipulate others 
(Fox 1982). Capacities like empathy, altruism, intentional deceit, grati-
tude, etc., are signs of these abilities. 
In sum, I propose that any living being has awareness; but an in-
creasing amount of self-awareness entails a splitting of self and other, 
an ability to discriminate self from not-self, which may be interpreted 
as the ability to "objectify" (Fox 1982). 
In the context of this paragraph it is also important to note that 
the capacity to suffer could in principle be present well down to the 
"lower" levels, since awareness is defined as an emotional perception 
of the quality of the environment to suffering of self-aware beings; yet 
it indicates that suffering is present not only in self-aware beings. 
THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP 
The phenomenon of "consciousness," and the existence of an ob-
jective "I" has always fascinated man (Lorenz 1963). Is it something 
that just human beings have, or is the existence of "personality" a 
universal phenomenon, somehow present in the whole of nature? Dif-
ferent theories have been given to explain the nature of the relation-
ship between "mind" and "body"; within philosophy, it has always 
been a major topic for study, since it comes so close to the mystery of 
existence of life itself. 
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The discussion seems to evolve around two basic perspectives: a 
dualistic one, in which mind is a separate entity from matter in princi-
ple; or a panpsychistic one, which assumes "some sort of psychic ele-
ment in the ultimate physical particles" (Thorpe 1977). 
The dualistic perspective has become very influential since Des-
cartes. In this view, one may regard the mind-body relationship as a 
two-way causal interaction between mental and physical events 
(Thorpe 1977). Another form of dualism is the so-called psycho-physi-
cal-parellelism theory, in which mental events may be seen as a "side-
effect" of physical events (Lorenz 1963). 
Since dualism is in essence reductionistic (Thorpe 1977), the ques-
tion comes up at what point in evolution "mind" came into being and 
what its adaptive value is in the mechanism of natural selection. 
Thorpe (1966) stated that "consciousness may have been an evolu-
tionary necessity in that it may have been the only way in which 
highly complex living organisms could become fully viable." In this 
way, it would be of great interest to see "whether we can find grounds 
to think that consciousness is present only above a certain level of 
neural organization." Thorpe thus seems to follow the widespread in-
tuitive assumption that consciousness is related to complexity of neu-
ral organization; and also that it is generated "out of the blue" at a cer-
tain point in evolution, through the process of natural selection. Grif-
fin (1981a) also mentions the adaptive value of consciousness for com-
plex animals, in order to cope with changing situations. He goes on, 
however, arguing that "a sufficiently fertile imagination can almost 
always find a plausible adaptive advantage for any observed trait," 
and therefore the argument for the adaptive value of consciousness is 
not very weighty in the consideration of its existence. Humphrey 
(1982) expresses his doubt of complexity as a condition for conscious-
ness by saying that our animal ancestors "were no doubt percipient, 
intelligent, complexily motivated creatures, whose internal control 
mechanisms were in many respects the equals of our own. But it is to 
say that they had no way of looking in upon the mechanism. They had 
clever brains, but blank minds." He proposes social complexity as a 
reason for the sudden appearance of consciousness. 
Arguments against dualistic perspectives are that one can 
speculate about possible parameters for the generation of con-
sciousness, but these remain scientifically unverifiable, and ultimately 
the existence of life itself becomes an unexplainable event in a dualistic 
framework. 
"Generally, in the building of a scientifically 'sound' theory, we 
want the newly apparent property to be explicable in terms of the 
old, ... to be the sum of whatever composes it... So the awareness of a 
complex organism ought, we feel, to be a similar resultant, and either 
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atoms are already conscious, or else consciousness is only a misleading 
label for neural impulse" (Nagel, cited by Clarke 1981). "There must be 
something positive limiting chance, and something more than mere 
matter in matter, or Darwinism fails to explain life" (Hartshorne, cited 
by Birch 1974). Others, however, reject the idea of "panpsychism" as 
"cheap" and "a radical simplification" (Popper 1974), or because it is 
not possible to confirm this idea scientifically, and that there is no visi-
ble evidence that lower life forms are conscious, as are humans and 
some higher animals (Thorpe 1977). 
There is, however, a third perspective possible. It is a concept in 
some ways resembling panpsychism, yet it is also fundamentally dif-
ferent. Whitehead has developed a theory in which events are at the 
same time both mental and physical. Thorpe (1977) states that White-
head is a panpsychist, yet this does not seem the case to me. The idea 
that all "life-events" are physical and mental by nature, does not imp-
ly that these events are conscious of this, as panpsychism implies. Nor 
does the idea that perception and physical energy are emotional in 
nature, imply that this emotionality is consciously experienced at the 
lower levels. 
A theory which defined the nature of life processes as both physi-
cal and mental, in a meaningful interaction, provides a basis for a 
gradually evolving continuum of mental capacity. The fact that we ac-
cept the statement "human beings are conscious" more or less as an 
axiom (Lorenz 1980), forces us to accept that we most probably share 
this quality at least rudimentarily with most life forms (Fox 1976; 
Griffin 1981a; Rollin 1981; Lorenz 1980). 
To account for the evolution of a rudimentary form of perception 
of causal relationships, to a conscious experience of self is not easy, 
and still requires the explanation of "leaps," for example between the 
occurence of mental images and the use of a real mind, as defined 
above. 
The results of the research on split brains and the nature of con-
sciousness by Nobel-prize winner Roger Sperry (1982) point in the di-
rection of an explanatory concept known as "the emergent principle." 
It implies that interaction between parts creates a "whole" that has in-
trinsic qualities of its own which none of the parts possess. In 
Whitehead's framework, this element of "the whole being more than 
the sum of the parts" is equivalent to the subjective, "mental" part of 
events. "The key development is a switch ... to a new causal or interac-
tionist interpretation that ascribes to the inner experience an integral 
causal control role in brain function and behaviour ... The whole, 
besides being 'different from, and greater than the sum of the parts,' ... 
also causally determines the fates of the parts, without interfering 
with the physical or chemical laws of subentities at their own level. 
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The events of inner experience as emergent properties of brain pro-
cesses, become themselves explanatory causal constructs in their own 
right." (Sperry 1982). 
These results are derived from research on human beings, and 
therefore mainly apply to them. A much wider range of application of 
the main principles is clearly indicated, however; Sperry himself states 
that the acceptance of the revised causal view has important implica-
tions for scientific views of man and nature. Also he says that his re-
sults indicate features about the nature of consciousness and its fun-
damental relation to "brain processing." Unless we suppose that the 
general concept of animal consciousness is completely different from 
human consciousness, which is extremely unlikely (Fox 1976; Midgley 
1978; Griffin 1981a), it is only reasonable to apply general principles 
about "the nature of consciousness" to animals as well, and in a 
Whiteheadian framework to all evolutionary events in general. 
If this is the case, then however simple the nervous mechanism 
might be, there will always be generated ''a whole,'' some sort of inner 
experience. 
Complexity of nervous structure probably correlates to complexi-
ty of inner experience (Fox 1976). The more complex the interaction 
between parts, which then in turn can serve as a new part, of a new 
emergent quality, a new ''whole.'' But it would be a mistake to set up a 
simple hierarchy of values, attributed to different sorts of complexity 
(Hodos 1982). Rather, all life forms constitute "an integrated, in-
terdependent unified field of being, not a ladder leading to some 
ultimate goal of perfection." (Fox personal communication 1982). 
What an emergent "whole" seems to express is "the being-ness" 
of a certain animal, e.g., "the dogness" that comes out of the specific 
neural organization of a dog. This beingness implies consciousness on 
its own level, on its dog-, or fish-, or whale-level. Each "beingness" 
has its own, unique qualities to contribute to the overall ecosystem 
and possesses unique modes of perception and awareness, suitable for 
the needs of the animal (Hodos 1982). 
In conclusion, we can say that man is not alone on earth in his 
awareness of life around him; all life forms are conscious in their own, 
unique way, and the capacity to individualize and become self-aware 
gradually emerges from the lowest levels of perception. 
Philosophically speaking, the possibility for real sensitivity and 
awareness in the animal kingdom is given. Now we must see what the 
biological study of awareness leads to in the framework of a nondualis-
tic philosophy. 
In the biological study of awareness, the main indicator for "be-
ingness" would be behaviour, since it represents that aspect of an 
animal in which all partial aspects, like physiological and hormonal 
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processes, are integrated; it also includes the subjective, individual 
evaluation of all these partial aspects. Behaviour, being itself an 
emergent property, is the nearest indicator of the animal's emergent 
individual subjectivity and quality of being. In fact, one could say that 
behaviour is the overt, outward manifestation of inner experience, 
both being on the same level of emergence. 
An animal relates to its environment through its behaviour. It ex-
presses its inner drives, abilities, and experiences in the way it deals 
with different environmental influences. We, as "human animals," can 
evaluate different kinds of behaviour by observation and experiments, 
and try to classify the quality of beingness as "aware," "self-aware," 
"intelligent," etc. The behavioural data available for this will now be 
discussed. 
THE ANIMAL AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 
The great "oneness" between animal and environment, the com-
plete adaptation which makes animals fit right into their specific 
''niche,'' has caused some scientists to presume that animals are 
automata, blindly ruled by environmental circumstances. The other, 
opposite, way of looking at it is that animals are so perfectly aware of 
their environment and at one with it, that an almost transcendent uni-
ty arises. In this view the essence of animal life lies largely in its rela-
tion to the surrounding world, and this notion leads "phenomenologi-
cal" scientists to say that the subjectivity of an animal lies as it were 
in its "Umwelt" and a qualitative study of the way ananimal "meets" 
its environment is the basis for understanding the animal's experien-
tial world, as well as its ecological function (Kortlandt 1954). 
This qualitative beingness of an animal is called its nature, or 
"telos" (Midgley 1978; Rollin 1981), implying the unique expression of 
life that a species represents, and the specificity of needs and purposes 
of each different species. 
D.R. Griffin should receive the credit for having opened the door 
again to serious scientific investigation into animal awareness with his 
book The Question of Animal Awareness (1981a). With respect to 
animal learning, one of the most basic properties of animal life, he sug-
gests that the principle of parsimony might be best served by accept-
ing some sort of awareness related to animal learning. Trying to stick 
to the behaviourist standpoint that animals are black boxes leads to 
''complex circumlocutions and confusing euphemisms,'' which are ''far 
less parsimonious than frankly calling a spade a spade and a thought a 
thought.'' 
The ability to learn is one of the most basic properties of animal 
life. In his review on animal intelligence, Hodos (1982) states that habi-
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tuation "appears to be a universal phenomenon in animal organisms, 
including protozoans." Also "classical-and operant conditioning have 
been demonstrated ... in those metazoans that possess a central ner-
vous system with axial symmetry." This includes platyhelminthes 
(e.g., planarians), annelids, arthropods and molluscs. Delayed response 
as a more complex behaviour has been reported in arthropods and mol-
luscs, and molluscs are also capable of reversal learning, so Hodos re-
ports. 
A well-known anecdote that Buytendijk reports is that an octopus 
is able to distinguish between "touching" and "being touched," which 
might even indicate the presence of self-awareness: "A good example 
of a lower animal with highly developed interactions with its environ-
ment is the octopus, which has a highly differentiated set of behaviour, 
much more so than some vertebrates ... One could attribute a relatively 
clear form of consciousness to an octopus ... The fact that an octopus 
has so-called pupil-reactions e.g. in adverse situations, an indication 
of emotional life in mammals, could imply a high degree of develop-
ment" (Buytendijk 1963). 
Entomologist V.B. Wiggelsworth in a recent article argued that 
insects might experience visceral pain, as well as pain caused by heat 
and electric shock (Rollin 1981). From the existing literature it can be 
argued that the experience of pain as such is not possible without the 
presence of some sort of purely subjective, inner experience, since the 
adversity of any stimulus is essentially something which is experienced 
subjectively. 
Given the fact that awareness seems to exist from the "lowest" 
level of animal life onward, it develops and becomes more complex 
along with the development of neural complexity, as was stated ear-
lier. But do animals come near to any kind of "higher" awareness at 
all, any kind of the faculties we consider "intelligent" and self-aware 
in humans? More than anything else, introspection and the use of sym-
bols are regarded as specific human characteristics, which set man 
apart from all other living beings (Jeuken 1975). 
GENERAL INTELLIGENT BEHAVIOUR 
The ability to make use of symbols is related to a number of other 
abilities: to use language, to use concepts, to have time-awareness, 
and to respond adequately to novelty, amongst others. It implies a 
capacity to abstract from present reality, and in that respect is direct-
ly linked to introspection, which is the capacity to regard the self in an 
abstract, "symbolic" way. Many authors connect introspection with 
social communication (Humphrey 1978; Midgley 1978; Griffin 1981a; 
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Thorpe 1966), or with intention-behaviour and imitation (Rollin 1981; 
Midgley 1978). These are mostly the topics dealt with by authors who 
discuss animal awareness. They support their point of view with evi-
dence coming from either the little amount of systematic research be-
ing done in this field, or from anecdotes of "natural," "spontaneous" 
behaviour. A few relevant examples of this evidence will be given 
shortly. 
Griffin (1981a) states that "Black, McMullan, Robinson, and 
others have distinguished animal communication systems from hu-
man language on the ground that the former are rigid responses to ex-
ternal or internal stimuli, which ... be definitely specified, whereas 
human language is spontaneous, creative and unpredictable." The ani-
mal's ability to communicate may be less rigid, however, since studies 
of animal behaviour have shown that animals are also capable of spon-
taneous, creative and unpredictable behaviour. For example, Marko-
witz (1982), in his book on behavioural enrichment in zoos, reports the 
highly unique, creative, unpredictable way in which zoo animals would 
invent solutions and play games. A young elephant, for instance, in-
stead of touching the right panel to set off an electrically regulated 
reward, would always save water in his trunk, no matter how long be-
fore the experimental session the trough was emptied, and smear the 
water between the response panels, thereby electrically shorting them, 
·so that every response would pay off. (The same elephant walked over 
to the only arrogant, boasting person in a group of students and step-
ped deliberately on this person's foot). This story, in which the animal 
actually manipulates the research project and the researcher, instead 
of the other way around, can hardly be interpreted otherwise than as a 
falsification of the argument presented by the three researchers in 
Griffin's book. It gives evidence of the presence of time-awareness ("I 
will use this water later"), intentionality, conceptual thinking and 
creativity in handling a completely new situation, and its behaviour 
therefore is worthy to be labelled consciously self-aware. 
All of this also holds for a story that Rollin (1981) reports of a 
police dog who was trained to hold suspects by the arm unharmed un-
til the officer arrived. When they ran into a robbery being performed 
by two men, the men broke away and took off in different directions, 
assuming the dog could not pursue both. The dog chased one of them, 
disabled his leg, left him, ran after the other and held this man 
unharmed by his arm, in this way having caught both men, although 
he never had been trained to attack the leg. Like Fox (1982), Mugford 
(1981) concludes that the ability to manipulate matters in order to 
fulfill a need, gives evidence of self-awareness. Many dog owners may 
be able to give examples of dogs who manipulate their owners. Dol-
phins, apes (Midgley 1978), wolves (Fox 1974), etc., are able to save 
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wounded fellows and humans, use and invent tools, and deceive prey in 
order to catch it. Both Markowitz and Mugford stress the fact that in 
these situations the animal is in control, rather than the experimenter, 
and that by humbling himself in this way, the observer might "in-
vestigate ways in which animals derive unique solutions, rather than 
simply measuring their activities in a narrow response largely dictated 
by the experimenter." (Markowitz 1982). However, there are also ex-
periments that indicate some sort of awareness in different animals. 
Dawkins (1980) describes well-known experiments with pigeons and 
rats. Beninger and his co-workers trained rats to indicate what 
behaviour they were performing at the moment a buzzer was sound-
ing. They tried to find a simpler hypothesis than that the rats were ac-
tually aware of what they were doing, but failed to do so. This experi-
ment strongly suggests even a kind of conscious awareness in rats. 
Hernstein and Loveland, and Siegel and Honig, proved by showing 
numerous slides to pigeons that they are capable of forming what 
could be described as abstract concepts of almost anything, like water, 
trees, human beings, etc.; Kohler furthermore found by doing in-
genious, well-controlled tests that pigeons can count, or as he put it, 
"think unnamed numbers," and in doing this, really grasp the concept 
of numbers, rather than being "Clever Hanses." (Clever Hans was a 
horse who could do many a mathematical calculation, but later it was 
discovered that he reacted to subtle indications of his owner, instead of 
calculating.) 
It seems that this evidence, experimental and anecdotal, shows 
that some animals are fully capable of abstraction and that they can 
think symbolically in order to express themselves and control their 
world. What about the "highest" form of symbolic communication, 
namely language? 
LANGUAGE 
There is no consensus about the real nature of language, let alone 
the difference between man and animals in this respect. Chomsky 
(cited by Griffin 1981a), argues that "the unboundness of human 
speech, as an expression of limitless thought, is an entirely different 
matter (from animal communication), because of the freedom from 
stimulus control and the appropriateness to new situations." Griffin 
comments that animal communication is not that rigid at all, nor is 
human language endless in its scope. Midgley (1978) considers speech 
as a further development of "creative, expressive, communicative 
power," and nothing all by itself. Fox (1976) relates speech to the con-
trolling and predicting function of the rational mind, which does not 
diminish the consciousness and deep emotional experiences that the in-
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tuitive mind can have, without speaking a word. Animals can very well 
have such an intuitive kind of mentality. In this line, Rollin (1981) 
argues, while discussing the "private language argument" developed 
by Wittgenstein, that animals might have to rely far more on direct ex-
perience for learning than on words, or that they might express their 
universal statements (all strangers are dangerous) by their behaviour 
instead of words, but that this does not imply that animals are not ra-
tional beings; rational being defined as the ability to do the right thing 
at a certain moment, choosing between different possibilities (Rollin 
1981; Midgley 1978). In any case, the fact that the possession of a com-
munication system is a widespread property rather than a specific 
human trait, might be demonstrated by the ability of the chimpanzees 
trained by the Gardners (Griffin 1981a) to express themselves in alan-
guage-like way with gestures, and acquire the "vocabulary" of a 
young human child. 
Also, dolphins have been shown to be able to communicate certain 
instructions to a mate purely by sound, while they could not see each 
other (Fichtelius and Sjolander 1972). 
Monkeys are known to have different warning calls for predators 
in the air or on the ground (Seyfarth 1982). The explicit use of variation 
in sound for communication, with which apparently detailed and pre-
cise information can be passed on, comes very close to what we call 
''language.'' 
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 
Rather than attributing self-awareness only to language-using 
species, many authors discuss the likelihood, and the need, for self-
awareness in all socially organized species. Social animals, dependent 
on each other for survival, must understand the other animals and 
their mental state in order to act adequately (Humphrey 1978); or 
must be able to recognize other individuals in relation to themselves in 
order to maintain a hierarchy, as in the case of domestic pigs, cattle 
and chickens (Bryant 1972), or to live in families or clans (Thorpe 
1966). Fox (1974) describes altruistic behaviour in wolf clans: wolves 
that go hunting bring back food for the cubs and the "babysitters" 
that remained behind. 
In the growing up of young animals, play and imitation are of 
great importance. The great ability of young (and older) animals to 
play indicates their need for the capacity to be aware of self and others, 
the need to be able to react to new situations and make decisions; play 
facilitates the development of these capacities. But apart from the 
functional meaning of play, it implies that animals are spontaneous, 
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creative and sentient beings, individuals who are fully able to enjoy 
themselves. 
While it is sometimes suggested that it is a proof of an animal's 
"dumbness" that it imitates a researcher, instead of "consciously" 
performing acts, authors like Thorpe, Midgley and Fox refer to play 
and imitation as crucial for healthy development in the more complex 
social animals, and as a clear indication of the animal's ability to 
engage in creative, highly communicative action. The "teaching" of 
the art of survival by parents to their offspring could even be seen as a 
beginning of culture (Fox 1976). Bonner (1980) devotes a whole book to 
"culture" in animal species. 
Roughly speaking, the presence of "animal awareness" in' its 
many forms has been discussed by going into the phenomena of learn-
ing behaviour, general intelligent behaviour, communicative behav-
iour and social behaviour. 
Now that the question "can animals think?" has been discussed, 
an equal amount could be written on the question "can animals feel?" 
However, I will not attempt it, since many of the same principles that 
apply to awareness, apply to the existence of emotions, and the two are 
intimately, perhaps inseparably, linked together in animal behaviour. 
ANIMAL FEELINGS 
As a fact of life, feelings must be rudimentarily present in all life 
forms, as Whitehead philosophically indicated. Basic emotions like 
fear, aggression, frustration, and satisfaction are directly related to in-
ternal motivational states (Wiepkema 1982) and are essential for the 
survival of the animal (Dawkins 1977; Murphy 1978; van Putten 1981). 
For instance, fear in the predator-prey relationship is very essential. 
Considerable research on fear in the domestic chicken has been done by 
researchers like Hughes and Murphy (Murphy 1978).* The fact that 
these "instincts" have a biological function, and in that respect might 
be predictable, does not in the least imply the absence of an actual 
emotional experience (Clark 1981; Dawkins 1977; van Rooyen 1981). 
As the selfhood of animals develops into greater degrees of self-
awareness it will be accompanied by a greater capacity for individual, 
conscious emotion. This is especially evident in social animals, who 
often form life-long bonds with mates or clans (Fox 1976). Well-known ex-
amples are swans, geese arid ducks who choose a partner for the rest of 
their lives. Lorenz (1980) describes the signs of grief shown by a goose· 
*See also Fear in Animals and Man, 1979. W. Sluckin (ed). New York: Van Nostrand 
Reinhold,-Ed. 
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when it looses its mate; for instance its eyes become dull, its muscles 
weaken and the goose lets its head hang down, just as people do, so 
Lorenz comments. He states that higher mammals and birds have 
emotional experiences completely similar to ours, representative of the 
basic structure of all experiences for man and animal alike (Lorenz 
1980; see also Midgley 1978). Self-awareness of the emotional state is 
shown by the chimpanzee Lucy, who possessed learned gesture-language; 
during a session, when her foster mother went away, she ran to a win-
dow and signed to herself: "cry me, me cry" (Midgley 1978). She was 
also able to appreciate jokes, and imitate them for her own amusement. 
Emotions can also lead to empathetic (altruistic) action, such as 
cases where dogs save little children, and dolphins support a sick or in-
jured companion. Emotions must also underly the "psychic" tracking 
of dogs who travel hundreds of miles to find their owners who moved 
to a place, unknown(!) before the dog's arrival (Fox 1976). Because of 
the similarity in emotional make-up, animals have many of the same 
psychological illnesses and abnormalities as humans, e.g. anorexia and 
depression, which in higher animals can occur as a result of sudden en-
vironmental changes, such as captivity and isolation from peers, mate 
or parent (Fox 1971). Carter (1982), for example, presents evidence 
which indicates strongly that many causes of death for dolphins in 
captivity are psycho-physiological, the shock of captivity being the 
cause for a loss of resistance to disease. Sometimes psychoneurotic ill-
ness can be the result of captivity or loss of a mate. This is also the 
basis for the very extensive research that is being done on animals in 
laboratories, using them as models for human disorders. Research to 
find new drugs to relieve anxiety is often done on mice and rats (Good-
man and Gilman 1975; McKegney 1982). The experiments of Suomi and 
Harlow on the development of depression as a result of maternal depri-
vation are also well known. They developed "a monkey model of hu-
man anaclictic depression, since ... the resulting behaviours are seem-
ingly identical for monkey and human infants alike" (Midgley 1981). 
Because of this correspondence in structure and behaviour Midgley is 
right, I think, when she criticizes such experiments from an ethical 
point of view. 
Midgley (1978) comments that "to be disposed to make the ges-
tures, you must also be capable of the emotions in order for them to be 
convincing and truly reciprocal;" "behaviour is only possible for a 
creature with an inward dimension, with its own real perception of the 
world." (Clark 1981). However, the mind is a private thing, as so many 
scientists comment (Griffin 1981a), for humans and animals alike; and 
so the gap remains, however much research and interpretation we are 
prepared to do. At least humans can speak and explain their thoughts 
and feelings. But animals cannot; or can they? 
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Lorenz (1963, 1980) states that the similarity of experience, the 
direct comparability of one's own experience with that of others is 
beyond proof, in that it is so evident that we cannot not believe it. This 
extends at least to higher vertebrates. Karl Buhler, according to 
Lorenz, refers to this as "du-evidenz," a necessary axiom of life. It is 
not up to science to establish the framework of communication and 
recognition of behaviour, or have ''heady metaphysical doubt'' about 
the similarity of experience of man and man, and man and animal, 
since science itself depends on this mutual understanding (Clark 1981). 
He goes on to say that "we do not see merely material motions (of an 
animal) but rather the embodiment of character and feeling in a mate-
rial mode.'' To make use of the so-called analogy-postulate to assume 
animal awareness (Sambraus 1981) might not be direct enough. The 
fact that we really do see the embodiment of character and feelings in 
behaviour (Clark 1981; Midgley 1978; Fox 1983b) makes it not only 
justified to describe "material entities in mentalistic terms" (Clark 
1981) but we have no right to withhold those terms to describe animal 
behaviour (Rollin 1982, personal communication). "Stones cannot be 
bored, or cross, or joyful, but dogs and pigs and cattle can" (Clark 
1981). 
In an overall perspective, we might say that animals are alive, and 
present in their beingness, for anyone who wants to see and meet them 
on their own ground. What their minds, or inner experiences are like, is 
largely expressed in their behaviour in intimate interaction with the 
environment, including other individuals. Olfactory and auditory 
senses might play as great a role in this interaction as the highly 
valued visual senses (Fox 1976). Although it seems to bother many 
scientists that many of the abilities ascribed to animals are also at-
tributable to machines, the nature of the machine is given to it by man, 
and the parts are equally as independent or durable as the whole; when 
an animal dies, however, the whole body dies, which again shows the 
causality of the whole, and the fundamental selfhood of a whole organ-
ism (Rollin 1981). 
We, as human beings, share different traits with different species 
(Midgley 1978) and are especially close to the more complex social 
animals such as dogs, elephants, dolphins, and apes, in that those seem 
to have a highly developed self-awareness and even self-reflec-
tiveness. Besides, we are able to communicate with them, to a great ex-
tent, as one individual to another. 
Human beings belong to the "Umwelt" of an animal, just as ani-
mals belong to ours. It is in the meeting of individual and Umwelt, of 
man and animal, that mutual understanding and appreciation grows 
(Kortlandt 1954). There is no separation between our position as 
observer and as partner in the relationship and in this context it can be 
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seen how our understanding of animals has a direct moral impact on 
our actions. 
The fact that it is justifiable to describe animal behaviour in em-
pathetic terms does not imply at all that "scientific" inquiry in the 
form of systematic observation would not be necessary and useful. It 
is important in order to discover the nature of different animal species, 
and systematically investigate different assumptions about their na-
ture, needs, and interests. 
The most instructive and direct way to learn about animals is by 
observing their spontaneous behaviour under conditions where they 
have total freedom to express themselves to their fullest potential 
(Midgley 1978; Markowitz 1982). "Despite the difficulties, field work 
with gorillas, chimpanzees, orangutans, and wolves demonstrates that 
the most realistic observations and assessments on wild animals are 
those made in the natural environment" (Carter 1982). For other 
animals, for example dogs and cats, a·man-made environment can pro-
vide an adequate situation in which a personal bond between observer 
and animal might well be a very valuable way of testing and under-
standing an animal (Mugford 1981; Fox 1983b). 
Working in the experimental environment of a laboratory the dan-
ger is great that the knowledge which is produced "is hardly a whole-
some source of learning, since it is based on abnormally conditioned 
animals" (Carter 1982). The most important thing is to ask the right 
question, so that the animal can show us its abilities. A negative 
answer to a test, like Gallup's mirror-tests, might be our fault: we did 
not ask the correct question for that particular species (Rees, Wolfle 
1982, personal communication). 
The capacities of an animal to feel and be aware are not static 
states by themselves, but abilities that are constantly expressed and 
developed in interaction among animal, man and environment. 
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FIELD OF 
ANIMAL WELFARE 
A being who is aware of his environment, and can react emotional-
ly to external situations, is also able to suffer. Every level of "being-
ness'' has its own purpose and needs, and its own qualitative link with 
its environment; the thwarting of those needs matters to an animal, 
and most animals will struggle to survive if in danger. The whole no-
tion of the nature, or telos, of an animal implies that it will suffer if a 
certain level of "fulfillment" of its behavioural possibilities is not 
reached. In relation to animals in present intensive production sys-
tems, Humphrey (1981) points out the importance of realizing that do-
mestic animals have become "dull" and unresponsive not because they 
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are dumb and stupid but because we have made them that way by de-
priving them of stimuli which would enable them to develop a proper 
sense of selfhood. 
The suggestion that domestic animals do not miss what they do 
not know is rejected because the concept of animal awareness implies 
that animals actually experience suffering in some conscious way. The 
absence of human-like self-consciousness might even increase the in-
tensity of animal suffering: most animals cannot foresee whether their 
situation will improve or not, nor realize other factors which make 
their suffering relative. Because of this lack of knowledge, all that may 
exist for them is a feeling of suffering. 
An animal, whether a "lower" or a "higher" one, is a qualitative, 
sentient being. To affect its environment is to affect the quality of its 
existence, and its individual well-being. 
Current intensive production systems have affected what used to 
be the natural environment of farm animals tremendously. The de-
mand for efficiency and production more and more became the guiding 
factor in designing and creating living environments for the animals. 
As a result, environmental diversity has been reduced to its absolute 
minimum. The reaction of animals, dependent on the environment as 
they are for their development and health, to this deprivation, will be 
detailed later in Section IV of this book (Animal Management, We-
melsfelder). 
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AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD AND 
KNOWLEDGE OF ANIMALS: AN UPDATE*t 
Stephen R. Kellert 
ABSTRACT 
The distribution of a typology of basic attitudes toward animals in 
the American population is explored through personal interviews with 
3,107 randomly selected persons in the 48 contiguous states and Alas-
ka. Data is presented on the prevalence of these attitudes in the overall 
American population and among major social demographic and animal 
activity groups. In addition, results are presented on Americans' 
knowledge of animals as well as their species preferences. Finally, in-
formation is presented on perceptions of critical wildlife issues in-
cluding endangered species, predator control, hunting, trapping, ma-
rine mammals and wildlife habitat protection. 
INTRODUCTION 
During the period 1973-1976, a typology of basic attitudes toward 
animals was developed and a limited study conducted to examine the 
distribution of these viewpoints throughout the American public (Kel-
lert 1978). In 1977, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service of the Depart-
ment of the Interior granted funds to explore more carefully the 
presence and strength of these perceptions among diverse social demo-
graphic and animal activity groups in the 48 contiguous states and 
Alaska. In addition, five other focus areas were identified for this 
study: 1) public attitudes toward critical wildlife and natural habitat 
issues (e.g., endangered species, predator control, hunting, trapping 
*Supported by grant #1416000977056 from the United States Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice, Department of the Interior. 
tReprinted from International Journal for the Study of Animal Problems 1(2)1980. 
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and habitat preservation); 2) the size and social characteristics of 
various wildlife and domestic animal activity groups (e.g., hunters, 
birdwatchers, pet owners, and humane and wildlife protection organi-
zation members); 3) public knowledge of animals and species prefer-
ences; 4) historical trends in uses and perception of animals during the 
twentieth century; and 5) children's knowledge of, and attitudes and 
behavior toward animals. 
This report will review some of the results of this investigation. 
Space limitations, however, restrict the amount of information that 
can be covered and, thus, some data will be omitted and others only 
cursorily examined. No data will be provided on the historical orchil-
dren's studies as these investigations are still in progress. 
The results presented in this paper are largely based on a national 
survey of 3,107 randomly selected Americans in the 48 contiguous 
states and Alaska. A special oversampling was drawn in the Rocky 
Mountain States and Alaska in order to ensure sufficient numbers in 
these important regions. In all analyses referring to the entire 
American population, however, this oversampling was accounted for, 
resulting in a total national sample size of 2,455. Respondents were 
chosen according to a probability random selection method roughly en-
suring that every individual in the American population had an equal 
chance of being selected. In addition, a minimum of one initial contact 
and three call-backs were included before the designated respondent 
could be dropped. These methods considerably enhanced the represen-
tativeness of the sample. Each respondent was personally interviewed 
for approximately sixty minutes. Twenty-two percent of those con-
tacted refused an interview, thirteen percent could not be located after 
the fourth interview attempt, and approximately four percent ter-
minated the interview before its completion. In spite of these limita-
tions, a comparison with the national census suggested that the sam-
ple was a relatively good cross section of the American population 
with a slightly higher socioeconomic profile (age, sex and race differ-
ences were nonsignificant). In addition to the national sample, special 
mail surveys, using the same questionnaire, were conducted with 
members of the National Cattlemen's, American Sheep Producer's and 
National Trappers' Associations, as well as with subscribers to the 
magazine, Vegetarian Times. 
Five pretests were conducted to develop reliable and valid attitude 
questions. Attitude scales were developed based on a typology of nine 
basic attitudes toward animals. Cluster and other multivariate ana-
lyses were employed in the scale construction process. No useful scale 
was devised to measure the aesthetic attitude. Additionally, a neutral-
istic attitude scale could not be usefully distinguished from a negati-
vistic scale and, thus, only one scale was developed including elements 
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of both the negativistic and neutralistic attitudes, with perhaps more 
of the latter. Sixty-five attitude questions were used in the develop-
ment of these scales, with the smallest scale (ecologistic) consisting of 
four questions and the largest (utilitarian) thirteen. Where ap-
propriate, the strength of the response (e.g., strongly versus slightly 
agree/disagree) was included. Scale scores ranged from 0 to 11 for the 
ecologistic attitude scale, and from 0 to 27 for the utilitarian attitude 
scale. The independence of the resulting eight attitude scales was sug-
gested by relatively small scale intercorrelations-14 under .20; the 
smallest, .04; the largest negative correlation, -.42 (the naturalistic 
and negativistic attitudes); and the largest positive correlation, .40 
(the naturalistic and ecologistic). 
In addition, more than 500 indices were reviewed and three pre-
tests conducted to develop a "knowledge of animals" scale. The 
resulting 33-item true-false and multiple choice knowledge scale 
covered all vertebrate classes, and five questions dealt with inverte-
brates. All questions were omitted which favored specialized knowl-
edge on the part of any particular animal activity group. The distribu-
tion of knowledge scale scores was roughly normal, with a mean of 52.8 
on a range of 0 to 100. 
ATTITUDES TOWARD ANIMALS 
As previously indicated, prior research identified a typology of 
basic attitudes toward animals. As this typology is described in detail 
elsewhere, only crude, one-sentence definitions are provided below 
(Kellert 1976; Kellert 1979b). 
Naturalistic- Primary interest in and affection for wildlife and 
the outdoors. 
Ecologistic-Primary concern for the environment as a sys-
tem, for interrelationships between wildlife species and natural 
habitats. 
Humanistic-Primary interest in and strong affection for indi-
vidual animals, principally pets. 
Moralistic-Primary concern for the right and wrong treat-
ment of animals, with strong opposition to exploitation of and 
cruelty toward animals. 
Scientistic-Primary interest in the physical attributes and 
biological functioning of animals. 
Aesthetic-Primary interest in the artistic and symbolic char-
acteristics of animals. 
Utilitarian-Primary concern for the practical and material 
value of animals. 
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Dominionistic-Primary satisfactions derived from mastery 
and control over animals, typically in sporting situations. 
Negativistic-Primary orientation an active avoidance of ani-
mals due to dislike or fear. 
Neutralistic-Primary orientation a passive avoidance of ani-
mals due to indifference and lack of interest. 
The scales used in the national survey are crude approximations of 
the attitude types and only in the broadest sense measure their true 
prevalence and distribution in the American population. Nevertheless, 
the relative frequency of the attitudes in the national sample was 
assessed by standardizing the various scale scores on a 0 to 1 range, 
plotting a regression line through the scale score distribution frequen-
cies for each attitude, and using these frequency curves and regression 
figures to estimate the comparative "popularity" of the attitudes. As 
particular scores on one attitude scale cannot be equated with similar 
scores on other scales, this procedure only roughly indicates the rela-
tive frequency of the eight attitudes in the American population. The 
results of this analysis are presented in Figure 1. 
These results suggest that the most common attitudes toward ani-
mals in contemporary American society, by a large margin, are the 
humanistic, moralistic, utilitarian, and negativistic attitudes. In many 
respects, these attitudes can be subsumed under two broad and con-
flicting dimensional perceptions of animals. The moralistic and 
utilitarian attitudes clash around the theme of human exploitation of 
animals. The former opposes many exploitative uses of animals involv-
ing death and presumed suffering (e.g., hunting, trapping, whaling and 
laboratory experimentation), while the latter endorses such utilization, 
or other human activities which might adversely affect animals, if sig-
nificant human material benefits result. In a somewhat analogous 
fashion, the negativistic and humanistic attitudes tend to clash, 
although in a more latent fashion, around the theme of affection for 
animals. The former is characterized by indifference and incredulity 
toward the notion of "loving" animals, while the latter involves in-
tense emotional attachments to animals. The relative popularity of 
these four attitudes in contemporary American society may suggest a 
dynamic basis for the conflict and misunderstanding often existing to-
day over issues involving people and animals. 
The scientistic and dominionistic attitudes, according to the 
results of Figure 1, are the least common perceptions of animals 
among the American public. The shape of the naturalistic frequency 
curve suggests that this attitude is strongly present among a minority 
of Americans, but relatively weakly evident among the majority. The 
ecologistic scale score distribution indicates a substantial number of 
respondents expressing modest support for this viewpoint, but very 
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Figure 1 
ATTITUDE DISTRIBUTION CURVES: ENTIRE POPULATION 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 4 
AGE GROUPS BY SELECTED KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDE SCALES 
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Figure 5 

















NAT ECO HUM MOR SCI UTI DOM NEG KNOW 
few strongly oriented in this fashion. Impressions on the percentage 
distribution of the attitudes in the American public, their most com-
mon behavioral expressions, and benefits or values generally associ-
ated with each attitude type are summarized in Table 1. 
The distribution of the attitudes among various demographic 
groups (e.g., age, sex, urban-rural residence and income) and animal 
activity groups (e.g., hunters, birders and organization members) was 
also examined. These attitude distributions are reviewed in terms of 
relative frequencies on a single attitude, and by comparisons of one or 
more groups across all the attitude types. The first type of analysis is 
presented in Tables I through V, while the second type is included in 
Figures 2-5. In order to expedite the discussion, only the naturalistic, 
humanistic, moralistic, utilitarian, dominionistic, and negativistic at-
titude results are described, although tabular results are provided for 
the other attitude types. 
THE NATURALISTIC ATTITUDE 
A comparison of na·;uralistic attitude scale means among various 
animal activity groups (Table I) reveals that nature "hunters" had the 
highest scores, along with environmental protection organization 
members (e.g., members of the Sierra Club, Wilderness Society) and 
birders. The naturalistic scores of nature hunters were far higher than 
those of meat or recreation hunters. Anti-hunters, livestock raisers, 
and fishermen had comparatively low scores on this attitude scale, 
although all animal activity groups had higher mean scores on the na-
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turalistic scale than did the general population. 
Among social demographic groups (Table II) Alaskans had the 
highest naturalistic scores. Other social groups with high naturalistic 
scale scores included the college-educated, the affluent, professionals, 
persons under 35, respondents from moderate-sized population areas, 
Pacific Coast residents, and those who rarely or never attended reli-
gious services. In contrast, the poorly educated, nonwhites, the elder-
ly, low income respondents, and persons of farm background scored 
substantially below the general population average on this dimension. 
The possibility that variable differences were a function of inter-
relationships among certain demographic factors prompted the use of 
a statistical procedure, analysis of variance. Basically, this test ex-
amined the combined effect of a number of demographic groups on the 
attitude scales. When the following factors were subjected to analysis 
of variance-age, sex, race, marital status, occupation, education, in-
come, region, population of present residence, and attendance at 
religious services-marital status, occupation and population of 
residence were not found to be significantly related to the naturalistic 
scale. 
Multiple classification analysis is a statistical technique based on 
analysis of variance which allows one to determine which categories of 
a variable contribute most to the overall significance of the var-
iable-e.g., which specific regional or educational groups are most re-
lated to the naturalistic scale after all other demographic variables 
have been taken into account. According to the results of this analysis, 
(Tables III and IV), the most naturalistic groups were graduate school 
and college education, Alaskan and Pacific Coast residents, respon-
dents under 35 years of age, and persons who rarely or never attended 
religious service. In contrast, the least naturalistic were blacks, re-
spondents with less than a high school education, and persons over 56 
years of age. 
THE HUMANISTIC ATTITUDE 
Among animal activity groups, humane and environmental pro-
tection organization members, zoo visitors, anti-hunters, and scien-
tific study hobbyists scored very high on the humanistic scale (Table 
I). In contrast, livestock producers, nature hunters, and surprisingly, 
birdwatchers had much lower scores. Apparently these latter groups, 
in light of their high scores on the naturalistic scale (with the exception 
of livestock producers), were far more oriented toward wildlife and out-
door recreation values than toward the benefits derived from love of 
animals, particularly pets. 
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Persons under 25 years of age, those earning between $20-35,000, 
females, respondents who rarely or never attended religious services, 
and Pacific Coast residents were the most humanistically-oriented 
demographic groups (Tables II-IV). In contrast, farmers, persons over 
. 76 years of age, residents of the most rural areas, and males had the 
lowest scores on this attitude dimension. Analysis of variance results 
suggested that size of town, education, marital status and race were 
not significantly related. 
THE MORALISTIC ATTITUDE 
Those demographic groups expressing the greatest moralistic con-
cern were Pacific Coast residents, the highly educated, those engaged 
in clerical occupations, females, persons who rarely or never attended 
religious services, and respondents under 35 years of age (Tables 
11-IV). Groups least troubled by animal welfare and cruelty issues 
were rural residents, farmers, respondents from Alaska and the South, 
and males. 
Animal activity groups scoring high on the moralistic scale (Table 
I) included humane and environmental protection organization mem-
bers and anti-hunters. Scientific study hobbyists also had high scores 
on this dimension. Recreation and meat hunters, sportsmen organiza-
tion members, trappers, fishermen, and livestock producers scored 
very low on this attitude scale. 
THE UTILITARIAN ATTITUDE 
Farmers, the elderly, blacks and Southern respondents had the 
highest scores on the utilitarian scale. In contrast, persons under 35 
years of age, those with graduate school education, Alaska respon-
dents, single persons and residents of areas of one million or more 
population indicated the least utilitarian interest in animals (Tables 
II, III and IV). Among animal activity groups, livestock producers, 
meat hunters and fishermen displayed an especially strong utilitarian 
orientation in contrast to members of humane, wildlife protection and 
environmental protection organizations, and, to a somewhat lesser 
degree, scientific study hobbyists, backpackers, and birdwatchers 
(Table I). 
THE DOMINIONISTIC ATTITUDE 
The most dominionistically-oriented animal activity groups were 
trappers and all three types of hunters. Humane organization mem-
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hers and anti-hunters had the lowest scores on this attitude scale, sug-
gesting that differences in dominionistic perception of animals 
represented a basic and important distinction in the perspectives of 
hunters and anti-hunters. Zoo visitors and environmental protection 
organization members also had comparatively low scores on this scale 
(Table I). 
Farmers, males, Alaska and Rocky Mountain residents, blacks 
and those with high incomes were the most dominionistically-oriented 
demographic groups. Females, Pacific Coast respondents, the highly 
educated, clerical workers, and persons rarely or never attending 
religious services scored lowest on this scale (Tables II, III and V). Dif-
ferences among the most affluent and educated on the dominionistic 
scale were in marked contrast to similarities between these higher 
socioeconomic groups on other attitude scales, and suggested that 
high income and advanced education do not necessarily result in the 
same perceptions of animals. 
THE NEGATIVISTIC ATTITUDE 
No animal activity group revealed marked disinterest or dislike of 
animals, as measured by the negativistic attitude scale (Table I) 
although livestock producers did score only slightly above the general 
population mean. Interestingly, anti-hunters had comparatively high 
scores on this dimension, suggesting that broad principles concerning 
the ethical treatment of animals were more salient considerations in 
opposition to hunting than general interest in animals. Environmental 
and wildlife protection organization members, scientific study hob-
byists, and birdwatchers were the least negativistic. Among demo-
graphic groups, the elderly, those of limited education and females had 
the highest negativistic scale scores. In contrast, persons with 
graduate school education, Alaska residents, respondents under 25 
years of age, and those residing in areas under 500 population were the 
least negativistic in their perception of animals (Tables II, III and V). 
Ecologistic and scientistic attitude scale differences are indicated in 
Tables I-V. 
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS 
Attitude profiles of selected demographic groups are provided as 
an illustration of comparative group variations across all of the at-
titude dimensions. Educational group differences (Figure 2), for exam-
ple, indicate that respondents of limited education had considerably 
lower scores than the highly educated on all the attitude dimensions 
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with the exception of the dominionistic, utilitarian and negativistic 
scales. These findings suggest a relative disinterest in and lack of af-
fection for animals among the least educated, with the possible excep-
tion of situations involving sporting satisfactions and material gain. 
Indeed, the dramatically evident differences among the education 
groups pointed to a fundamental divergence in the perceptions of ani-
mals and the natural world among various socioeconomic groups in 
our society. 
Regional differences (Figure 3) were also fairly large and some-
what surprising. One of the most striking results was the stronger 
wildlife interest, concern and appreciation of Alaska respondents. In 
general, the western states revealed greater wildlife appreciaton and 
knowledge while the South was characterized by the least interest and 
concern for animals and the most utilitarian orientation. 
Age and race profiles are presented in Figures 4 and 5. Differences 
between the very oldest and youngest respondents were especially 
striking on nearly every attitude dimension, particularly on the natu-
ralistic, humanistic and utilitarian scales. Those over 75 and 25 years 
of age were only similar in their relative lack of knowledge of animals. 
Race results suggested a comparative lack of interest in, and concern 
and affection for animals among nonwhites. 
KNOWLEDGE OF ANIMALS 
All animal activity groups scored significantly higher on the 
knowledge of animals scale than did the general public (Table 2). How-
ever, birdwatchers, nature hunters, scientific study hobbyists and all 
types of conservation-related organization members had significantly 
higher scores than did livestock producers, anti-hunters, zoo en-
thusiasts, sport and recreation hunters and fishermen. Among demo-
graphic groups (Tables 2 and 3), the most knowledgeable were persons 
with higher education (especially graduate training), Alaska and 
Rocky Mountain residents, males and respondents who rarely or never 
attended religious services. In contrast, the least informed about ani-
mals-even after accounting for the interrelationships of all demo-
graphic variables-were blacks, respondents with less than a high 
school education, persons over 75 and, interestingly, under 25 years of 
age, and residents of cities of one million or more population. 
The American public, as a whole, was characterized by extremely 
· limited knowledge of animals. For example, on four questions dealing 
with endangered species (Table 4), no more than one-third of there-
spondents obtained the correct answer-only 26 percent knew the 
manatee is not an insect and just 24 percent correctly answered the 
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statement, "timber wolves, bald eagles and coyotes are all endangered 
species of animals." Regarding other knowledge questions, just 13 per-
cent knew that raptors are not small rodents and one-half of the sam-
ple incorrectly answered the statement, "spiders have ten legs." A bet-
ter but still distressingly low 54 percent knew that veal does not come 
from lamb, and just 57 percent indicated the correct answer to the 
question, ''most insects have backbones.'' The knowledge questions 
were divided into a number of generic categories, and a comparison of 
mean scores revealed that the public was most knowledgeable on ques-
tions concerning animals implicated in human injury, pets, basic 
characteristics of animals (e.g., "all adult birds have feathers") and 
domestic animals in general. On the other hand, they were least knowl-
edgeable about invertebrates, "taxonomic" distinctions (e.g., "Koala 
bears are not really bears") and predators. The respective mean scores 
for these categories were: 
Animals That Inflict Human Injury 
Pets 
Basic Biological Characteristics 




Overall Mean for 33 Question Knowledge 
Scale with 0 to 100 Scoring Range 









The general public was also questioned on its perceived familiarity 
with or awareness of eight relatively prominent wildlife issues (Table 
5). The three most widely recognized issues were the killing of baby 
seals for their fur (43 percent knowledgeable), the effects of pesticides 
such as DDT on birds (42 percent knowledgeable), and the use of steel 
leghold traps to trap wild animals (38 percent knowledgeable). The 
least familiar issues included the use of steel versus lead shot by water-
fowl hunters (14 percent knowledgeable) and the Tennessee Valley 
Authority/Tellico Dam/Snail Darter controversy (17 percent knowl-
edgeable). The public appeared to be far more aware of relatively emo-
tional issues involving specific, attractive and typically large and 
"higher" animals, compared to issues of a more abstract nature, in-
volving indirect impacts on wildlife due to habitat loss, and dealing 
with "lower" animals. 
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SPECIES PREFERENCE 
The national sample was queried on its feelings about 33 species 
ranked on a seven point like/dislike scale (the most and least liked are 
indicated in Table 6). The most preferred were two common domestic 
animals-the dog and the horse-followed by two familiar and highly 
aesthetic bird species and one insect order-the robin, swan and but-
terfly. The trout-a popular and highly attractive game species-was 
the best-liked fish, and the most preferred wild predator was the eagle. 
The most favored wild mammalian species was the elephant. 
On the other hand, three of the four least-liked animals were 
biting, stinging invertebrates-the cockroach, mosquito and wasp. 
The third, fifth and sixth least preferred animals-the rat, rattlesnake 
and bat-have all been implicated in physical injury or disease in-
flicted on human beings. Relatively negative views of the coyote and 
wolf were interesting to note given the prevailing controversy over 
predator control programs in the United States and the considerable 
amount of favorable publicity received by the wolf in recent years. 
High standard deviation scores for the wolf, coyote, lizard, skunk, 
vulture, bat, shark, and cat suggested considerable variation in public 
opinion regarding the positive and negative qualities of these animals. 
A qualitative assessment of the most and least preferred animals, 
as well as a categorical mean grouping of the 33 animals according to 
particular qualities (e.g., attractive, unattractive, predator, etc.-see 
Table 6), suggested a number of particularly important factors in 
public preference for different species. These factors included: 
1. Size (usually, the larger the animal, the more preferred) 
2. Aesthetics 
3. Intelligence (not only capacity for reason but also for feeling 
and emotion) 
4. Dangerous to Humans 
5. Likelihood of Inflicting Property Damage 
6. Predatory Tendencies 
7. Phylogenetic Relatedness to Humans 
8. Cultural and Historical Relationship 
9. Relationship to Human Society: pet, domestic farm, game, 
pest, native wildlife, exotic wildlife 
10. Texture (generally, the more unfamiliar to humans, the less 
preferred) · 
11. Mode of Locomotion (generally, the more unfamiliar to hu-
mans, the less preferred) 
12. Economic Value of the Species 
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CRITICAL WILDLIFE ISSUES 
Public attitudes toward over thirty critical wildlife and natural 
habitat issues were explored. Insufficient space precludes a review of 
all these findings, and a detailed description can be found elsewhere 
(Kellert 1979a). Only a brief summary of results pertaining to the 
following issues will be provided here: endangered species, predator 
control, hunting, trapping, harvesting of selected marine mammals 
and wildlife habitat protection. 
Endangered Species 
Protection of endangered species was generally explored in the 
context of various socioeconomic impacts including energy develop-
ment, water use, forest utilization, and industrial development. The 
results graphically depicted in Table 7 concern the situation of costly 
modification of an energy development project in order to protect 
varying kinds of endangered species. While the public overwhelmingly 
accepted this sacrifice to protect species of eagle, mountain lion, trout, 
crocodile and butterfly, less than a majority were willing to tolerate 
this socioeconomic impact for the sake of plant, snake or spider spe-
cies. 
The results of Table 8 deal with a Tellico Dam-type question in-
volving the protection of a threatened, unknown fish species at the 
cost of forfeiting various needs derived from these water uses- hydro-
electric energy, increased drinking supplies and agricultural irriga-
tion-the public strongly disapproved of curtailing the water projects 
to protect the unknown fish species. On the other hand, in situations 
entailing relatively "nonessential" benefits-water for cooling in-
dustrial machinery and to make a lake for recreational purposes-less 
than a majority approved of the projects. 
The results in Table 9 cover two additional endangered species 
questions. The first concerns the preservation of large amounts of 
wilderness habitat to protect the grizzly bear at the expense of forest 
products and jobs. The results suggest a moderate, but significant 
public willingness to accept this economic sacrifice to protect the 
species. The second question concerns the filling of wetlands to build 
an industrial plant in an area of high unemployment. The endangered 
species is an unspecified bird species and, in line with the grizzly bear 
result, the public indicated a significant but moderate support for pro-
tection despite the socioeconomic impact. 
These results and related literature suggest eight factors critically 
related to the public's willingness to protect endangered wildlife 
(Ehrenfeld 1970; Guggisberg 1970; Ziswiler 1967). The first is 
aesthetics, which was probably relevant in results involving the but-
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terfly, snake and spider. The second is phylogenetic relatedness to 
humans. Generally speaking, the closer the biological relation of the 
endangered animal to human beings, the greater the likelihood of 
public support for the species. The third factor is the reason for en-
dangerment, with typically greater public sympathy in cases involving 
direct causes of endangerment (e.g., overexploitation or persecution) 
than in situations involving indirect impacts (e.g., habitat loss due to 
expanding human populations). The fourth factor is the economic 
value of the species being exploited. The fifth concerns the numbers 
and types of people affected by efforts to protect the endangered 
animal. The cultural and historical significance of the endangered 
species is the sixth factor, and may have been involved in public sym-
pathy for the bald eagle and trout. The seventh variable is the public's 
knowledge and familiarity with the endangered animal. Public support 
for the American crocodile may reflect this factor. Finally, the perceived 
humaneness of the activity threatening the species may be important. 
For example, the relatively slight opposition to water uses endanger-
ing an unknown fish species may have stemmed partially from 
assumptions regarding the capacities of fish to suffer or experience 
pain. 
The willingness to protect endangered wildlife varied considerably 
among diverse demographic groups. These variations are summarized 
in the results of an endangered species protection scale developed on 
the basis of the four previously described endangered species ques-
tions. As Table 10 indicates, significantly higher scores (i.e., a greater 
willingness to protect endangered species) were found among the 
highly educated, younger and single respondents, persons residing in 
areas of more than one million population, and residents of Alaska. In 
contrast, older respondents, persons with less than an eighth grade 
education, farmers, residents of highly rural areas and residents of the 
South had significantly lower endangered species protection scores. 
One of the most controversial issues facing the wildlife field today 
is predator control. Table 11 deals with the issue of controlling coyotes 
that prey on domestic livestock. Five control options were considered 
and the views of an informed and uninformed general public, as well as 
members of the American Sheep Producers and National Cattlemen's 
Associations were contrasted.* Options considered included the two 
most controversial control strategies: indiscriminate population reduc-
tions by shooting or trapping as many coyotes as possible, and poison-
*Results of the fifth option-compensating ranchers for livestock losses out of general 
tax revenues-is not presented. Both the general public and livestock producers were 
opposed to this alternative. 
194 S. Kellert 
ing. The public was moderately opposed to indiscriminate population 
reductions (with the informed public significantly more opposed) and 
overwhelmingly against the use of poisons (even though this alter-
native was described as the least expensive). In dramatic contrast, 
livestock producers were strongly in favor of both control strategies 
(indeed, these differences were, statistically, the largest found in the 
study). 
As indicated in Table 11, nearly 79 percent of the public supported 
the notion of hunting only individual coyotes known to have killed 
livestock. Additionally, more than two-thirds approved of capturing 
and relocating coyotes in areas away from livestock despite this being 
described as a very expensive solution. While livestock producers were 
strongly opposed to coyote relocation efforts, they were somewhat 
divided on the notion of hunting only individual coyotes responsible 
for livestock loss. 
In general, the predator control results indicated a strong public 
concern for the humaneness and specificity of the control method as in-
dicated by strong opposition to the use of poisons and support for con-
trolling only individual offender coyotes. 
An equally controversial issue is the public's attitude toward 
hunting. Attitudes toward six different kinds of hunting were ex-
plored. Table 12 indicates the public overwhelmingly approved of the 
two most pragmatically justified types of hunting-subsistence hun-
ting as practiced by traditional native Americans and hunting ex-
clusively for meat regardless of the identity of the hunter. On the other 
hand, approximately 60 percent opposed hunting solely for recrea-
tional or sporting purposes, whether for waterfowl or big game. 
Moreover, over 80 percent objected to the notion of hunting for a 
trophy. Perhaps most interestingly, 64 percent approved of hunting 
for recreational purposes if this also included using the meat. The im-
plication is that hunting is viewed as too serious an activity to be 
engaged in solely for its sporting or recreational value, but is accep-
table if the animal's meat is to be consumed. 
Over 70 percent of the public objected to the use of the steel 
leghold trap. No difference was found between knowledgeable and un-
informed people. On the other hand, nearly all trappers saw nothing 
wrong with the use of these traps (Table 13). 
Somewhat unexpectedly, 77 percent of the general public approved of 
killing whales for a useful product so long as the species was not en-
dangered. A very different perception of the dolphin was indicated 
with nearly 70 percent willing to pay a higher price for tuna if this 
resulted in fishermen killing fewer porpoises in their nets. The dispari-
ty between these two marine mammal findings may have been related 
to the colorful and romantic history of whaling in America, as opposed 
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to the absence of any tradition in this country of harvesting porpoises. 
On a variety of wildlife habitat protection questions, the public in-
dicated a moderate but significant willingness to protect wildlife 
habitat even at the expense of various human benefits. The results of 
four habitat protection questions are indicated in Table 14. In each 
situation, a trade-off was proposed, placing the protection of wildlife 
habitat in the context of various socioeconomic costs. In order to main-
tain waterfowl habitat, the filling of wetlands for housing development 
is sacrificed; to protect rangeland from overgrazing, higher beef prices 
result. The wilderness, housing development, and livestock grazing 
findings were remarkably similar-a moderate but significant majori-
ty of the public was willing to protect wildlife habitat even at the ex-
pense of the stated human benefits. Seventy-six percent favored the 
harvesting of timber in ways which helped wildlife even if this resulted 
in increased lumber prices. 
CONCLUSION 
A variety of results have been presented suggesting considerable 
public interest in and affection for animals and a willingness to sup-
port wildlife conservation in this country. On the other hand, a great 
deal of variation and conflict was found in the attitudes, perceptions 
and knowledge of animals among diverse groups in American society. 
While a bedrock of affection and concern was found, it appears that 
much needs to happen before this appreciative orientation is usefully 
broadened to encompass a more biologically knowledgeable and ethi-
cally sensitive feeling for animals. Those responsible for animal 
welfare and natural environments should recognize this public sym-
pathy and interest in animals and devote increasing efforts to address-
ing the needs for greater awareness and understanding. The challenges 
are great for wildlife professionals, humane educators, natural re-
source managers, and others responsible for the future well-being of 
the nonhuman world. Until these human factors are more properly un-
derstood, however, it is doubtful that the continued erosion of land re-
sources and destruction of fauna will be arrested. 
Table 1. Attitude Occurrence in American Society 





Naturalistic 10 Outdoor wildlife related recreation - Backcountry 
use, nature birding and nature hunting 
Ecologistic 7 Conservation support, activism and membership, 
ecological study 
Humanistic 35 Pets, wildlife tourism, casual zoo visitation 
Moralistic 20 Animal welfare support/membership, kindness 
to animals 
Scientistic 1 Scientific study/hobbies, collecting 
Aesthetic 15 Nature appreciation, art, wildlife tourism 
Uti I itarian 20 Consumption of furs, raising meat, bounties, 
meat hunting 
Dominionistic 3 Animal spectator sports, trophy hunting 
Negativistic 2 Cruelty, overt fear behavior 
Neutralistic 35 Avoidance of animal behavior 











Little or negative 





"' r;: ... .... 
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Table 2. Animal Knowledge Scale by Selected Groups: 1978 National Sample Maximum 
Score= 100 
Animal Activity Groups Selected Demographic Groups 
Group Score Group Score 
Birdwatchers 68.3 Ph.D. 67.7 
Wildlf. Protect. Org. Memb. 65.6 Non-Ph.D. Graduate 61.6 
Nature Hunters 65.3 Alaska 60.6 
Scientific Study 65.0 Law or Medical Degree 60.4 
Env. Protect. Org. Member 64.4 College Complete 56.8 
Humane Org. Memb. 62.8 Rocky Mountain Region 56.8 
Sportsmen Org. Memb. 62.7 $50,000-99,999 I neG> me 56.7 
Gen. Conserv. Org.Memb. 62.5 Professional 56.6 
Backpackers 57.5 Some College 56.3 
Meat Hunters 57.4 25,000-49,999 Pop. 55.7 
Fishermen 56.4 Childhqod 
Sport/Rec. Hunters 56.3 General Population 52.9 
Zoo Visitors 54.8 <$5,000 Income 49.3 
Livestock Raisers 53.9 Widowed 49.1 
Anti-Hunters 53.9 6th-8th Grade Education 47.8 
General Population 52.9 Black 46.1 
75 + Years Old 46.0 
<6th Grade Education 44.4 
1978 Mail Sample 
Natl. Trappers 66.0 
Cattlement 63.5 
Sheep Producers 61.8 
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Table 3. Animal Knowledge Scale Analysis of Variance and Multiple Classification 
Analysis Results Against Selected Demographic Variables 
Analysis of Variance 
Age 









Multiple Classification Analysis: 
Largest Positive and Negative Deviations After 
Adjusting for Independent and Covariant Variables 
Graduate Education 
Alaska 
Rocky Mountain States 
College Education 
Male 
Rarely/Never Attend Religious Services 
1 Million+ Population 
18-25 Years Old 
76 + Years Old 
9th-11th Grade Education 




























Table 4. Knowledge of Endangered Species 
%Correct 
Question or Statement Answer 
The passenger pigeon and the Carolina 
parakeet are now extinct. 26.2 
Pesticides were a major factor in the 
decline of brown pelicans. 33.3 
The manatee is an insect. 25.6 
Timber wolves, bald eagles, and 
coyotes are all endangered species of 
animals. 25.6 
Table 5. Awareness of Selected Wildlife Issuest 
Issue % Knowledgeable 
Killing baby seals for their fur 
Effects of pesticides such as 
DDT on birds 
Using steel leghold traps to 
trap wild animals 
Endangered Species Act 
Killing of livestock by coyotes 
Tuna-porpoise controversy 
Tennessee Valley Authority 
Tellico Dam/snail darter issue 
Use of steel shot versus lead 

























tThe 'knowledgeable' category combines the groups of very and moderately knowledgeable; the 'not knowledgeable' 
category combines the groups of very little and no knowledge. The 'slightly knowledgeable' category results are 
nrnitta.-1 in thi" r-nrnn!lric;nn 
Table 6. Animal Preference Means 
Most Liked Animals Least Liked Animals 
Animal X Valuet Animal X Valuet 
Dog 1.70 Cockroach 6.45 
Horse 1.79 Mosquito 6.27 
Swan 1.97 Rat 6.26 
Robin 1.99 Wasp 5.68 
Butterfly 2.04 Rattlesnake 5.66 
Trout 2.12 Bat 5.35 
Salmon 2.26 Vulture 4.91 
Eagle 2.29 Shark 4.82 
Elephant 2.63 Skunk 4.42 
Turtle 2.69 Lizard 4.13 
Cat 2.74 Crow 4.06 
Ladybug 2.78 Coyote 4.02 
Raccoon 2.80 Wolf 3.98 
tLower score indicates greater preference 
Species Preference Mean/Scores 
For Selected Animal Categories 
Animal Mean Scoret 
Domestic animals 2.08 
Attractive animals 2.38 
Game animals 2.59 
Birds 2.98 
Mammals 3.40 
Amphibians, reptiles, fish 3.55 
Predators 3.91 
Animals known to cause 
human property damage 4.02 
Invertebrates 4.64 
Animals known to inflict 
human injury 5.08 
Unattractive animals 5.46 







"' ..., .... 
Table 7. Public Attitudes Regarding Changing of an Energy Project to Protect Endangered Species Types 
Question: A recent law passed to protect endangered species may result in changing some energy development projects 
at greater cost. As a result, it has been suggested that endangered species protection be limited only to certain 
animals and plants. Which of the following endangered species would you favor protecting, even if it resulted in 
higher costs for an energy development project? 
% Favor %Oppose 
No %Favor 
Species # Polled Strong Moderate Slight Slight Moderate Strong Opinion Overall 
Butterfly (Silverspot) 2452 9.5 29.2 25.0 9.3 15.1 3.7 8.2 64 
Mountain Lion 2453 16.7 35.9 20.6 6.6 11.9 2.8 5.6 73 
Fish (Agassiz Trout) 2450 11.9 36.7 22.4 7.2 10.7 2.6 8.2 71 
Spider (Kauai Wolf) 2452 4.7 11.9 17.4 13.8 28.9 14.0 9.2 34 
American Crocodile 2452 13.2 35.0 21.5 7.3 13.5 4.2 5.2 70 
Furbish Lousewort 2451 5.7 20.8 21.1 10.8 17.8 5.2 18.4 48 
Eastern Indigo Snake 2452 6.0 19.2 18.2 10.7 25.3 12.4 8.0 43 






Table 8. Public Attitudes in Regard to Various Water Uses If Such Use Would Endanger a Fish Species N 
~ 
Statement: Various kinds of fish have been threatened with extinction because of dams, canals and other water projects. 
Please indicate if you would approve of the following water uses if they were to endanger a species of fish. 
%Approve % Disapprove 
Water Use # Polled Strong Moderate Slight Slight Moderate Strong 
A. Cool industrial 2316 3.1 21.7 23.2 17.1 22.1 7.1 
machineryt (48)+ (46) 
B. Provide hydroelectric 2336 7.7 38.2 25.7 10.2 10.1 3.3 
power (72) (24) 
C. Increase human 2391 18.6 51.6 16.5 4.9 4.2 1.6 
drinking supplies (87) (11) 
D. Dammed for 2374 3.6 17.6 18.1 15.5 28.6 13.3 
recreational use (39) (57) 
E. Diverted for agricultural 2384 12.7 47.1 23.4 6.8 5.2 1.9 
irrigation (83) (14) 
tDifference between approve and disapprove on this is not significant {Z = 0.75. P = 0.45) rn 
Differences on B- E are highly s1gnif1cant (P 0.0001) ~ 
"' +Numbers m parentheses () are totals approvmg or d1sapprovmg ;= ... .... 
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Table 9. General Public Attitudes toward Protection of Forest Land and Wetlands for 
Endangered Species 
Question 
It has been suggested that 5 million acres 
of national forest land be set aside so that 
the endangered grizzly bear remain un-
disturbed. The timber industry objects, 
saying that jobs and needed lumber will 
be lost. Would you agree to protect the 
endangered grizzly bear even if it 
resulted in the loss of some jobs and 
building material? 
A large coastal city has an unemployment 
problem. A major manufacturer want to 
build a new plant on a marsh it owns 
which could employ 1,000 people, but 
conservationists claim this will destroy 
land needed by a rare bird. Do you agree 
that this plant should be built, even if it 













Table 10. Endangered Species Scale (Mean Scores) by Selected Demographic Groups: 
1978 National Samplet 
Demographic Groups (High) 
Students (Largely College) 
Non-Ph.D. Graduate 
18- 25 Years Old 
Single 




56-65 Years Old 
Southern Region 
Less than 500 Population 
Farming 
6th - 8th Grade Education 
75 + Years Old 
tAll differences between high and low groups and between these 














Table 11. General Public and Livestock Producer Attitudes Toward Different Methods of Coyote Control 
Question 1. Shoot or trap as many coyotes as possible. 
Question 2. ~oisoning, because it is the least expensive solution even though other animals may be killed. 
Question 3. Whenever possible, hunt only individual coyotes known to have killed livestock. 
Question 4. Capture and relocate coyotes away from sheep even though this is a very expensive solution. 
%Approved+ 
Group II Polled Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 
General Public 
Informed 548 38:t: 8 71 67 
Uninformed 1833 44:t: 10 77 69 
Sheep Producers 134 96 75 43 17 
Cattlemen 124 94 70 52 10 
All Groups, (x)2 778.12 964.64 195.95 650.55 
(x)2 P Value .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 
tIn all cases, % disapproved can be obtained by subtracting from 100. 
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Table 12. Attitudes toward Hunting ~ 
'tl 
"' Question: Of the following reasons for hunting, which do you approve of or oppose? t:l 
~ 
%Approve % Disapprove 
Reason II Polled Strong Moderate Slight Slight Moderate Strong 
Traditional native hunting 2379 16.2 47.5 18.4 5.9 6.8 2.1 
(e.g. by Eskimos and Indians) (82)* (15) 
Hunting game mammals for 2417 4.4 18.6 13.6 10.9 27.3 23.6 
recreation and sport (37) (62) 
Hunting waterfowl for 2425 4.6 19.1 15.8 11.9 25.9 21.4 
recreation and sportt (40) (59) 
Hunting for meat 2429 22.1 46.5 16.6 5.5 5.1 3.1 
(85) (14) 
Hunting for recreation 2417 9.2 31.7 23.3 11.7 13.9 8.5 
and meat!: (64) (34) 
Hunting for a trophy 2412 2.0 7.8 8.4 9.4 26.7 44.1 
(18) (80) 
• Number in parentheses ( ) is total of approve or disapprove. 
t Difference between approve and disapprove, Z ~ 9.81, P .0001 N 
0 
:t: Difference between approve and disapprove, Z ~ 15.07, P .0001 C1 
Table 13. Attitudes of General Public and Trappers Toward the Use of Steel Traps 
Statement: I see nothing wrong with using steel traps to capture wild animals. 
%Agree 
Groupt # Polled Strong Moderate Slight 
Informed Public 929 3.9 11.6 4.9 
(20)t 
Uninformed Public 841 I 1.2 10.4 7.5 
(19) 
Trappers 171 I 81.9 12.9 1.2 
(96) 
t The x2 value is 676.98 (P .001) for the differences between the general public and the trappers. 



















Table 14. Public Attitudes Toward Wildlife Habitat Protection 
% % 
Question Agree Disagree Z Values 
Natural resources must be developed 44 51 3.28 
even if the loss of wilderness results (P = 0.001) 
in much smaller wildlife populations. 
I approve of building on marshes 39 57 8.94 
that ducks and other nonendangered (P::::: 0.0001) 
wildlife use if the marshes are 
needed for housing development. 
Cutting trees for lumber and paper 76 20 28.22 
should be done in ways that help (P::::0.0001) 
wildlife even if this results in higher 
timber prices. 
Cattle and sheep grazing should be 60 34 13.02 
limited on publicly owned lands if it (P:=0.0001) 
destroys plants needed by wildlife, 
even though this may result in 
higher meat costs. 
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TABLE I Scale Mean Scores by Selected Animal Activity Groups: 
1978 National Sample 
NAT ECO HUM MOR SCI UTI DOM NEG 
Max. Poss. Score t 16 11 11 20 13 27 18 17 
General Population 3.1 3.1 4.0 5.5 0.9 5.3 2.0 4.4 
Anti-Hunters 3.4 3.2 4.6 7.9 1.0 4.4 1.2 4.1 
Backpackers 5.4 4.5 4.4 7.0 1.6 3.7 2.3 2.7 
Birdwatchers 6.3 5.4 3.7 5.5 2.0 3.7 2.6 2.6 
Env. Protect. Org. Memb. 6.5 7.7 4.8 9.6 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.5 
Fishermen 4.0 3.6 4.1 4.4 1.0 5.4 3.0 3.6 
Gen. Conserv. Org. Memb. 4.6 4.5 4.1 6.3 1.6 4.0 2.2 3.1 
Humane Org. Memb. 5.6 5.1 6.1 9.5 1.8 3.0 0.9 2.7 
Meat Hunters 4.1 3.9 4.0 4.2 1.0 5.6 3.3 3.2 
Livestock Raisers 3.2 3.2 3.2 4.5 1.0 7.3 2.7 4.5 
Nature Hunters 8.5 5.7 3.9 4.8 1.5 3.8 3.8 2.9 
Scientific Study 5.7 5.3 4.5 8.0 2.7 3.3 1.8 2.2 
Sport-Rec. Hunters 3.8 3.8 3.8 2.9 1.2 5.4 4.1 3.4 
Sportsmen Org. Memb. 5.7 5.4 3.8 4.3 1.4 4.8 4.1 2.7 
Wildlf. Protect. Org. Memb. 5.8 6.3 4.4 7.7 2.2 2.9 1.7 2.7 
Zoo Visitors 4.4 3.6 4.8 7.1 1.2 4.0 1.5 3.4 
1978 Mail Sample 
Cattlemen 3.9 5.2 3.2 1.3 0.9 13.1 5.1 3.8 
Natl. Trappers 9.6 7.3 4.0 2.8 1.8 3.4 8.5 2.1 
Sheep Producers 3.7 4.5 3.3 2.0 1.08 12.8 4.7 3.9 
t The score maxima for each attitude varies because there was a different number of questions for each attitude with different scoring. 
For example, there were eight questions for the Naturalistic attitude with a score of either 2 or 0 for three questions and scores of 2,1 or 0 
for the other five. The number of questions for the other attitudes are (in the order listed in the table) 4, 5, 10, 6, 13, 8 and 8, respectively. 
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TABLE II Demographic Groups (selected) and Mean Scores for 
Different Attitudes. 
NAT ECO HUM MOR SCI UTI DOM NEG 
Max. Pass. Score 16 11 11 20 13 27 18 17 
General Population 3.1 3.1 4.0 5.5 0.9 5.3 2.0 4.4 
Regions 
Alaska 4.6 4.4 3.7 4.5 1.3 4.1 2.4 2.4 
North Central 
North East 
Pacific 3.6 3.6 4.4 7.5 1.5 
Rocky Mountain 2.3 
Southern 3.6 4.5 6.4 2.3 
General Groups 
Male 3.4 3.4 3.6 4.7 2.6 
Female 4.3 6.0 1.5 
Black 2.1 2.4 3.7 6.4 2.5 5.6 
White 
Married 
Single 3.6 4.3 6.1 1.3 4.1 
Never Religious Service 3.9 3.7 4.3 6.7 1.2 4.1 
1/Week Religious Service 2.8 3.5 5.9 
Education 
<6th Grade 1.3 2.3 2.4 3.6 0.4 6.9 2.6 6.4 
6th-8th Grade 2.1 2.6 3.4 4.7 0.6 7.1 2.4 5.8 
9th-12th Grade 2.4 2.5 0.6 6.1 5.1 
Student 4.0 3.6 4.4 6.7 1.6 3.9 1.7 3.3 
Non-PhD. Graduate 4.5 4.5 6.8 1.7 4.2 3.0 
PhD. 5.3 4.6 7.3 1.9 3.7 1.5 2.3 
Employment 
Unemployed 2.4 2.7 
Retired 2.5 3.7 6.3 1.8 5.3 
Vocational 2.7 2.7 3.7 6.4 5.3 
Professional 3.7 3.6 6.2 1.2 4.6 1.7 
Unskilled 2.8 4.6 2.5 
Blue Collar 2.7 2.8 
Service 2.6 2.8 
Farming 2.4 2.7 3.1 3.7 8.5 2.7 5.3 
Age 
18-25 Years Old 3.4 4.8 6.2 1.2 4.1 3.5 
26-35 Years Old 3.4 6.1 1.2 4.2 1.8 
56-65 Years Old 2.8 3.7 0.6 6.4 
66-75 Years Old 2.5 2.6 3.4 4.7 0.6 7.0 5.3 
75 + Years Old 2.2 2.6 3.2 0.4 7.1 6.0 
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TABLE II (Continued) 
NAT ECO HUM MOR SCI UTI DOM NEG 
Income 
<$5,000 2.6 2.7 3.7 0.7 6.1 2.3 5.4 
$15,000-14,999 3.4 6.0 4.6 
$25,000-34,999 3.6 3.5 4.5 
$50,000-99,999 3.7 4.7 2.6 3.5 
Population - Childhood 
Community 
<500 2.8 3.4 4.0 0.7 6.4 2.4 
25,000-49,999 3.5 3.4 6.7 4.6 1.7 
250,000-999,999 3.4 3.4 4.3 6.0 1.2 
1 Million+ 6.4 4.6 1.8 
Population - Present 
Community 
<500 3.2 3.3 6.3 2.5 
25,000-49,999 3.6 3.4 4.4 6.1 1.2 4.7 
250,000-999,999 4.3 1.8 
1 Million+ 6.3 
• Mean Scores are the same (i.e. do not differ significantly} as those reported for the General Population. 
TABLE Ill - Analysis of Variance of Selected Demographic Variables 
by Attitude Scales* 
Variable F Values 
NAT ECO HUM MOR SCI UTI DOM NEG 
Age 9.64t 2.53t 11.31 t 3.35t 15.69t 24.95t 0.99 15.91 t 
Population of Present Residence 1.08 0.56 0.74 2.47t 0.91 1.70 1.68 2.41t 
Region 5.03t 3.42t 4.o6t 12.5ot 0.56 10.01 t 6.98t 6.41t 
Education 12.03t 18.37t 0.56 4.82t 20.03t 4.49t 2.71t 13.23t 
Occupation 0.73 1.72 1.79 1.84 0.57 3.28t 1.88 0.61 
Religiosity 4.97t 4.41 t 5.34t 6.38t 1.06 5.o9t 3.62t 2.46t 
Income 3.69t 1.33 5.56t 1.59 0.34 3.92t 0.84 5.41 t 
Marital Status 0.69 0.32 0.63 1.81 6.12t 5.55t 0.27 1.73 
Race 15.13t 11.45t 2.39 0.94 0.60 11.54t 6.1ot 23.04t 
Sex 23.16t 26.90t 63.12t 63.18t 1.52 20.76t 183.93t 128.91t 
• Only main effect F values and significance levels are indicated. Two analysis of variance tests were performed. The first included as 
main effects: age, population of present residence, region, education, occupation; and, as covariates: attendance at religious services 
(religiosity), income, marital status, race and sex. The second run included as main effects: religiosity, income, marital status, race and 
sex; and, as covariates: age, population of present residence and education. Occupation and region could not be included as 
covariates in the second analysis due to their nonlinear character. 
t F value has significance of less than 0.01 
:t: F value has significance of less than 0.05 
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TABLE IV Multiple Classification Analysis of Selected Demographic 
Variables for the Naturalistic, Ecologistic, Humanistic and 
Moralistic scales. 
(See Table Ill for note on performance of the analysis.) 
Naturalistic (Max Score = 16) Ecologistic (Max Score = 11) 
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Group Deviationt Group Deviationt 
Graduate Education 1.13 Graduate Education 1.28 
Alaska 0.85 Alaska 0.94 
18-25 Years Old 0.52 Prof./Manag. Occ. 0.31 
26-35 Years Old 0.36 Rarely/Never 
College Education 0.36 Attend Religious Service 0.27 
Pacific Coast 0.31 Male 0.27 
Rarely/Never attend 500-1.999 Pop. 0.24 
Religious Services 0.31 56-75 Years Old -0.29 
Clerical Occupation -0.44 Unskilled Blue Collar -0.32 
76 + Years Old -0.49 Less than 8th Grade 
56-75 Years Old -0.54 Education -0.35 
9-11 th Grade Education -0.54 9-11th Grade Education -0.58 
Less than 8th Grade Black -0.62 
education -0.61 
Black -0.87 
Humanistic (Max Score = 11) Moralistic (Max Poss. Score = 20) 
Group Deviationt Group Deviationt 
18-25 Years Old 0.71 Pacific Coast 1.59 
$20,000-34,999 Income 0.36 Clerical Workers 1.37 
Female 0.33 Graduate Education 1.32 
Rarely/Never Female 0.64 
Attend Religious Service 0.31 Rarely/Never 
Pacific Coast 0.27 Attend Religious Service 0.61 
Less than 500 Pop. -0.42 South 26-34 Years Old 0.49 
Male -0.45 18-25 Years Old 0.44 
Alaska -0.58 -0.80 
76+ Years Old -0.67 500-1,999 Pop. -0.83 
Farmers -0.90 Male -0.86 
Less than 500 Pop. -1.50 Farmers -0.94 
Alaska -1.38 
tAll deviations listed above are significant. The positive deviations indicate greater than average prevalence of the attitude, and 
negative deviations lower than average prevalence of the attitude. 
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TABLE V Multiple Classification Analysis of Selected Demographic 
Variables for the Scientistic, Utilitarian, Dominionistic, and 
Negativistic Scales. 
(See Table Ill for a note on performance of the analysis.) 
Scientistic (Max. Poss. Score = 13) Dominionistic (Max. Poss. Score= 18) 
Group Deviationt Group Deviation t 
Graduate Education 0.83 Male 0.68 
18-25 Years Old 0.30 Farmers 0.66 
26-35 Years Old 0.28 Alaska 0.43 
Single 0.22 Rocky Mt. States 0.37 
College Education 0.17 $35,000+ Income 0.23 
Alaska 0.10 Rarely/Never attend 
High School/Vocat. Rei igious Services -0.21 
Education -0.19 Clerical Workers -0.36 
Less than 8th Grade Graduate Education -0.45 
Education -0.21 Female -0.51 
9th-11th Grade Education -0.22 Pacific Coast -0.55 
56-75 Years Old -0.30 
76 + Years Old -0.38 
Utilitarian (Max. Poss. Score = 27) Negativistic (Max. Poss. Score = 17) 
Group Deviationt Group Deviationt 
Farmers 2.11 Black 1.08 
76 + Years Old 1.43 Less than 8th Grade 
56-75 Years Old 1.15 Education 0.95 
Black 1.13 76 + Years Old 0.74 
South 0.88 Female 0.51 
1 Million+ Pop. -0.45 56·75 Years Old 0.50 
Single -0.61 Less than 500 Pop. -0.59 
Alaska -0.70 Male -0.68 
Graduate Education -0.85 18-25 Years Old -0.69 
26-36 Years Old -0.88 Graduate Education -0.99 
18-25 Years Old -1.14 Alaska -1.16 
t All deviations listed above are Slgnlilcant. The pos1l1ve dev1at1ons md1cate greater than average prevalence of the ilttltude, and 
negative dev1at1ons lower than average prevalence of the attitude 
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ANIMAL BOREDOM: IS A SCIENTIFIC 
STUDY OF THE SUBJECTIVE 
EXPERIENCES OF ANIMALS POSSIBLE? 
Francoise W emeisfelder 
Instituut voor Theoretische Biologie 
Groenhovenstraat 5, 2311 BT Leiden 
Holland 
INTRODUCTION 
The study of animal well-being has now become an accepted field 
of scientific research. Until recently the dominant belief was that sub-
jective experience was inaccessible to the natural sciences, since it 
could not be experimentally manipulated. It led so-called behaviour-
ists to the denial of any sort of subjective life to animals. This scien-
tific conception of animals is far removed from daily reality, in which 
people regard and treat animals as sentient beings. Second, the way we 
as human beings exploit animals for our own sake and profit has caused 
protest from several groups of people who consider these practices ir-
responsible and uncaring. Pigs, calves and chickens are "produced" in 
great quantity in small housing systems for meat consumption; rats 
and other species are extensively used in experimental laboratories, 
and all kinds of wild species are kept and bred in zoos. The will to im-
prove the conditions in which these animals live has led to the develop-
ment of ,a new field of scientific research: the science of animal welfare. 
Marian Dawkins' book Animal Suffering (1980) gives an overview 
of current theories and problems, and it becomes apparent how diffi-
cult it is to find parameters for well-being which are truly adequate, 
insofar that we can be sure that certain parameters are directly repre-
116 F. Wemelsfelder 
sentative of the limits within which animal well-being can exist. 
Another, closely related field which has recently started to attract 
attention is the study of animal awareness or intelligence. D.R. Grif-
fin's The Question of Animal Awareness (1981a) is the first book dealing 
extensively with the subject. Here too, it becomes clear how hard it is 
to relate criteria such as communicative ability, or adaptive behaviour 
to the existence of real understanding and awareness within the ani-
mal. What is the final discriminative evidence to distinguish "hard-
wired" behaviour from intelligent behaviour, or an "instinctive" reac-
tion from a really "felt" reaction? The question whether it is possible 
to study animal well-being scientifically therefore largely comes down 
to the question how we can bridge the "communication gap" between 
man and animal, or how we can become sure that what are usually con-
sidered to be indirect parameters are in fact direct. 
This question has intrigued me for several years. In discussions 
with colleagues about the justifiability of vivisection, the argument 
whether or not animals can feel and suffer played a large role. The fact 
that something which seemed so obviously true to me was not ac-
cepted within a scientific framework and might even be inassessable 
that way puzzled me. I started to study literature on the phenomenon 
of pain in animals, since pain is biologically functional, and often overt-
ly expressed; yet it also implies a purely subjective experience within 
the animal. It seemed to me that pain is a form of subjective feeling 
which (nevertheless) might be accessible to biological research. I ex-
plored this in an ethological research project on pain in piglets after 
castration without anaesthesia (Wemelsfelder 1982). It appeared that 
behavioural criteria rather than physiological ones are adequate to 
study pain, since behaviour represents the self-expression of the ani-
mal as an intrinsic whole, including any subjective experience it has. 
Physiological criteria seem to be more indirectly linked to subjective 
experience. 
However, current scientific methodology regards the reduction of 
phenomena to lower hierarchical levels as fundamentally desirable, 
and further there is the great danger of anthropomorphic interpreta-
tion of behaviour. Because of these reasons many scientists prefer 
physiological criteria on principle. 
In fact, the importance which is attributed to different parameters 
or criteria seems to depend on the concept of scientific objectivity 
itself. Science is not the experience of reality as such; it constructs a 
representation of reality, and therefore the decision which representa-
tions of reality are valid and which are not so valid depends on the 
choice of a meta-scientific framework. 
The aim of this paper is to explore the relationship between dif-
ferent meta-scientific frameworks and the science of animal welfare. 
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During the past few years, I have become more and more convinced 
that the great difficulty science has in studying subjective experience 
in its objects, might be related to the denial of any role to subjective 
experience in the observer as an interpretational guide. Can a quality 
in the world around us be observed, when this same quality is deliber-
ately excluded from the process of observing? 
As a practical example for the discussion described above, the 
phenomenon of animal boredom has been chosen. Boredom implies 
some sort of awareness, some form of a direct inner experience of self-
hood. Because without a sense of selfhood related to the developmen-
tal potential of the animal, it would be impossible to "miss" certain 
things, to be bored. With the phenomenon of boredom one can illus-
trate the qualitative difference between behavioural and physiological 
deviations, but is still bored, since it misses the opportunity to per-
form its specific behaviour. How important behaviour is for an animal 
is a crucial question in theories on adaptation and stress, and as we 
shall see, on the existence of animal boredom as well. 
Besides the fact that boredom is, theoretically speaking, an ap-
propriate topic for a discussion about the possibility of studying 
animal welfare scientifically, it is also said to be a major problem for 
animals in intensive production systems (or bio-industry) and zoos, 
and in many cases in laboratories as well (van Putten 1982b; Markow-
itz 1982; Fox 1974). However, many people, farmers and scientists 
alike, share the view that when animals "are well fed, well watered and 
the temperature is very comfortable, I do not know what else you 
could do" (Kirkeide, Secretary of the North Dakota Beef Cattle Im-
provement Association, in the Grand Forks Herald, Nov. 28, 1982). It 
seems to be in the interest of the animals, therefore, to discuss whether 
boredom is a real problem which should be taken seriously, and how we 
might study and alleviate it if it is a problem and not some erroneous 
anthropomorphic inference. 
Within the framework of the discussion mentioned above the fol-
lowing questions are central in this paper: 
1. Can animals be bored, and what are important criteria in the 
study of boredom? 
2. Is there evidence of boredom in intensive animal husbandry? 
"OBJECTIVE" SCIENCE AND THE STUDY OF 
ANIMAL WELFARE 
It has often been said that the study of the subjective is unscien-
tific: inner, personal experiences are private and not accessible to 
methodological observation. In the science of psychology, verbal com-
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munication between observer and observed bridges most of the gap. In 
studying animals, however, this way of having access to their inner ex-
perience is closed. This dualistic view can be traced back to Descartes' 
well-known statement that "not only do animals have less reason than 
humans, they have none at all" (Gilson 1976). The idea that animals 
are mere material automata, not possessing any of the human "non-
material" qualities, has since become quite influential. Yet it is not a 
logical and necessary conclusion. 
To conclude that animals have no inner experience since it is not 
observable using the scientific method is only justifiable within the 
framework of the method used for observation. But it is not right to 
exclude the possibility a priori that the subjective world of animals 
could be observed-and studied with other methods. What is presently 
accepted as "the scientific method" is not the only absolute guarantee 
for "objectivity," meaning complete knowledge of an object. Scientific 
ideas must ultimately be compatible with "common sense," or the 
common experience of humanity as a whole; with "those presump-
tions, which, in spite of criticism, we still employ for the regulation of 
our lives" (Whitehead, cited by Griffin 1977). The natural sciences, ex-
cluding inner experience (of animals, and humans as well since behavior-
ism) from their range of vision, are not compatible with human "com-
mon experience." Therefore it might be justifiable to say that current 
science represents a choice for a certain kind of relationship with the 
world; a relationship characterized by duality and total detachment be-
tween observer and observed, subject and object. 
As a consequence of this duality, life has been reduced to material 
mechanisms; the natural sciences have become reductionistic in princi-
ple, with the science of Newtonian (mechanistic) physics at the basis of 
other, "derived" fields of study (Verhoog 1983). 
It is possible, however, to think of a concept of "science" in which 
the methodological criteria for objectivity are maintained, but in 
which the ontological starting point is different from the current one. 
Tranoy (1977) makes this distinction between the two sorts of objec-
tivity, and argues that ontological objectivity, implying a separation 
between object and subject, is "not universally acceptable ... , not even 
reasonably uncontroversial." Furthermore, it has the serious limita-
tion of excluding objects that are related to "subject-consciousness," 
like intentions, norms, feelings, etc. On the other hand, he says 
methodological objectivity is far more essential for any concept of 
knowledge. This implies conditions like intersubjectivity and consen-
sus, sincere interest in an object, the absence of arbitrariness, etc. 
And, as has been said above, a concept of science which is consistent in 
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this methodological sense, but is based on a non-dualistic ontological 
starting point (with emphasis on interconnectedness and interdepen-
dence) is very well possible. 
The field of animal welfare is pre-eminently one in which different 
interests are likely to underly the different opinions on the matter. Be-
tween economic interests and the interests of the animal, scientific re-
search is supposed to take a neutral position. The role of different 
scientific concepts in present controversies will now be examined. 
Within the study of animal welfare, the subjective experience of 
the animals of course plays a crucial role. Welfare is in essence a sub-
jective concept, and in order to study welfare, we should study the sub-
jective world of an animal. Almost all natural scientists, however, 
agree that it is not possible to do experiments to demonstrate (prove) 
the existence of animal awareness and feeling. Analogy with humans 
or introspection are considered to be necessary to bridge the gap be-
tween outward behaviour and inner feeling, and many researchers are 
reluctant to do so through fear of anthropomorphism. One even says 
that "this idle speculation is a burdensome appendage to the real 
scientific work of observing and accounting for lawfulness in animal 
behaviour" (Zuriff 1982). 
It may well be possible, however, to get access to this very impor-
tant part of reality. "It is especially in the relationship human-animal 
(in which the duality object-subject is transcended) that animal con-
sciousness can be best understood ... and investigated" (Fox 1983b). 
Suffering is in principle such an intensely personal phenomenon (Cas-
sel1982) that it certainly cannot be studied in terms of "lawfulness." 
It requires willingness of individual observers to interpret data in an 
empathetic way. After a symposium on animal awareness Wood-Gush 
(1981) commented: "The general opinion seems to be that it (animal 
awareness) is very difficult to prove or disprove. The decision one 
takes is very much dependent on one's sympathy or attitude towards 
animals." 
Those who have an economic interest in animals, accepting their 
exploitation for our benefit, have a different perspective on and inter-
pretation of the. situation than public groups, for instance, whose in-
terest it is to assure the total well-being of the animal. The first group 
might state: "To exclude animals from fulfilling their role in helping to 
sustain the human population .. .is untenable" (American Society of 
Agricultural Engineers 1981). This point of view is accompanied by 
the notion that the general public should be informed "of the generally 
high level of animal care and husbandry exercised on most farms to-
day, whether 'large or small'," since "their perceptions of animals are 
often unrealistic (oriented to Disney characters, pastoral scenes, and 
pets)" (ASAE 1981). Furthermore, it is believed that one of the nega-
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tive aspects of "the current controversy on animal welfare" is that it is 
retarding the movement towards modern "technology which improves 
production.'' 
Starting from the basic belief that animals exist to serve mankind, 
the main focus is upon production and efficiency, which at the same 
time seems to imply a belief that animal welfare in current systems is 
only marginally, not fundamentally, affected, and that people who 
think otherwise are sentimental and childish. 
People whose primary interest is not to make money for a living by 
means of animal exploitation, have a totally different opinion; not be-
cause they are childish or sentimental, nor are their opinions "unscien-
tific." They speak from the notion of "potential action." Regardless of 
any facts, we can give animals better housing than they have now, and 
make them less "unhappy." Ethical responsibility is more fundamen-
tal than scientific knowledge, as has been argued before, and therefore 
to consider nonscientists as "dumb crowds" is a misinterpretation of 
the fact that "man is a doer, not a knower" (Cave 1982; Debrock 1982). 
Scientific research in the sense of systematic observation can study 
different possibilities for reaching a desired goal, and so be a very im-
portant tool in making sure that our human ideas are reasonable, and 
correspond to natural reality. 
Many animal-welfare scientists, however, think of the relation-
ship between science and ethics in the opposite way: "The decisions 
whether or not we exploit animals ... and to what extent, ... are ethical 
decisions ... that should be made by society at large, ... but not without 
knowing the facts, or scientific evidence, provided by scientific re-
search" (Duncan 1981). This statement can be said to represent the 
currently accepted view, in which ethical decisions are based on "ob-
jective" data. This statement obscures the fact that it is not always 
easy to discover hard scientific ''fact.'' An interesting example is the 
phenomenon of adaptation, on which much research is focussed. An 
animal has to adapt to adverse situations, otherwise it dies. It does so 
by abnormal behaviour, for example. The question is, does an adapted 
animal suffer, or does "adapted" imply a calmed-down, relatively con-
tent animal? The first answer can be defended from a point of view in 
which the animal and its environment are seen as a meaningful whole, 
combined with empathetic observation of behaviour; the second can be 
defended by saying that behaviour is a stimulus-response mechanism, 
in which energy outlet is more important than the adequacy of the 
stimulus. So it seems that there is no "fact" here; the conclusion de-
pends on which point of view one takes. This example will be discussed 
more elaborately in part I of this paper. 
A "vice" that scientists often warn of or complain about is the 
danger of "anthropomorphic" thinking and reasoning, especially by 
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non-scientifically trained people. But respect, involvement, care, and 
responsibility as integral parts of compassionate stewardship do not 
necessarily imply sentimental projection. The care is for the animal, 
and to fulfill its needs, rather than ours. To say that "a pig does not 
bathe in the mud because it likes it, but because it increases its possi-
bilities for cutaneous evaporation" (Dantzler and Mormede 1979), is a 
denial of the subjectivity of the animal, and creates the duality be-
tween subjectivity and objectivity typical of scientific reductionism. 
The fear of anthropomorphism might well be a result of fear of taking 
animals completely seriously as fellow living beings; and for the "bur-
den" of responsibility that would exist if it was accepted that our an-
thropomorphic notions about animals might be correct. 
Biological data relevant to the concept of animal boredom will now 
be presented and discussed. In doing so, the ontological starting point 
of nondualism and empathic connectedness as developed in this in-
troduction will be used as a basis. An attitude of empathy, serving as 
interpretational guideline, might give rise to controversial conclusions 
in the eyes of those who believe in a dualistic perspective. If it has been 
argued correctly that the choice of an attitude is primordial to observa-
tion, philosophically speaking, and that this choice directs the search 
for "scientific evidence," then the proposed procedure is justified. 
PART I 
ENVIRONMENTAL DEPRIVATION AND THE 
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ANIMAL 
The environment provides adequate stimuli to fulfill an animal's 
needs, and elicits appropriate, species-specific behaviour in an animal. 
In a diverse, rich environment, an animal has to search for these ade-
quate stimuli (van Putten 1981). In a monotonous, "barren" environ-
ment, the animal is not only prohibited from searching for adequate 
stimuli most of the time, but hardly any adequate stimuli are present. 
This change in environment has an effect on the behaviour of the ani-
mal. What are these effects, and do they matter to an animal? In other 
words, does a change in quality of the environment affect the quality 
of the animal's life in a noticeable way for the animal? 
DOES BEHAVIOUR MATTTER TO AN ANIMAL? 
Behaviour includes all those processes by which an animal senses 
the external world and the internal state of its body, and responds to 
changes which it perceives (Manning 1972). Van den Assem (1973) 
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adds that the term behaviour refers only to outwardly observable, 
mainly motor responses. In the course of time, several explanatory 
models for behaviour have been presented, which try to reduce behav-
iour "to a system of hypothetical components" (Manning 1972); com-
ponents that are linked together in such a way that behaviour can be 
consistently predicted from certain conditions. '' ... ultimately we shall 
hope to explain behaviour in terms of the functioning of the basic units 
of the nervous system" (Manning 1972). 
The question is, in this framework, where and how subjective ex-
perience fits into these kinds of models, and in what way an animal ex-
periences its own behaviour. 
In relation to the welfare of individual animals in a deprived en-
vironment, Hughes (1980) proposes a behavioural model which is an in-
tegration of the Lorenzian psychohydraulic model and the mixed-mo-
tivation model as developed by Deutsch and Hinde. The first states 
that behaviour is mainly caused by internal, genetic drives which have 
to be expressed, even if no adequate stimuli are present; the second 
model implies that behaviour is mainly triggered by external stimuli in 
combination with internal, chemical receptors, and, therefore, not per-
forming a certain behaviour does not frustrate the animal. Hughes 
combines these two into a continuum: some behaviour patterns are 
mostly internally originated, some largely externally, and many arise 
through the interaction of rhythmically varying internal motivations 
and external releasers. In this framework the appearance of distorted 
or abnormal behaviour in a barren environment is clear evidence of a 
need for some environmental improvement, so he suggests, since the 
internal drive apparently is so strong that the absence of adequate 
releasing stimuli does not prevent an animal from performing abnor-
mal behaviour. 
This split into internally and externally regulated behaviour im-
plies that not performing externally regulated behaviour in case of 
absence of stimuli may not be adverse to an animal. Or, an animal does 
not miss what it does not know, in other words. 
How does an animal experience internally regulated behaviour 
that becomes distorted for lack of adequate stimuli? Any lack of an 
adequate environment requires adaptation of the animal to the present 
conditions. Adaptation is a fundamental property of each animal 
(Freeman 1975), and "basically all behaviours, including disturbed 
ones, represent adaptations of an organism to its 'Umwelt"' (Wiep-
kema 1982). 
Proposing a model for adaptive behaviour, Wiepkema (1980) uses 
the terms "soll-werte" and "ist-werte," meaning, respectively, the 
way an animal expects its environment to be and the way its environ-
ment actually is perceived to be. When there is a difference between 
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soll-werte and ist-werte, the animal makes, or tries to make there-
quired behavioural or physiological adjustments in order to solve the 
conflict. If the gap is too big, however, "abnormal" behaviour is a sign 
of the difficulty the animal experiences in attempting to control its en-
vironment adequately. According to Wiepkema, abnormal adjust-
ments are accompanied by emotions such as fear and general suffering. 
After a certain time, when the animal has not been able to regain 
satisfactory control, the physiological parameters revert to apparent 
normality, and conflict behaviour develops into stereotypic behav-
iours. These stereotypic behaviours are not necessarily adverse any-
more; on the contrary, they might prevent the animal from feeling un-
happy, by caln:!.ing the animal down and suggesting restored con-
trollability (Wiepkema 1982). Discussing Lorenz's psychohydraulic 
model, Duncan (1981) says that "even if a psychohydraulic model is ac-
cepted, it could be argued that as long as the energy finds an outlet (in-
to abnormal behaviour-au) that is not damaging to the hen itself or 
its flockmates, then welfare will not be adversely affected." 
From the models presented above, we could conclude that not per-
forming (potential) behaviour does not matter to an animal; that ab-
normal behavioural adjustments do matter to animals initially; but 
that more permanent abnormal behaviour might not be adverse any-
more. 
This way of looking at an animal and its behaviour, however, is the 
result of a reductionistic approach: the starting point is a dualistic 
perspective of animal versus environment, internal versus external. 
Wanting to reduce behaviour to neural systems (Manning 1972) may 
imply the view that the subjective experience of an animal is only 
secondarily, temporarily present. 
In a recent article, Baxter (1982/83) gives an analysis of functional 
behaviour in relation to animal production and welfare, which could il-
lustrate this way of thinking somewhat further. 
He states that only those species-specific behaviour patterns 
which promote biological fitness have survived the pressure of natural 
selection. By biological fitness is meant reproductive potential, and all 
factors that contribute to this, such as number and quality of offspring, 
ability to rear offspring, etc. Subjective well-being therefore must also 
have some function towards this goal, and "will have been selected on 
the basis of its representation of biological fitness." Brain programs 
cause "the animal to change its current state by inducing pleasurable 
or displeasurable sensations ... The study of animal welfare becomes 
therefore the study of the programs of their brains." 
From this perspective he proceeds to say that the consequences of 
behaviour are crucial for animal productivity, and therefore for their 
welfare, rather than the behaviour itself: "allowing an animal to per-
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form behaviour is one way of accommodating requirements, and is not 
the requirement itself .... This opens the possibility of accommodating 
animal requirements entirely by environmental manipulation and 
without the animal performing behaviour." Ethology in this frame-
work becomes an attempt at functional interpretation of behaviour, 
rather than a study of behavioural requirements in their own rights. 
In short, subjective experience, and behaviour are said to be secon-
dary means towards the goal of (re)production. The motor which 
moves the different parts of the mechanism is the central nervous 
system. And, as Ingram (1981) comments: "if an animal survives so 
that its DNA gets into the next generation, it has been a success." 
These perspectives on behaviour do not regard animals as individ-
ual, qualitative, sensitive beings, but as mechanisms which find their 
reason for existence in quantitative production. 
From a nondualistic perspective in which qualitative relationships 
are crucial for the animal's well-being it does matter to an animal 
when it does not have the chance to perform the behaviour which is 
part of a species-specific range of behavioural possibilities. The behav-
ioural potential of an animal represents the quality of the ani-
mal-environment relationship. Rather than regarding behaviour as a 
means towards reproduction (in other words quality serving quantity), 
a nondualistic perspective regards reproduction as a means towards 
individual life and behaviour (quantity serving quality). Subjective ex-
perience is intrinsically present in all activity and together with behav-
ioural expression represents the meaningfulness, the telos, of animal 
life. 
In this way, distorted abnormal behaviour is an indication of an af-
fliction upon the quality of the animal's life. What follows is a further 
discussion of abnormal behaviour, its forms of appearance and func-
tion. 
The types of abnormal behaviour which occur mostly in barren, de-
prived environments are stereotypic behaviour, redirected behaviour, 
vacuum behaviour (van Putten 1981) and over-reactiveness to sudden 
disturbances (Metz and Oosterlee 1980; Stolba and Wood-Gush 1980). 
Stereotypic behaviour mainly consists of the constant, compulsory 
repetition of certain motor patterns, resulting from a lack of general 
stimulation, or a lack of exercise. Redirected behaviour implies the 
fulfillment of behavioural needs on inadequate stimuli, and is often 
harmful or damaging to the animals, since parts of the body of mates 
often form the substitute for the original inanimate stimulus. Vacuum 
activity occurs when no appropriate stimulus is present at all, and the 
behaviour is performed "in the air," e.g., the air-chewing of sows in 
confinement. Over-reactiveness can be seen in, e.g., the alarm-reac-
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tion after sudden disturbances or the response to novel stimuli in a 
bare environment. 
"In severely impoverished environments, arousal is generally in-
creased, ... due to an unsatisfied, strong motivation for certain activi-
ties" (Stolba and Wood-Gush 1980). By performing abnormal behav-
iour, the animal often "creates" its own stimulation, thereby reducing 
the increased arousal (Fox 1971; Vestergaard, 1981). 
Again, as has been mentioned before, one can ask the question 
whether "abnormal behaviour actually is an advantage for the animal, 
since it reduces arousal" (Moss 1981b) but the answer must be "no" if 
we consider it from the perspective of the larger whole of an animal's 
nature and potentials. 
A deprived animal, when placed in a rich environment, will over-
react and indulge in a certain behaviour pattern (Wiepkema 1980). 
Even when an animal has been performing a certain behaviour on non-
adequate objects e.g. bar-biting of sows, or "in the air" (vacuum-acti-
vities) it will immediately and strongly respond to adequate stimuli 
when these are given after the performance of displacement behaviour. 
This clearly indicates that an animal does discriminate between ade-
quate and nonadequate stimuli, and that real satisfaction is not derived 
from adapted behaviour, otherwise the animal would not react so vig-
orously to adequate stimuli (Sambraus 1982; van Putten 1981; Stolba 
and Wood-Gush 1980). Sambraus mentions feeding and sexual behav-
iour as examples; sleep behaviour is furthermore added by Wiepkema. 
Stolba and Wood-Gush (1980) showed that the more bare the environ-
ment was, the stronger did piglets show the urge to explore new ob-
jects. 
The fact that an animal has a telos, or intrinsic nature, implies 
that the fulfillment of its potential capacities matters fundamentally 
to it; every animal has a strong urge to be active and alert. 
This is most clearly shown by some experiments which indicated 
that animals prefer to work for food, even if they do not have to. Mar-
kowitz (1982) describes how ostriches, who had learned to press key in 
order to obtain some peanuts as a reward, preferred to work in this 
way for their food instead of having it free. When a keeper accidentally 
dumped a whole bag of peanuts in their cage, they went over to the 
heap, sampled a few peanuts, and went back to their key to "earn" 
their peanuts. Wood-Gush (1973) mentions this phenomenon for chic-
kens. 
As others have repeatedly found, animals will typically work for 
food even when the same food is available free. This phenomenon "has 
been disquieting for some traditional learning theorists. After all, this 
illustrates how ... superficial some of our explanations of animal 
behaviour are .... We are emphatically confronted with the proposition 
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that also animals like to do things, to see things change because of 
their efforts, to enjoy the pride of gathering their own food or drink, 
and to have some control over their lives. This is what behavioural en-
richment is all about" (Markowitz 1982). 
When an animal can fulfill its telos, and express its natural behav-
iour freely, it is generally recognized as being a contented or "happy" 
animal. Subjective experience, fulfillment and quality are inseparable 
aspects that come together in the behaviour of an animal. 
What are the basic behavioural needs of animals, indicated by the 
concept of telos? Of course, this is basically different for each species, 
but attempts have been made to generalize some basic needs into be-
havioural categories. 
BEHAVIOURAL NEEDS OF ANIMALS 
In an attempt to determine behavioural needs of domestic ani-
mals, as well as those of laboratory animals, the question whether or 
not these animals are fundamentally different from their wild ances-
tors is a crucial one (Duncan 1981). 
On a population level, adaptation is the result of changing gene 
frequencies (Beilharz 1982), caused by environmental pressures; a pro-
cess called "natural selection." In the case of domestic species, 
another important factor has been selective breeding by man for cer-
tain desirable traits, such as docility and productivity. 
It can be stated that those animals that have adapted their geno-
type continually to the demands created by man are very different 
from their wild ancestors (Beilharz 1982; Hughes 1980; Duncan 1981). 
An example of this might be the elimination of incubation and broody 
behaviour in the domestic chicken (Wood-Gush 1973; Craig 1982), 
although Brantas (1980) describes the frustration that occurs in hens 
that do not have a nest in which to lay their eggs. In the discussion 
after Brantas' presentation, it was remarked that the hens might have 
been frustrated because they had experienced laying in nests before. 
Whether behaviour is learned or not, it remains a fact that the animals 
respond adequately to stimuli which used to be a part of their ances-
tors' natural habitat. 
Wood-Gush and Stolba (1982) report that pigs, kept in a "pig-
park" with "a variety of environmental features, and a diversified 
social structure," show behaviour "that closely resembles behaviour 
described for the European wild boar." Boice (1981) in a review article 
of studies on captivity and feralization, states that "captivity and 
domestication do not necessarily produce behavioural degeneracies." 
As an example he mentions an experiment that showed that for albino 
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Norway rats, placed in an outdoor pen, "hundreds of generations of life 
in captivity have not altered the burrowing abilities of Norway rats.'' 
Systematic studies of the effects of feralization have shown that for a 
large number of species, animals placed in an outdoor pen resume their 
wild ways. Therefore, in order to understand the function of behav-
ioural traits in domestic animals, and their importance for the animal, 
scientists need to study the wild ancestors of our domestic species 
thoroughly (Hartsock and Strickland, personal communication, 1982). 
Besides, domestication does not refer to today' s intensive production 
systems. It is very unlikely that animals who always have been kept in 
extensive or semi-extensive conditions, have been able to adapt to the 
rapid changes of the past 20 years (Wood -Gush, as reported by Buche-
nauer, 1981). 
So, on a population level, it is very likely that much of the poten-
tial for the full range of behaviour of wild ancestors is still present 
genetically, despite some selective, mostly physical changes. Baxter 
(1982/83) remarks that selective pressure on agricultural animals 
might even have strengthened original traits aimed at biological 
fitness rather than diminishing them. This would include traits like 
nesting behaviour. For zoo animals hardly any intentional selection 
takes place, and therefore their behavioural needs will resemble the 
needs of their wild conspecifics very much. 
The following behavioural categories are considered to correspond 
with the most basic needs of animals: 
Eating and drinking behaviour, especially search behaviour, is 
agreed upon by several authors to be crucially important (Fraser 1980; 
Sambraus 1981). A long list of abnormal and stereotypical behaviour 
related to this exists for many farm animal species (Sambraus 1981), 
indicating that the animal's internal drive to perform this behaviour is 
strong. He reports that when, for example, chickens are given their 
food in straw so that they have to search for it, they show a decreasing 
amount of abnormal feather-pecking. In zoos too, devices that are in-
vented to make an animal work for his food rather than being fed at 
regular times, have caused drastic changes in formerly apathetic, inac-
tive animals (Markowitz 1982). 
Closely related to this are explorative behaviour and locomotion, 
considered almost as important as ingestive behaviour (Fraser 1980; 
Sambraus 1981). Stereotypic weaving of, e.g., polar bears and horses is 
interpreted to be evidence of lack of exercise and space to move, and 
disappears when more space is provided (Meijer-Holzapfel1968; Fra-
ser 1968). Daschbach et al. (1982/83) consider the importance of 
enough space for the locomotory behaviour of encaged monkeys (the 
slow Iori, Nycticebus concang, in case), since too little space, especially 
if less than the so-called "flight-distance," can cause increased ag-
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gression, physical damage and resulting stress. (Flight distance refers 
to the linear distance between an animal and an animal of another 
species which is tolerated without fleeing.) 
Exploratory behaviour is a strong drive, generally present in most 
animals, which serves to increase familiarity with the environment 
(Baxter 1982/83). Even when the possibility for locomotion is present, 
many abnormal adjustments appear when there is an absence of ob-
jects which are explorable. In pigs, for example, a well-known vice 
called tailbiting (which is a redirected activity) is considered to be 
directly related to a lack of exploratory possibilities, and causes 
significant economic losses (Sambraus 1981; Murphy 1978; Wiepkema 
1982). Ekesbo, as reported by Duncan (1981) has shown that the in-
cidence of trampled teats and clinical mastitis is higher when dairy 
cows are housed in small stalls without bedding. And these are only a 
few of the numerous examples of the damage that is done to animals 
physically and mentally by deprivation of adequate stimuli and the 
restriction of space. 
The possibility of relating to the environment in a normal, healthy 
way is strongly represented by play behaviour. Especially for young 
animals, playing is of essential importance for their normal develop-
ment, since it provides the possibility for a dialogue between the 
animal and its environment (Buchenauer 1981). Young animals devel-
op their own ability for action through the interplay with the environ-
ment (Buchenauer 1981; Wood-Gush 1973); they acquire indepen-
dence from the mother, learn to interact with peers (Jensen and Bob-
bit, cited by Fox, 1974) and develop motor control (Fraser 1980). By 
playing, the young animal gradually learns to be less dependent on its 
mother, and to control its environment on its own. "The entire basis 
for intelligence, for the acquisition of information, and for learning 
itself hinges upon early playful exploratory behaviour" (Fox 1974). 
Fraser (1980) further mentions comfort activities like grooming and 
nest-building, both of which are recognized as being of primary impor-
tance for the domestic chicken (Wood-Gush 1973; Hughes 1980), and 
the pig (Sambraus 1981); as well as sleeping and social behaviour. 
As Fraser (1980) concludes, these needs seem formidable. But 
rather than being discouraged by the long list of behavioural needs, it 
might be important in this framework to summarize the discussion 
above by saying that most present animal-confinement systems, be it 
zoos, laboratories or intensive-production systems, have a great need 
for more "general stimulation," whatever stimuli this might imply. 
Too little general stimulation, and a (fundamental) lack of the pos-
sibility for self-expression, deprive human beings and animals of a 
sense of fulfillment and satisfaction. In other words, a qualitatively 
poor environment leads to deprived, bored animals as a result (Murphy 
1978). 
Animal Boredom 
BOREDOM AS A RESULT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
DEPRIVATION 
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Considering environmental deprivation, it is meaningful to make a 
distinction between social environment and physical environment 
(Duncan 1981). 
Clearly, for social animals the social environment is of crucial im-
portance. All agricultural domestic animals are social species, which 
means that they normally live in groups with an organized social struc-
ture (Duncan 1981). Most laboratory animals such as mice, rats, dogs 
and monkeys are social animals, too. Duncan mentions and discusses 
several possible kinds of social deprivation: prevention of the forma-
tion of a parent-offspring bond, early weaning, the keeping of animals 
in single-age or single-sex groups, and isolation. Some effects of social 
deprivation are a higher mortality, increased aggression, displacement 
behaviour (e.g., calves, lambs and piglets who are weaned early suck 
each other, or perform vacuum-sucking behaviour); distorted behav-
iour (such as isolated cockerels chasing their own tails), physiological 
effects like a high incidence of arteriosclerosis (Duncan 1981) and 
"learned" helplessness (Fox 1983a). 
However, since a more common problem in farms is overcrowding, 
rather than social deprivation (Murphy 1978), it is mainly the im-
poverished physical environment that makes people question animal-
keeping systems like zoos, laboratories and intensive production units. 
The so-called "barren environment" is referred to by many authors in 
their discussion of animal welfare (Hughes 1980; van Putten 1982b; 
Wood-Gush 1973; Duncan 1981; Buchenauer 1981; Brantas 1975). 
"What could be more unhealthy than an unresponsive environment?" 
Markowitz (1982) asks in his book about behavioural enrichment in 
zoos. He reports on the beneficial effect that environmental enrich-
ment had on the performance of species-specific behaviour of polar 
bears: reduced stereotypic activity, greatly improved physical health 
(not in the least because they stopped begging for junk-food from zoo 
visitors), and reduced aggressive behaviour of males towards 
newborns. All too familiar is the stereotypic behaviour of caged zoo 
animals, from canaries, foxes, coyotes, bears, etc., to great apes. The 
latter are also known to eat their own vomit and faeces (Fox 1971). 
For laboratory animals, nervous anorexia, coprophagia (eating of 
faeces), polyphagia and polydipsia (eating and drinking too much), as 
well as asocial, stereotypic and aggressive behaviour can be results of 
social and environmental deprivation (Fox 1974). 
A related area of concern is the lack of general stimulation for dogs 
and cats in shelters. Isolation and understimulation can cause hyster-
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ical, high-pitched barking, abnormal behaviour such as a dog chasing 
his own tail, and a general appearance of nonalertness: dull coats and 
eyes. This can be improved by providing toys such as sticks, balls and 
blankets. But for animals used to being so close to human beings, the 
most important need they have is human contact. All other needs such 
as exercise, play etc., are dependent on the presence or absence of 
human attention. To have a relationship with human beings has be-
come the most important aspect of the nature of a dog; far more so 
than for a cat (Wright, personal communication, 1982). However, even 
for piglets the presence of two human caretakers can make a difference 
of 5 kilograms growth per pig per 6 weeks! (Hammer 1980). 
In Part II, the problem of environmental deprivation in agricultu-
ral animals will be discussed more elaborately. Many scientists use the 
term "boredom" with or without quotes, in talking about the subjec-
tive experience of animals in a deprived environment (Wood-Gush 
1973, 1981; Murphy 1978; Duncan 1981; Griffin 1981b; Humphrey 
1981; K.iley-Worthington 1981; Vestergaard 1981). This phenomenon 
can be explained biologically in terms of "a motivational state which 
drives the animal to increase its overall sensory input" (Murphy 1978; 
see also Griffin 1981b). 
But before it can be accepted that animals can be bored, there are 
some questions that have to be considered first, according to several 
authors. Can one apply a concept like boredom to "an animal as primi-
tive as a fowl, particularly if its behaviour is largely governed by 
releasers?" (Wood-Gush 1973). "Does it matter to an animal whether 
the necessary stimulation comes from the environment directly or 
whether from themselves by performing a stereotypy in a non-stimu-
lating environment?' (Murphy 1978). Is boredom a term which applies 
only to humans, as Duncan (1981) says, and which does not refer to an 
equivalent mental experience in animals (Murphy 1978; Humphrey 
1981)? 
Although several authors raise these questions, most of them go 
no further than to offer a few speculatory lines. Griffin (1981b) sug-
gests that "since laboratory rodents will run several kilometers every 
night in an exercise wheel, while wild conspecifics never seem to go 
more than 100 m. from their nest, the laboratory animal might be 
bored." Some people say, however, that despite all the evidence that 
animals do prefer to respond to external stimuli when these are pres-
ent, this still does not answer the question whether animals miss what 
they do not know (Ewbank 1981), or whether they actually suffer in 
the absence of stimuli (Wood-Gush 1973). Because intuitively, that 
seems to be what boredom implies: missing stimuli that should be 
there but are not. 
The presence of stereotypies in zoos and laboratory animals, and 
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all domestic species, however, strongly suggests that an animal does 
miss general stimulation, otherwise it would not develop these highly 
repetitive, unnatural behaviour patterns to stimulate itself, nor would 
it engage in all kinds of harmful and physically injurious displacement 
activities. This is where the second question comes in: does it matter to 
the animal how it satisfies its need for stimulation; do animals have a 
sense of "quality of life" as suggested by Murphy (1978). 
From a reductionist point of view, there might be no decisive an-
swer to this question. Subjective experience is considered to be a sec-
ondarily derived factor in reductionistic explanatory models. A fun-
damental way of taking subjective experience seriously, as a central 
feature of life, requires a shift of observational perspective (or "ges-
talt-shift''). 
From such a perspective we see behaviour not solely as a means to-
wards a reproductive end. Baxter's (1982/83) statement that behaviour 
is "one way of accommodating requirements, and not the requirement 
itself'' is direct evidence of an approach which reduces the animal to a 
functional mechanism. In this approach boredom could not exist as 
long as the desired production were guaranteed. A shift from quantity 
to quality does imply that behaviour is seen as the requirement itself. 
In this framework an animal can be said to be bored when it has to 
adapt to its environment in an abnormal way, indicative of understim-
ulation, in order to maintain its sense of selfhood. The continuity be-
tween man and animal, and the evidence for feeling and awareness in 
animals (see Section I, The Question of Animal Awareness, in this vol-
ume) imply that boredom is a direct subjective experience of an ani-
mal. , 
It is not always easy to distinguish "boredom" from 
"frustration." Boredom can give rise to frustration, e.g. when a sow 
tries to break away from its ties to build a nest, or when aggression in 
battery cage hens increases as a result of deprivation of nesting boxes 
for laying-behaviour. An aggressive bird can hardly be called a bored 
one, yet it is important to realize the close link between the two 
phenomena. Boredom could be regarded as a qualitative description of 
the psychological state that gives rise to general frustration. 
An advanced form of boredom is the phenomenon of helplessness, 
elaborately described by Seligman (1975) for human beings, and by 
Fox (1983a) for animals. After a prolonged time of lack of control and 
predictability over the environment, animals "give up" trying to ex-
press themselves and become apathetic. Van Putten describes this for 
tethered sows: the sow sits, lets its head hang down and has its eyes 
nearly closed. This has been referred to as "mourning" behaviour (van 
Putten 1982b; see also Fox 1983a). In laboratory animals it is often 
present as a result of experiments, and the animal's inability to control 
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its life (Fox 1982). Helplessness is characterized by the general refusal 
to respond, even to novel stimuli, or damage being done to its own 
body; these traits distinguish helplessness clearly from habituation 
(Fox 1983a). Further effects are decreased learning ability, immuno-
suppression, loss of weight and appetite, norepinephrine depletion and 
increased cholinergic activity (Fox 1983a). 
Helplessness is the pathological mental state arising from the 
animal's conviction that, whatever it does, it cannot have any real con-
trol over its environment. It believes (or has learned) that responding 
is useless, since there will be no reinforcement to the response 
(Seligman 1975). If lack of natural stimuli can produce such a patholo-
gical state, equivalent to mental illness and depression in humans, 
then surely it matters to an animal that it be provided with an environ-
ment that gives it the chance to be a mentally and physically healthy 
animal, rather than a bored or helpless one. 
THE SCIENTIFIC ACCESSIBILITY OF BOREDOM 
Although there have been no attempts to conduct systematic re-
search about the phenomenon of boredom, methods to do so might be 
indicated. 
Discussing possible parameters for the observation of boredom, it 
is helpful to realize that boredom is a relative as well as an absolute 
phenomenon. It is relative in the sense that animals perform a greater 
variety of behaviour patterns in a more stimulating environment, and 
therefore any environment can be said to be boring in comparison to a 
richer environment. A rich environment can give us an idea of the 
behavioural potential of different animal species, and may serve in this 
way as a frame of reference for the evaluation of understimulating en-
vironments, and for the interpretation of the abnormal behaviour oc-
curring in them. Boredom is an absolute phenomenon so far as lack of 
stimulation becomes apparent in abnormal behaviour patterns. 
For adequate observations of an environment that is suspected to 
be boring, the following conditions seem to be essential: 
1. A thorough knowledge of the species-specific behaviour and its 
development in a rich, stimulating environment, whether it be 
wild or domestic. 
2. Observations of animal behaviour over long periods of time, 
preferably 24 hours, or 12 hours a day. The occurrence of differ-
ent behaviour patterns can be evaluated best in this way, since 
boredom is a concept related to time. 
3. The presence of the observer must be concealed, or it must be 
certain that this does not influence the behaviour of the animals 
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in any way. In relation to boredom this is especially important 
since human presence is itself a stimulation which might tem-
porarily obscure evidence of boredom. 
The following criteria for boredom are proposed: 
1. Stereotypic movements. 
2. Redirected activity which occurs systematically towards inade-
quate stimuli. 
3. Vacuum behaviour. 
4. General apathy and immobility over longer periods, accom-
panied by an inalert expression in the eyes, if possible to 
observe. This includes longer periods of sitting and standing. 
The first three behaviours are evidence of the fact that an animal is 
still trying to cope with a lack of stimulation. The fourth, advanced 
state of boredom indicates the impossibility for the animal to express 
itself; it has more or less given up trying to adapt to the situation. 
The presence of any one of these behaviours is a direct indication 
of the fact that the environment is inadequate for the behavioural 
needs of an animal. It is generally agreed that understimulation is the 
main cause for the behaviour patterns which are proposed as in-
dicators of boredom. Everyone who spends a short time in a particular 
intensive production system can observe the presence of stereotypic 
behaviour, vacuum activities or redirected activities such as forms of 
cannibalism. These are all qualitative indicators that the environment 
is a boring one to which the animals have to adapt in an abnormal way. 
As was said before, larger periods of observation are desirable for a 
more detailed scientific description of the situation. However, it is 
questionable whether at present this is really necessary. Much is 
known already about the occurrence of abnormal behaviour in farm 
animals, enough to indicate the actual need for environmental enrich-
ment in intensive systems. 
Accepting that boredom is an adverse state, it can be regarded as 
a form of stress for the animal. Stress is a phenomenon that has mainly 
been studied in terms of internal processes. That is, what are the ef-
fects of external stressors on homeostasis, which is the regulation of 
the internal environment to maintain an internal equilibrium. In order 
to gain insight into the way boredom acts as a stressor on an animal, a 
general theoretical framework of stress will be discussed. Central ques-
tions in the development of such a framework appear to be "what is 
normal?" and "is the maintenance of homeostasis a good criterion for 
the absence of stress?" Secondly, "what are the best parameters for 
abnormal, stressful states?" As will become clear, the last question 
concentrates on the usefulness of behavioural versus physiological 
parameters. 
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BOREDOM AS A STRESSOR 
Within the difficult and vague field of stress research, the concept 
of a General Adaptation Syndrome (GAS), as developed by Hans Selye 
was a major breakthrough (Moss 1981a; Friend 1980; Ewbank 1973). 
One of the important aspects of his work was his distinction between 
"stressors" and "stress response," the first referring to adverse or 
noxious stimuli, the latter to the mechanisms by which an animal 
resists the effects of adverse stimuli (Ewbank 1973; Moss 1981a). He 
defined stress as a specific syndrome in a biological system, consisting 
of all nonspecific responses to a stressor. 
Although Selye's work is still very influential, Fraser, Ritchie and 
Fraser (1975) have pointed out that the concept might be too simple. 
First, specific stressors may not only generate nonspecific responses 
but very specific ones as well (Siegel1980; Dantzer & Mormede 1981), 
depending on the nature of the stressor. Second, while overstimulation 
might cause a certain (general) reaction, it has become clear that 
animals can be understimulated as well, which might also cause a 
physiological reaction. In terms of the response of the animal, one 
could speak of "understress," "stress" and "overstress" in this con-
text, thereby indicating that "stress" in itself is not adverse, but that 
only extreme effects are deleterious to the animal (Ewbank 1973; 
Freeman 1978). 
This immediately raises the question whether it is possible to 
determine a "normal" baseline of stress in order to see which stressors 
are "beneficial" (building up biological fitness) and which are adverse 
(Fraser, Ritchie and Fraser 1975; Freeman 1976; Perry 1973). A study 
on the variance in corticosteroid levels during egg-laying in hens 
(Beuving 1980) showed also, however, that changes in normal behav-
iour correspond to variations in hormone concentration. This makes it 
very hard to interpret any response of the adrenal glands as adverse or 
normal. In fact, an animal is never in a static state, but always acting 
and reacting to external and internal stimuli, in order to maintain a 
state of internal, physiological homeostasis (Ewbank 1973). 
This state of homeostasis is widely regarded as the "normal" 
state. ''The psychological setpoint at which there is no effect on 
welfare, represents the homeostatic setpoint" (Baxter 1982/83). 
Behaviour, in this context, is regarded as the means by which an ani-
mal maintains homeostasis and adapts to the environment (Wiepkema 
1982; Bure 1981a). 
If the pressure of certain stimuli rises, however, and it becomes 
harder for an animal to maintain a homeostatic equilibrium, the inter-
nal stress-response leads to a stage which is referred to as "the 
resistance stage," a concept introduced by Selye (Fraser, Ritchie and 
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Fraser 1975). If the stressors in the environment are too severe, or are 
present too long, the stress-response proceeds into the so-called "ex-
haustion stage" which will result in death, if nothing is done (Freeman 
1978; McBride 1979). 
It is now widely believed that adaptation to a stressful situation (a 
stressor) eliminates that event from being a stressor (Friend 1980 
referring to Mobey), which implies that only when an animal's physi-
ological state is in the stage of exhaustion, can it truly be called stressed 
in its adverse meaning (McBride 1979; Perry 1973). A very practical 
aspect of accepting this concept of stress is that in domestic situa-
tions, most animals are slaughtered before they could reach the ex-
haustion stage, and therefore it is hard to determine whether some 
stimuli should be classified as highly stressful or not (McBride 1979; 
Freeman 1975). Furthermore, the psychophysiological costs of adapta-
tion, which may lower the animal's ability to cope with additional 
stressors, need to be considered when it is believed that an animal has 
actually adapted to a given set of stressors. 
In the model of stress outlined above, "normal" as a standard for 
-\ 
an acceptable level of stress-response can be replaced by "adapted" 
(Bessei 1980), and is represented by a homeostatic state. 
Several authors agree upon the fact that stress primarily must be 
determined by means of physiological parameters, since homeostasis 
is a physiological phenomenon (Freeman 1976; McBride 1979; Friend 
1980). " ... It is quite clear that evidence will come from physiologists 
and not ethologists. It is they who must face the problems of measure-
ment and definition" (McBride 1979). If, after the initial acute 
physiological response to adverse stimuli, physiological changes re-
main, it might well mean that the situation has become too severe and 
that the animal cannot adapt through its behaviour. This is the worst 
kind of stress, leading to death. If the initial physiological response 
disappears after a while because of behavioural adaptation, then the 
developed homeostatic state is not recognized as stressful according to 
the framework presented above. In other words, a decrease of phys-
iological deviation is directly correlated to a decrease of stress. Abnor-
mal behaviour has been reported to cause a decrease in corticosteroid 
reaction (Dantzer 1981; Bure 1981b; Dantzer and Mormede 1981), and 
therefore might be regarded not as a sign of stress, but as a means to-
wards decreasing stress (Wiepkema 1982; Dantzer and Mormede 1981). 
It must be questioned whether it is appropriate to consider homeo-
stasis as a standard of what is "normal" in this respect, since the price 
that animals have to pay in order to be able to adapt is completely left 
out of account. And the distortion of the intrinsic nature of an animal, 
caused by the performance of abnormal behaviour, is a high price in-
deed. 
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As Fraser, Ritchie and Fraser (1975) pointed out, from a veterinar-
ian, animal-centered point of view, the quality of the process of coping 
is as important as the final result. Referring to "the perennial disagree-
ment" about the question whether behavioural disruptions could by 
themselves be regarded as symptoms of stress, without physiological 
confirmation, they state that this is justified, since "a system of 
husbandry is clearly in need of improvement if adverse consequences 
are prevented only by gross changes in either behaviour or physiology" 
(emphasis added). 
To understand the role behavioural and physiological factors play 
it is important not just to understand the relationship between behav-
iour and physiology, but to understand first of all the relationship of 
each of them with the nature, or beingness of the animal. 
First of all, it is possible that there are as yet unknown phys-
iological indicators, other than adrenocortical hormones, which do cor-
relate with emotional behaviour. Heart-rate, cardiac output or skin-
resistance (Baldwin and Stephens 1971) or other neurohormonal sys-
tems (Dantzer and Mormede 1981) have been mentioned as possibili-
ties. In this case behaviour and physiology would both refer to the 
same state of being of the animal. The suggestion that there also 
might be a fundamental difference regarding their function for the ani-
mal is elucidated by Seligman (1975), in his book Helplessness. Since 
helplessness is an advanced form of boredom, as was described earlier, 
Seligman's remarks apply very well to the study of boredom. After dis-
cussing several experiments, he concludes that the neurotransmitter 
norepinephrine (NE) level appears to be a very important physiological 
parameter for a feeling of control over the environment in humans and 
animals. However, he goes on, "NE-depletion alone cannot account 
for many of the facts that the cognitive theory predicts, since 
NE-depletion seems to be neither necessary nor sufficient to produce 
learned helplessness ... The difference between escapability and ines-
capability is not physical; it is information that can only be processed 
cognitively." The way in which this information is processed in a par-
ticular situation depends on the behavioural possibilities the animal 
has for controlling its environment (e.g. to escape or not). Cognition 
and emotion are inseparable (Seligman 1975) and so cognition, emotion 
and behavioural possibilities are linked on the same level of integra-
tion, namely the highest one possible, and equivalent to the concepts 
of "nature," "telos" or "beingness." Considering Seligman's results it 
can be concluded that stress in general and boredom in particular are 
best assessed by behavioral parameters, rather than by physiological 
ones. The idea that physiology is a form of behaviour as well (Wiepke-
ma, personal communication 1982) obscures the presence of a qualita-
tive difference between the two: behaviour has to do with the "whole" 
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integrated animal, whereas physiology reflects the interaction of the 
various (unconscious) parts. Physiological factors cannot be weighed 
on the same scale as behavioural ones, though they can certainly be 
useful indicators.* 
With the definition of stress given by Fraser, Ritchie and Fraser 
(1975), there is room for the considerations discussed above: "an ab-
normal or extreme adjustments in its behaviour or physiology, in order 
to cope with adverse aspects of its environment and management." 
So far we have argued that homeostasis is not an adequate 
criterion for ''normal,'' since it ignores the price an animal has to pay 
for its adaptation. It was also argued that behaviour as a parameter 
for stressful states is, qualitatively speaking, the most appropriate 
one. This shift in emphasis might make it easier to determine what is 
"normal" when we have to speak of "abnormal or extreme adjust-
ments." "Extreme" and "abnormal" in a behavioural context do not 
refer to a numerical scale anymore as would be the case with phys-
iological parameters, but to a qualitative change in behavioural adjust-
ment. Redirected activity like tail-biting for example can then be 
regarded as an indicator of stress, since it is a form of abnormal behav-
iour. 
Rather then speaking of understress, stress and overstress, abnor-
mal adjustments could be indicated by using the terms "stress" and 
"distress;" distress being caused by understimulation, and stress by 
overstimulation. In this way "normal" refers to a certain level of 
"healthy" stimulation by specific stimuli (van Putten 1981), and not to 
a normal level of "stress." It is true that animals need a certain 
amount of stimulating "pressure" from the environment to develop 
their "fitness," their flexible response to changing conditions. But if 
the terms "understress" and "overstress" were used as Ewbank 
(1973) proposed, thereby accepting the "normality" of stress, or even 
calling it beneficial (Ewbank 1973), the adverse quality of the term 
"stress" would be very much diminished and thereby lose most of its 
meaning. 
Boredom, in the framework developed above, can be characterized 
as a form of distress, resulting from chronic understimulation. Impor-
tant criteria are the different forms of abnormal behaviour, mentioned 
in the previous paragraph. In physiology, hardly any relevant research 
about the effects of understimulation has been done; a few relevant ex-
periments will be discussed shortly. It seems important to consider 
*Psychological-cognitive and emotional factors can be more potent in producing 
physiological changes such as increased production of natural opiates than physical 
trauma per se (Miczek, K.A. et al. 1982. Science 215:1520-1522)-Ed. 
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that the physiological reaction towards understimulation might be 
(fundamentally) different from the reaction to overstimulation, which 
is aimed at a homeostatic equilibrium. 
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FIELD OF 
ANIMAL WELFARE 
In order to make it possible for the natural sciences to study 
animal well-being, an operational definition of "well-being" is· 
necessary. The definition given by Lorz (1979) has been widely ac-
cepted as useful in this context: "welfare implies a state of harmony, 
both physical and psychological, of the animal with itself and with its 
environment. Health and normal behaviour are usually indicators for 
well-being. They presuppose a life-course which is species-specific, 
and which does justice to species-specific behaviour." 
As can be seen from the previous paragraphs boredom represents 
a serious impairment of well-being as defined above since it implies a 
fundamental lack of behavioural possibilities for an animal. Yet in a 
larger context, so it is argued by many, this kind of suffering is only 
relative. In nature, animals experience all kinds of other, harmful and 
adverse conditions, such as bad weather, lack of food and the pressure 
of predators. These are eliminated in intensive farm systems, where 
the basic existence of an animal is guaranteed. How can we ever weigh 
these different elements on an overall scale of well-being? 
The argument implies that an ideal situation is not possible, and 
therefore the present husbandry system might give an animal a dif-
ferent environment from its natural one, but not necessarily a worse 
one. However, this line of thought leaves out the fact that we as 
humans have consciously taken responsibility for the lives and well-
being of our farm animals. Natural conditions for wild animals are 
beyond human responsibility, but it lies fully within our power to pro-
vide farm animals with whatever they need, "and there can be no 
justification for continuation of the conditions once severe strain has 
been diagnosed" (McBride 1979). Not providing animals with the op-
portunity to express their behavioural needs is therefore a conscious 
choice, dependent upon our own moral and economic standards. Only 
from a dualistic perspective can one compare natural and confinement 
conditions as if they were two "objective" situations. From an involved 
perspective, it is clear that however thoroughly we study needs and 
adaptive capacities of animals, in the end it remains a subjective 
choice whether we realize certain options for the animal or not; 
whether we force an animal to adapt, or give it room to express its 
basic behavioural drives. "Potentiality is an unseen reality," and as 
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long as we know that we could give an animal more stimulation, we 
will have to find good reasons not to give it, however great the 
animal's adaptive capacities. 
Another option we have in the conflict present in farms, laborato-
ries and zoos between the animal's needs and its actual environment, is 
not to adjust the environment to the animal, but the animal to the en-
vironment. By altering its genetic make-up fundamentally through 
selection and genetic manipulation, we could "create" animals whose 
needs can be fulfilled in a man-made, economically oriented environ-
ment. By selecting animals "that are less aware of their environment 
and so less likely to be distressed by it" (Duncan 1973), general animal 
welfare could be "improved" according to several authors (Craig 1982; 
Faure 1980; Beilharz 1982). Raymond (1980) rejects this idea, however, 
not on ethical grounds but for the practical reason that it takes a very 
long time; in the meantime our economic needs or ethical framework 
might change, and then it would be hard to reverse the process. Ad-
justing the environment to the animal is more efficient on a short-
term basis and more flexible. But apart from the practical objections, 
one can have serious ethical objections. Changing animals in this way 
is again one step further on the road of the manipulation of life and the 
acquisition of power over the world. I do not see this as a desirable 
direction, and I think we would harm ourselves as much as the animals 
by alienating ourselves in this way from natural life. 
Boredom is a serious problem in present husbandry systems. In 
the next section evidence for this statement will be provided, and the 
importance of boredom in relation to other parameters of well-being 
will be discussed. 
PART II 
BOREDOM IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
SYSTEMS 
We have noted earlier that very little serious research about 
animal boredom has been performed. But work on closely related sub-
jects such as housing systems and stereotypic behaviour is very rele-
vant to our understanding of boredom. 
In the field of farm animal welfare, most research on environmen-
tal deprivation seems to be concentrated on battery cage chickens and 
on sows and their litters kept in close confinement. Cows appear to 
have much less need for external stimulation. This may be due to their 
rumination process, which provides self-stimulation via chewing of 
the cud and grooming, and thus "boredom and aggression are reduced 
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in establishing groups of cattle" (Albright 1982). Yet in veal calves 
boredom might be considered a serious problem. Because of isolation 
and lack of opportunity to fulfill their needs, calves lick and suck 
themselves, other calves, walls and inanimate objects. Health prob-
lems are often the result (Albright 1982). 
A general description of present housing systems of pigs and chic-
kens will now be given, and behavioural and physiological evidence of 
boredom in these systems presented. The effect that boredom has on 
other welfare criteria such as productivity, reproductivity, disease 
susceptibility, etc., will be discussed and a general evaluation of 
boredom as an indicator of welfare closes this section. 
HOUSING SYSTEMS 
The housing systems of chickens and sows have changed dramati-
cally since the 1930's (Sainsbury 1978) and 1950's (van Putten 1982a). 
Our improved technological ability to develop a completely artificially 
controlled microclimate (Sainsbury 1978), the rapidly growing mono-
poly of the animal-feed industry (van Putten 1982a), the role of genetic 
science in the selection for productive animals, along with the increas-
ing cost of land and labour, have worked together to press farmers to 
move the animals from outside yards to increasingly restricted en-
vironments, "where technical demands were given a higher priority 
than the animal's basic needs" (Ekesbo 1981a). As a result "commer-
cial egglayers" are housed mostly in multibird cages with the birds 
kept in groups of 3 to 5 with considerable restriction of movements 
(Sainsbury 1978). 
Sows are usually kept in individual pens and are tethered, prevent-
ing social contact with other sows. The floor is bare; oestrus is usually 
induced with hormones (because spontaneous oestrus disappears in 
the absence of social C!Jntact), and piglets are weaned at ever earlier 
ages (Lean 1978). 
BEHAVIOURAL EVIDENCE FOR BOREDOM IN 
PIGS AND CHICKENS 
Sows and piglets 
''The type of pigs most affected by the extreme changes in hous-
ing systems are sows" (Buchenauer 1981). Tethering or restraint 
deprives them of their natural tendency to be active and inquisitive, 
and the lives of sows have become "extremely dull" (van Putten 
1982b); their great need to explore the environment is reflected in their 
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continuous use (given the opportunity) of their very sensitive noses 
(Hartsock, personal communication, 1982). In an article on sow health 
and housing Ekesbo (1981a) reports that tied sows are significantly 
less active during daytime than loose sows (respectively 32% versus 
59%). During this active time the loose sows carried out 12 different 
behaviour patterns with straw while for the tied sows, only two or 
three behaviour patterns involving straw were observed. Furthermore, 
Ekesbo (1981a) also notes that pig breeders have always given their 
animals separate areas for feeding, defecating and lying. Recent in-
vestigations have shown that loose sows divide their time in these 
three areas accompanied by 1216 social interactions, with 12 different 
patterns of behaviour. Tied sows only performed 236 interactions, 
while three patterns were completely absent. 
Daelemans (1981) also argues that loose sows have a chance to 
move between separate areas for drinking and eating, thereby being 
able to gratify their apparently highly motivated need for exercise 
(Ekesbo 1981a). Baxter (1981) adds nest building to the list of behav-
ioural needs. Restrained sows can be observed trying to break away 
before farrowing, because of their high motivation to move around and 
arrange a nesting area (van Putten 1982b; Buchenauer 1981; Vester-
gaard 1981). 
Restrained sows demonstrate a high incidence of abnormal behav-
iour, which can be as much as 17.5% of the whole range of behaviour 
patterns (Buchenauer 1981). Stereotypical behaviour such as "weav-
ing;" redirected activity such as "bar-biting," licking bars, trough 
floor and chain; "play-drinking," and vacuum behaviour such as 
"teethgrinding," "air-chewing," "tongue rolling" and rooting; and a 
general restlessness, are strong evidence of frustration due to lack of 
adequate stimuli (Ekesbo 1981a; Vestergaard 1981; Sambraus 1981; 
van Putten 1982b; Buchenauer 1981). Other indicators are the long 
periods, up to six hours, of "sitting," which has been attributed to 
significant drowsiness (Buchenauer 1981). Vestergaard (1981), Sam-
braus (1981) and Fraser (1968) report observations of sows sitting with 
their heads hanging down, or pressed against the stall divisions. 
Standing, which occurs for long periods, may be regarded as a conflict 
between the desire for activity and the impossibility to achieve it (Bu-
chenauer 1981). 
The absence of straw also appears to be a significant deprivation. 
The effect of its presence or absence is discussed by many authors 
(Ekesbo 1981a; Vestergaard 1981; Sambraus 1981). Vestergaard 
(1981) reports in fact that oral and other stereotypies (such as weaving, 
vacuum-chewing, bar-biting) were reduced. by loose straw. He found 
that such abnormal behaviour would increase within a few days after 
the removal of straw and decrease as soon as straw was present. This 
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suggests that stereotypic behaviour might not be a remnant, left over 
from adaptation to some adverse situation in the past (Wiepkema 
1982), but an immediate response to the adequacy of the environment. 
At the same time, straw could be used as nest building material (van 
Putten 1982b). 
Piglets are never restrained, but the effect of the absence or 
presence of straw on their behaviour has been reported in several 
studies. When straw is present, rooting and chewing are more com-
mon, and other patterns such as nest building behaviour and play with 
the straw are elicited (Troxler 1980; van Putten and Dammers 1976). 
When straw is absent, redirected exploratory behaviour such as nib-
bling on other piglets and inanimate objects occurs (Troxler 1980; van 
Putten and Dammers 1976; Buchenauer 1981). Tail-biting is reported 
to be positively correlated with the absence of straw, since the provi-
sion of straw reduces this behaviour (Sambraus 1981; Buchenauer 
1981; Koomans 1981). Therefore tail-biting might be a sign of bore-
dom (Ewbank 1981; Bareham and Vestergaard 1981). In the straw 
barn, playing and fighting occur more than in cages (Bure 1981a), so 
straw in pig pens provides play material and reduces boredom (Bare-
ham and Vestergaard 1981). "By enriching even a small environment, 
... their reactivity towards unfamiliar stimuli drops dramatically, and 
approaches the low intensity and short duration seen under semi-na-
tural condition" (Stolba and Wood-Gush 1980). 
The long list of stereotypic and conflict behaviour, related to ex-
ploratory behaviour, feeding behaviour and locomotion in a richer en-
vironment where the sows are not restrained, provides evidence that 
boredom is a real problem for pigs in modern confinement systems 
without straw or some other substance to stimulate various natural 
behaviours. 
CHICKENS IN BATTERY CAGES 
The chicken is a very different animal and is also considered to be 
more primitive than a pig (Duncan 1981). Nevertheless, "deprivation 
of external stimuli is a factor to be considered even in an animal as 
phylogenetically primitive as a fowl" (Wood-Gush 1973). 
Compared to deep litter pens, battery cages restrict behavioural 
patterns such as turning, dust-bathing, ground-pecking, wing-flap-
ping, movement flapping and general locomotion (Bareham 1972, 
1976; Duncan 1979; Hughes 1978). Furthermore, the absence of litter 
and nest boxes makes dust-bathing and nesting behaviour impossible. 
As was observed for pigs above, the restriction of several behav-
ioural possibilities is accompanied by a range of abnormal behaviour 
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patterns, like stereotypic movements and redirected activities. The 
most prevalent abnormalities are feather-pecking, as a form of canni-
balism, stereotypic pacing, stereotypic headflicking, displacement 
preening and vacuum dust-bathing. 
"The most important factor contributing to feather-pecking is the 
absence of litter" (Duncan 1978). This is supported by experiments 
conducted by Bareham (1976). Hughes (1978) suggests that rather 
than being a result of boredom, feather-pecking is a substitute for 
ground-pecking. However, redirected activities are regarded as signs 
of boredom since they indicate the lack of stimuli. Feather-pecking 
can be compared to tail-biting in pigs: one animal, probably genetical-
ly disposed, starts the vice, and the others "learn" it from a few in-
itiators (Duncan 1978; Sambraus 1981). Sambraus also states that, if 
chickens are fed on the ground instead of a trough, this reduces 
feather-pecking. 
Stereotypic pacing is usually regarded as a sign of frustration due 
to the impossibility of performing nest building behaviour in a battery 
cage (Hughes 1978; Duncan 1978; Bareham 1976; Brantas 1980; 
Wood-Gush 19'Z3; Folsch 1980). Experimentally frustrated hens, in 
fact, do exhibit stereotypic pacing (Duncan 1978). 
Head-flicking in laying hens described by Bareham (1972) can be 
compared to an equivalent sort of head turn in zoo animals when they 
are engaged in stereotypic pacing (Bareham 1972; Fox 1971). Its oc-
currence can be attributed to a monotonous environment with are-
striction of external stimuli. This behaviour can be seen as the 
animal's attempt to increase its sensory input (Bareham 1972; Duncan 
1981). Compensatory feeding behaviour, where chickens play with 
their food for long periods, without a higher intake of food, can be 
regarded as a compensation for other behaviour which has become im-
possible. A similar phenomenon occurs in pigs. Excessive preening can 
likewise be interpreted as a sign of "mild frustration" in the form of 
compensatory activity (Bareham 1976; Duncan 1979). The occurrence 
of vacuum dust-bathing indicates the innate need for a hen to perform 
this behaviour (Hughes 1980; Vestergaard 1981). The same is true of 
the need for wing-flapping and body/wing shaking, which may ac-
cumulate as well during deprivation (Vestergaard 1981). 
Aggression might be considered as a sign of frustration due to 
deprivation, since it can be reduced by providing hens with a nest box 
(Vestergaard 1981). Vestergaard furthermore states that this indicates 
that "the birds really do miss those things." 
From the evidence presented above, it can be concluded that bore-
dom, as defined earlier, is a concept applicable to the chicken as well. 
The fact that they miss exploration-eliciting stimuli, and stimuli that 
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facilitate other natural behaviour, can be inferred from the presence of 
many abnormal behaviour patterns, and from experiments that have 
shown that chickens prefer to work for their food rather than have it 
available freely (Wood-Gush 1973). 
PHYSIOLOGICAL INDICATORS OF BOREDOM 
Although it was suggested that stress, and distress due to 
understimulation, are detected mainly through behavioural pheno-
mena, this does not mean that there are no physiological indicators. 
However, hardly any direct research into physiological responses to 
understimulation has yet been done. It is known from several ex-
periments (Dantzer and Mormede 1981; Wiepkema 1982) that depriva-
tion can originally lead to rise of plasma corticosteroid levels. But 
stereotypic behaviour such as chain-nibbling in pigs during food 
deprivation reduces the hormone levels considerably (Dantzer and 
Mormede 1981). As a result of these experiments it was concluded that 
circulating ACTH and corticosteroid levels are not sensitive to chronic 
stress (which boredom is considered to be). However, Barnett, Hems-
worth, and Hand (1982/83) do refer to corticosteroid levels as para-
meters for chronic stress, based on experiments about the effect of 
handling pigs. Corticosteroids might be sensitive to chronic stress, 
therefore, but not to chronic distress. This is supported by the fact 
that none of the three studies done so far on understimulation in chic-
kens indicates any difference between battery cages and deep litter 
pens in adrenal activity (Freeman 1978). One can speculate that there 
may be physiological indicators that correlate with understimulation, 
e.g. the neurotransmitter norepinephrine (Seligman 1975). 
THE EFFECT OF BOREDOM ON PHYSICAL 
CHARACTERISTICS OF AN ANIMAL 
Production 
A bored pig is a slower growing pig, and "time is money" (Jesse, 
Wall Street Journal-11/1982). Jesse reported that a group of pigs, 
moved around to other, identical pens twice before slaughter, gained 1 
pound more per pig per week than a control group. More stimulation, 
and a different view of the other pigs around them, are given as the ex-
planation for this. Similar results were found by Koomans (1981): fat-
tening pigs housed in an open front piggery with straw had a signifi-
cantly higher average daily gain, and higher average back fat, than 
those without straw. The average food conversion was the same, which 
indicates that the animals ate more per day. This was also noted by 
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Jesse who stated of his pigs that "they felt better and ate better." As 
tail-biting may result in condemnation to death at the abbatoir, straw 
given to prevent tail-biting can minimize production loss in an in-
direct way (Bareham and Vestergaard 1981). 
In chicken farming both better and worse production have been 
observed in pens compared to cages (Bareham 1972). The occurrence of 
cannibalism and extreme flightiness does decrease egg production 
(Craig 1982), but how this correlates with housing in cages or pens is 
not clear. There are many different factors at work, and a definitive ex-
periment has not yet been carried out. 
Reproduction 
The adverse effects of restraint on sows are indicated by a number 
of results. First, sows come into heat earlier in a free-range environ-
ment, the main reason being the social stimulation from other sows 
(van Putten 1982a), but also because piglets suckle less. The constant 
suckling in intensive systems retards oestrus (Stolba 1982). In an in-
direct way, restraint, and thereby the prevention of nesting behaviour, 
affects reproduction: the resulting stress can cause inflammation of 
udder and uterus, and lactation becomes impossible. This syndrome is 
especially prevalent in gilts. Also, indications have been found that 
restraint at farrowing increases the incidence of still births, mum-
mified piglets and piglets with splaylegs (Baxter 1981; Ekesbo 1981a). 
Disease-susceptibility 
An increase in the frequency of disease in sows correlates with the 
increased restraint of sows in confinement systems. It is not unusual 
that continuous medication is needed to prevent disease, and this is a 
poor way of maintaining the animal's health compared to changing the 
environment (Ekesbo 1981a; Buchenauer 1981). Concerning the direct 
correlation between exploratory behaviour and disease, different 
studies have shown that there is a significantly higher incidence of 
Salmonella (diarrhea) infection in herds with no straw (Metz and 
Oosterlee 1980; Ekesbo 1981b), although rationally the opposite might 
be expected because straw may be seen as a good medium for building 
up an infection fast (Truyen 1981). Backstrom's studies of environ-
mental factors showed that general health was better in pens with 
straw compared to other beddings, and much better than in pens with 
no bedding (Ekesbo 1981a). 
In this same line Metz and Oosterlee (1980) found a lower antibody 
level and therefore a greater disease susceptibility, of tethered sows in 
pens without straw, compared with free sows in pens with straw. Total 
morbidity, and also the occurrence of the mastitis syndrome (agalactia 
toxemia) was shown to be much higher for tethered sows; the litters of 
tethered sows in a small pen had a higher total morbidity than litters 
of free sows in large pens (Ekesbo 1981a). 
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For sows and piglets it seems there is a direct correlation between 
disease susceptibility and restraint and the absence of straw, which 
are considered to be the two conditions which are very likely to cause 
boredom. Besides diarrhea and mastitis, infectious pneumonia is a fre-
quently occurring and highly damaging illness in pig operations. 
For fowl, experimental work has been done on the effect of stress 
on disease susceptibility (Freeman 1976; Siegel 1980). How these 
results apply to the different aspects of battery cage life is not clear; 
only the effects of social stress as a result of reduced space have been 
examined (Siegel 1980) and were found to cause decreased antibody 
levels and greater susceptibility to viral diseases such as New Castle 
disease, Marek's disease, hemorrhagic enteritis, and Salmonella infec-
tion. (However, resistance to bacterial infection seemed to be increased.) 
Most of these stress factors are coupled with a rise in corticosteroid 
levels (Freeman 1976), but Freeman also reports that antibody produc-
tion can be shown "to be impaired by stressors which do not even 
evoke a rise in plasma corticosterone. If more research would be done 
in this field, it might be speculated that lack of stimulation, and 
resulting boredom and frustration, can be forms of non-corticosteroid 
mediated chronic stress that affect antibody production.'' 
PHYSICAL INJURY 
The most obvious examples of physical injury as a result of 
boredom are the vices of tail-biting in pigs and feather-pecking in lay-
ing hens. These are countered by debeaking hens and cutting the tails 
of newly born piglets. From a welfare point this is unacceptable, cer-
tainly for the hen, since the beak is a primary sensory tool for receiving 
information from the environment (Duncan 1978). Many physical in-
juries are not directly a result of boredom like the examples above, but 
are a result of the same barren environment that causes the boredom. 
For instance, wounds on feet and back in pigs are a result of the bare, 
hard floors (Troxler 1980; Baxter 1981); just as severely damaged 
claws of hens are caused by the wire floors of battery cages (Tauson 
1980). These injuries could be prevented by providing some sort of bed-
ding; this would, at the same time, lead to the alleviation of boredom. 
The same is true for the tethering of sows; the many traumatic injuries 
attributed to tethering (Ekesbo 1981a) could be prevented by housing 
the sows in a free-range pen. The close correlation between understim-
ulation and injury, due to the same practice, indicates the general in-
adequacy and undesirability of that practice. 
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GENERAL EVALUATION 
Studies described in this chapter about the influence of straw for 
pigs and deep litter for laying hens confirm the idea that environmen-
tal enrichment will be beneficial and adequate as a remedy against 
some forms of abnormal behaviour. 
Is it important to consider boredom seriously as a criterion of wel-
fare, and what its impact is compared to other welfare criteria? 
An essential characteristic of boredom in evaluating welfare is 
that it directly refers to the mental state of the animal and therefore 
directly implies suffering. Productivity and reproduction are indirect 
parameters; they are not only animal centered, since the farmer's 
well-being depends on good productivity as well. Physical injury and 
disease are animal centered, and it is generally accepted that these are 
adverse to the animals' mental well-being. If not too severe, and not 
too prolonged, however, pain and disease might be "bearable." The 
same may be the case with many forms of stress as a result of over-
stimulation, since they are temporary and do not fundamentally im-
pair the integrity of the whole animal. But boredom as it is present in 
today's production system causes the animals to suffer on their most 
existential level. An animal which cannot express its specific behav-
iour patterns loses its fundamental selfhood, cannot develop itself in 
relation to its environment and cannot bear anything, pain in particu-
lar. Deprivation of selfhood is the most fundamental affliction that can 
be imposed upon an individua~ be it pig, chicken or human. 
In nature, animals are never bored. A certain amount of en-
vironmental and social stress might be present, but that does not 
deprive the animal of its capacity to deal with it. If not too severe, it 
might even enhance its coping abilities. Weather conditions and social 
interaction are factors that might be desirable in husbandry systems 
as well. In human society, prisons are confinement systems where 
material care is sufficient, but the freedom of self-expression is inten-
tionally restricted. This may be a moral choice, but we certainly do not 
consider a prison a normal environment, and boredom is known to be a 
chronic problem there. 
To suggest that boredom might be fundamentally worse than sev-
eral forms of pain does not imply, of course, that the infliction of pain 
should not be avoided where possible. It is not a matter of either one or 
the other. Rather, as has been discussed in this paper, it is very likely 
that many other welfare characteristics will be improved as well by 
alleviating boredom. Production, reproduction, and health can be 
directly improved, because there is either a direct causal relationship 
between boredom and these characteristics, or there is a positive cor-
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relation, as between boredom and physical injury, both being there-
sult of the same causal factor. 
The fact that boredom does have quite a wide range of effects on 
other aspects of the individual animal, shows that it is not just an-
thropomorphic to state that boredom is fundamentally harmful to the 
integrity of an animal. Its complete physical health is affected and the 
deprivation of selfhood is one of the most serious attacks on mental 
health. This is not an anthropomorphic statement, but a statement 
about the quality of life, and therefore applying to all living beings. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. An empathetic, caring relationship between observer and ani-
mal is fundamental if we are aiming at knowledge of the subjective ex-
perience of the animal under certain conditions. This can be a ''person-
al" relationship between the observer and an individual animal, but it 
can also take the form of a general empathetic attitude towards a 
group of animals, or towards lower, less individuated animals. 
A detached, dualistic relationship can be regarded as resulting 
from an interest in knowledge for the sake of manipulation; an attitude 
of (nonpossessive) love on the other hand has the intention of knowing 
an object in order to be able to facilitate that the object can truly be or 
become itself. Therefore, an empathetic attitude may be more "objec-
tive" than a detached one (see also Section II, Empathy, Humaneness 
and Animal Welfare). Furthermore, the alienation between knower and 
known is replaced by involvement, and quality becomes more impor-
tant than quantity because an attitude of care regards an animal as a 
qualitative being instead of a quantifiable mechanism. 
2. Each animal exists on its own level of beingness, implying that 
awareness and emotional experience are fundamental characteristics 
of life, existing down to the lowest levels. However far removed from 
human inner experience as the lower levels might be, the concept of be-
ingness implies a respect for the selfhood of each species, and a rec-
ognition of the fact that the quality of life matters to each animal. 
Many higher vertebrates, such as dogs, dolphins, elephants, pri-
mates, etc., show capacities which indicate self-awareness and a well-
developed individual emotional life. They are intelligent and sensitive 
and an adequate environment is crucial for the proper expression of their 
selfhood. We should therefore be prepared to meet animals on their 
own terms in order to value their innate abilities and potentialities, in-
stead of forcing them to "adapt" to man-made environments and to 
those conditions that cause them otherwise avoidable stress and dis-
tress. 
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3. Behaviour is the qualitative expression of an animal's selfhood, 
and is therefore an end in itself, and not a means towards a homeo-
static state, or towards successful reproduction. Each animal has 
basic, genetically inherited, behavioural needs which clearly matter to 
it, because when it is prevented from performing these behaviours it 
resorts to abnormal behaviour or becomes apathetic. An animal can be 
said to be bored when it has to adapt to its environment in an abnormal 
way, indicative of understimulation, in order to maintain its sense of 
selfhood. Boredom can be regarded as a form of distress, indicating 
that an animal is stressed, not due to overstimulation, but due to un-
derstimulation. 
Behavioural criteria of boredom have been delineated in this paper 
and it was concluded that behaviour represents a higher level of in-
tegration than physiology; it concerns the whole, integrated animal, 
whereas physiology reflects the interaction of the various (un-
conscious) parts. Physiological processes are directed at the mainte-
nance of a homeostatic state. This state, however, is not necessarily 
equivalent to a state of well-being. Boredom is a form of suffering 
which primarily is the result of a cognitive process, directly linked to 
the behavioural possibilities an animal has. Physiological observations 
are not more objective because they are easier to quantify; in contrast 
with behaviour they miss the direct link to the subjective experience of 
an animal, and are therefore, secondary though they might be, useful 
indicators. 
4. Many forms of abnormal behaviour in pigs and chickens are de-
scribed. Their relatedness to boredom appears from the fact that they 
usually disappear when some form of environmental enrichment takes 
place, and when the animals are more able to express different behav-
iours. 
For sows and piglets, the fulfillment of basic needs which prevent 
the worst forms of boredom seem to be: the ability to moue unrestrict-
edly in a certain amount of space; the provision of straw and contact 
with other conspecifics. 
For chickens, these needs are: some space to moue, material to per-
form basic nest building behaviour and the opportunity to search for 
food on the floor. 
In a housing system where food and drink are provided, the most 
important remedy against boredom is the provision of explorative 
possibilities. Doing something, whether it be playing, looking for food, 
or ht1ilding a nest, constitutes the basis for selfhood. Deprivation of 
selfhood is the most fundamental affliction for any living being, and is 
reflected in lower production, lower reproduction, higher disease 
susceptibility and an increasing amount of physical injury. 
Recent research projects indicate that it is possible indeed to 
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create environments for domestic animals which give them much more 
freedom to express their behavioural needs, within economic limits 
(Wood-Gush and Stolba 1982; Albright 1982). The argument that if an 
animal is productive it surely is healthy and adapted, obscures the fact 
that the use of medical drugs is essential to keep farm animals alive 
and productive (Fox 1983a). Medical care is very expensive, and the 
cart is constantly put before the horse in this way. Instead of starting 
to care for animals when it is almost too late, it seems better to accept 
care as the foundation for our attitude towards them. 
In this paper I wanted to indicate and elaborate on the idea that 
there is an important and direct link between a meta-scientific start-
ing point of empathetic relationship, and practical guidelines for ani-
mal husbandry. The willingness to meet animals in a relationship of 
friendship, thereby discovering their inner world, can result in useful, 
animal-centered knowledge of their needs and preferences. We might 
in this way be able to create an environment for the animal which is 
healthy, both physically and mentally, and which will benefit not only 
them, but ourselves as well. 
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ATTITUDES TOWARD ANIMALS: 
AGE-RELATED DEVELOPMENT AMONG 
CHILDREN* 
Stephen R. Kellert * * 
School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, 
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New Haven, Connecticut 06511 
Abstract 
This paper reviews the results of a study of 267 children in the 
2nd, 5th, 8th, and 11th grades. A battery of tests was used to examine 
children's knowledge and attitudes towards animals, and behavioral 
contacts with animals. A typology of basic attitudes towards animals 
and appropriate scales was employed. Children's knowledge and at-
titudes towards animals were also compared to those of adults 18 
years of age and over. Major differences occurred among children dis-
tinguished by age, sex, ethnicity, and urban/rural residence. Addi-
tionally, significant knowledge and attitude variations occurred 
among diverse animal-related activity groups (e.g., among children 
who hunted, birdwatched, learned about animals in school). Perhaps 
the most important finding was the identification of three stages in the 
development of children's perceptions of animals. The transition from 
*This study was funded by grants from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and G.R. 
Dodge Foundation. For details of Dr. Kellert's earlier and more extensive study of 
American attitudes toward and knowledge of animals, see Appendix. 
**Many thanks to Miriam Westervelt who co-authored the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, General Printing Office report #024-010-00641-2 of the children's study. 
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6 to 9 years of age primarily involved major changes in affective, emo-
tional relationships to animals. The change from 10 to 13 years of age 
was marked by a major increase in cognitive, factual understanding 
and knowledge of animals. The shift from 13 to 16 years of age wit-
nessed a dramatic broadening in ethical concern and ecological ap-
preciation of animals and the natural environment. 
INTRODUCTION 
This report is the fifth in a series of studies on American attitudes, 
knowledge and behaviors toward animals and natural habitats. The 
first three reports focused on the findings of a national survey of 3, 107 
adult Americans residing in the 48 contiguous states and Alaska (Kel-
lert 1979, 1980a; Kellert and Berry 1981). The fourth report considered 
historical trends in American animal use and perception during the 
twentieth century (Kellert and Westervelt 1982). This fifth report fo-
cuses on children's attitudes, knowledge and behaviors toward animals. 
Children's perceptions of animals, particularly very young chil-
dren, are especially difficult to study (Pomerantz 1977). This study 
should, therefore, be regarded as exploratory, preliminary and tenta-
tive. Because of its exploratory character, this study did not include a 
random sample of American children. The sample was instead confined to 
the state of Connecticut, although representative numbers of children 
from each age, sex, urban/rural, and black/white category were included. 
The total sample included 63 second, 68 fifth, 67 eighth, and 69 elev-
enth grade students: a total of 267 children. Because somewhat similar 
methodologies were employed in the study of adult Americans, the 
children's sample will at times be compared with results obtained in 
the national adult survey. 
KNOWLEDGE OF ANIMALS 
Knowledge of animals was assessed primarily in four ways: a 
series of 33 true/false and multiple choice questions, a pictorial identi-
fication test of 15 animals, 11 questions regarding the primary foods of 
selected animals, and a film test focusing on ecological relationships. 
The results generally indicated that most children possessed a lim-
ited knowledge of animals. For example, less than 30% of the children 
were aware that the spring peeper is a frog, and only 29% knew koala 
bears are not really bears. A disappointing 21% understood veal does 
not come from lamb, and 55% believed whales are a large fish. A better 
but disappointing 60% realized all birds do not fly south for the 
winter, but only 52% knew the penguin is a bird, just 26% knew a tern 
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is not an insect, and only 29% realized tigers do not live in Africa. 
Lack of ecological understanding was suggested by responses to 
the film testing segment. Most children interpreted predation and 
nutrient cycling in anthropomorphic and negative terms, rarely appre-
ciating or identifying the ecological values of these activities. The ef-
forts of dung beetles were generally considered "disgusting," and 
many children regarded predation as "wrong." 
However, some encouraging knowledge results did emerge. Chil-
dren as a whole, and 11th graders in particular, were significantly 
more knowledgeable than adults on questions concerning inverte-
brates and the basic biological characteristics of animals (Table 1). 
Adults were, however, more knowledgeable than children about domes-
tic animals and situations involving animals inflicting injury on people 
and property. Greater knowledge of invertebrates among children was 
suggested by 78% of all children and 86% of 11th graders, compared 
to 50% of adults, knowing spiders do not have 10 legs. When adults 
were compared with 11th graders only, 23% of adults versus 48% of 
the students knew inch worms are not in the same family as earth 
worms. 
Table 1. Mean correct score by types of knowledge questions 
Children's and adult samples 
All children 11th Adult 
( <18 years of age) grade ( <18 years of age) 
Biological characteristics 56.8 63.9 55.3 
Invertebrates 47.5 51.3 34.7 
Human injury 39.5 47.8 63.4 
Domestic animals 39.2 44.4 53.4 
Taxonomic characteristics 37.3 43.9 38.5 
Endangered species 24.6 24.6 27.4 
Based, on mean scores, children were most knowledgeable about 
the basic biological characteristics of animals (e.g., "snakes are cov-
ered by a thin layer of slime") and invertebrates. These knowledge 
question categories had overall mean scores, respectively, of 56.8 and 
47.5, on a scoring range from 0 to 100. Adults had a dramatically lower 
invertebrate question mean score of 34.7. The adults, however, obtained a 
significantly higher mean score on questions concerning human injury or 
property damage-63.4 versus a children's mean of 39.5. Both children 
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and adults had similar scores on the "taxonomic characteristics of ani-
mals" category (e.g., "koala bears are not really bears")-37.3 and 
38.5 respectively. Both groups possessed relatively little knowledge of 
endangered species. 
Children were relatively able to recognize a variety of animal spe-
cies. At least 85% correctly identified a bluejay, swan, rattlesnake, 
eagle, raccoon, dolphin, wolf and monarch butterfly. Almost three-
quarters correctly identified a duck, although only 28% recognized it 
as a mallard duck. On the other hand, only 8% could identify a great 
blue heron, just one-third recognized a duck-billed platypus, and only 
15% knew a bobwhite. 
Children were also knowledgeable about the primary foods of a 
variety of species. Most children knew what foods were mainly eaten 
by mice, rabbits, wolves, owls, robins, caterpillers, snakes, and frogs. 
Only a minority, however, knew which foods were primarily consumed 
by trout, deer, and bobcats. 
Highly significant knowledge scale differences occurred among 
children distinguished by age, ethnicity, and geographic place of resi-
dence. Male/female differences were also significant but at a more 
modest .02 confidence level (Table 2). Eleventh grade children had the 
Table 2. Analysis of variance and multiple classification results on knowledge scale 
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highest mean scores; 2nd graders, the lowest. Relatively high knowl-
edge scores occurred among rural children and 8th graders. In con-
trast, relatively low knowledge means were characteristic of black chil-
dren and children residing in large cities. 
Age distinctions were especially impressive. Knowledge scale dif-
ferences among 8th and 11th graders, however, were substantially less 
divergent than between 5th and 8th graders, suggesting a decline in 
the effect of age. An absence of knowledge scale differences among 
adults over 18 years of age further suggested decreasing importance of 
age on knowledge of animals. 
Ethnic differences were very striking, particularly the very low 
knowledge scores of nonwhites. Black children had the lowest knowl-
edge scores of any demographic group with the exception of 2nd 
graders. These knowledge scale differences remained after considering 
the possible confounding effects of other demographic variables, par-
ticularly urban/rural residence. 
Urban/rural differences were very significant, particularly when 
comparing children living in large cities with those residing in the 
most rural areas. Rural children had the second highest knowledge 
scale scores, in contrast to children residing in large cities, who had the 
third lowest scores. 
Male/female differences were less pronounced, although still sig-
nificant at the .02 level. Significantly higher male knowledge scores 
typically occurred when the animal was a predator. Species preference 
results also revealed a more negative view of predator animals among 
female children. 
ATTITUDES TOWARD ANIMALS 
A typology of basic attitudes toward animals was developed dur-
ing previous research on adult relationships to animals. Brief defini-
tions of nine attitude types are indicated in Table 3, although more 
thorough descriptions are available elsewhere (Kellert 1980b). Survey 
scales were developed to measure each of the attitudes, although it 
proved impossible to obtain an adequate aesthetic scale. Fifty-four 
questions were used for measuring the eight attitude scales. Addi-
tionally, a 30-minute film, and an accompanying 87-item question-
naire, were created to provide a less structured and more visually sen-
sitive test of attitudes toward animals. Approximately 70 films were 
reviewed to obtain appropriate segments for this film methodology. 
The relative independence of the eight attitude scales was suggested 
by scale intercorrelations of .30 and less with the exception of the 
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Primary interest and affection for wildlife and the outdoors. 
Primary concern for the environment as a system, for interrela-
tionships between wildlife species and natural habitats. 
Primary interest and strong affection for individual animals, 
principally pets. 
Primary concern for the right and wrong treatment of animals, 
with strong opposition to exploitation or cruelty toward animals. 
Primary interest in the physical attributes and biological func-
tioning of animals. 
Primary interest in the artistic and symbolic characteristics of 
animals. 
Primary concern for the practical and material value of animals 
or the animal's habitat. 
Primary interest in the mastery and control of animals typically 
in sporting situations. 
Primary orientation an active avoidance of animals due to indif-
ference, dislike or fear. 
*Hypothetically, the negativistic attitude can be divided into two attitude types: 
neutralistic attitude reflecting a passive avoidance of animals due to indifference; and, 
a negativistic attitude characterized by dislike and fear of animals. In this research, on-
ly one encompassing attitude has been considered. 
negativistic and naturalistic, and negativistic and ecologistic atti-
tudes, which correlated at the + .48 level. 
The relative occurrence of the attitudes was assessed by examin-
ing attitude scale score frequency distributions, the slope of the regres-
sion line of the frequency distributions, and standardized attitude 
scale mean scores. According to these indicators, the most common at-
titude was the humanistic (Figure 1). This attitude scale had the 
highest mean score, lowest slope figure (indicative of a more dispersed 
frequency distribution), and included more children in the higher scor-
ing ranges. Also indicative of .the relative "popularity" of the hu-
manistic attitude was the finding of "loveable animals" as the most 
preferred type of animal, cited by 39% of the children (Table 4). In 
general, strong emotional attachment to individual animals, and a 
tendency toward anthropomorphism, were the most typical percep-
tions of animals among the children studied. 
The second and third most frequent attitudes were the naturalistic 
and negativistic. These attitudes were negatively correlated, sug-
gesting two somewhat conflicting perspectives of animals as common 
among children. The relative "popularity" of the naturalistic perspec-
tive was also suggested by "animals in the woods" as the second most 
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Table 4. Type of animal liked the most by all children 
Beautiful animals 
Useful animals 
Animals that scientists study 
Loveable animals 
Animals in sports 
Animals in the woods 
Animals that are important to the balance of nature 









The moralistic attitude ranked fourth in overall frequency of oc-
currence. Concern for the ethical treatment of animals was indicated 
by 70% of the children objecting to harvesting wild animals for their 
fur. Additionally, only 26% of the children supported hunting for rec-
reational or sporting purposes, and 91% objected to trophy hunting, 
although 60% approved of hunting for food. 
The utilitarian attitude was fifth in relative "popularity." By com-
parison, the greater frequency of the humanistic and naturalistic at-
titudes suggested children appreciate animals more for recreational 
and emotional than for practical reasons. Only 9% of the children cited 
"useful" animals as their favorite type of animal. 
The dominionistic attitude was relatively uncommon, ranking 
sixth in frequency of occurrence. The least requently occurring at-
titudes were the ecologistic and scientistic. These latter attitudes em-
phasize an intellectual perspective of animals, suggesting that concep-
tual understandings of animals are somewhat uncommon among chil-
dren. The rarity of the scientistic and ecologistic attitudes was also re-
flected in "scientifically interesting animals" being cited by 6%, and 
animals "important to the balance of nature" by 4%, of the children as 
their favorite types of animals. 
In the national study of adults, the humanistic attitude was also 
the most frequent perspective of animals, and the negativistic and 
moralistic attitudes were similarly popular (Table 5). The most strik-
ing difference in attitudes towards animals between children and 
adults was the widely varying occurrence of the naturalistic and 
utilitarian perspectives; The naturalistic attitude was much more com-
mon among children, while a utilitarian view of animals was far more 
typical of adults. 
Some impressive attitude differences occurred among children dis-
tinguished by age, sex, ethnicity, and urban/rural residence. 
Significant age differences were observed on every scale with the 
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Table 5. National sample-18 years and older; childrens sample-2nd, 5th, 8th, 
11th grades by attitude scale mean scores, slope of scale frequency distribution, and 
rank of occurence 
Adults Children 
X Slope based on Rank of x Slope based on Rank of 
actual response occurence actual response occurence 
ranges ranges 
Dominionistic .14 - 746.08 7 .27 -52.06 5 
Ecologistic .22 - 603.25 5 .27 -61.60 5 
Humanistic .36 359.86 1 .43 -17.09 1 
Moralistic .27 - 375.90 3 .33 -37.05 4 
Naturalistic .20 - 578.32 6 .35 -25.04 2 
Negativistic .28 - 456.61 2 .35 -23.68 2 
Sci en tis tic .10 -1143.45 8 .23 -76.67 8 
Utilitarian .23 - 398.21 4 .30 -45.74 4 
exception of the humanistic (Table 6). Younger children consistently 
placed the needs of people over animals, and expressed minimal con-
cern for the rights and protection of animals. This difference was 
reflected in highly significant utilitarian, dominionistic, and moralistic 
scale results. Younger children also expressed far less interest in 
animals, particularly wildlife. This difference was reflected in highly 
significant negativistic and naturalistic results. Finally, younger chil-
dren were substantially less knowledgeable and informed about ani-
mals and the natural environment, as suggested by striking knowl-
edge and ecologistic scale findings. 
These results were somewhat surprising, perhaps due to our soci-
ety's idealization of young children's perceptions of animals. The 
tendency is to believe young children have some natural affinity for 
living creatures, regarding them as little friends or kindred spirits. The 
results suggest otherwise, since young children were the most ex-
ploitative, unfeeling, and uninformed of all children in their attitudes 
toward animals. Some have argued our society creates a "make-be-
lieve" world for young children, often ill-preparing them for reality, 
and a related tendency may be a distortion of the actual views of 
young people toward animals. These results suggest educational ef-
forts among children 6 to 10 years of age might best focus on the affec-
tive realm, mainly emphasizing emotional concern and sympathy for 
animals. 
The most profound shift between 5th and 8th grade was a major 
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Table 6. Analysis of variance and multiple classification analysis results for grade 
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The ages of children in the 2nd, 5th, 8th and 11th grades are (approximately): 6-7, 
10, 13, and 16-18 years, respectively. 
increase in factual knowledge of animals. The apparent value of em-
phasizing factual learning at this age is consistent with results re-
ported by Horvat (1974), Dyar (1975), La Hart (1978), and Giles (1959). 
Eleventh graders were far more ecologistic, moralistic, and natu-
ralistic in their attitudes toward animals than were 8th graders. Acti-
vity results also suggested 11th grade children were far more inter-
ested in direct contact and recreational enjoyment of wildlife and the 
out-of-doors. The most basic change at this stage, thus, involved ma-
jor increases in ethical concern for animals, appreciation of wildlife, 
and an ability to deal with abstract concepts such as ecosystems and 
biological diversity. This period appears to offer the best opportunity 
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for developing ethical concern for animals and an understanding of 
ecology. 
In summary, three major transitions were suggested by there-
sults. The period from 2nd to 5th grade was most significantly charac-
terized by a major increase in emotional concern and affection for ani-
mals. The years between 5th and 8th grades witnessed a dramatic im-
provement in factual and cognitive understanding of animals. Finally, 
the change from 8th to 11th grade was marked most of all by a major 
expansion in ethical and ecological concern for animals and the natural 
environment. 
Highly significant differences among male and female children oc-
curred on the dominionistic, ecologistic, humanistic, negativistic, and 
knowledge scales (Table 7). Moderately significant utilitarian scale re-
sults were also found. These results indicated greater factual knowl-
edge, awareness and concern for wildlife among male children. On the 
other hand, female children were more inclined to oppose subordina-
tion and dominance of animals, and evidenced a greater emotional af-
fection for large, attractive, primarily domestic pet animals. 
Male/female differences on the humanistic, dominionistic and neg-
ativistic scales were significant at all age levels. Gender differences on 
Table 7. Analysis of variance and multiple classification analysis results for sex by 
attitude and knowledge scales 
SigF x Devia. from Sig F x Devia. from 
score mean after score mean after 
adj. for ind. adj. for ind. 
& cov. & cov. 
variables variables 
Dominionistic .00 Negativistic .00 
Male 3.61 0.64 5.18 -0.88 
Female 2.34 -0.62 6.80 0.85 
Ecologistic .01 Scientistic .89 
Male 3.36 0.39 1.83 -0.03 
Female 2.60 -0.38 1.86 0.03 
Humanistic .01 Utilitarian .09 
Male 3.93 -0.35 3.50 0.19 
Female 4.65 0.34 3.06 -0.19 
Moralistic .27 
Male 3.73 -0.16 
Female 4.05 0.16 
Naturalistic .66 Knowledge .02 
Male 5.78 -0.13 47.03 2.47 
Female 5.95 0.13 41.82 -2.39 
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the knowledge, ecologistic and moralistic scales, however, were in-
consequential among 2nd grade children, although significant at all 
other age levels. An increase in moralistic concern among female stu-
dents from 8th to 11th grades was particularly impressive. Male chil-
dren, in contrast, became far more knowledgeable and concerned about 
wildlife and the natural environment than female children as they grew 
older. 
Ethnic variations were striking on all the attitude scales with the 
exception of the moralistic and scientistic (Table 8). Far greater 
knowledge of animals and the natural enviroment among white chil-
dren was particularly evident. Moreover, knowledge variations were as 
great in 2nd as 11th grade. Black children also expressed a greater 
willingness to subordinate animals, especially in the context of im-
proving human material well-being. These differences were reflected 
in significant dominionistic and utilitarian scale results. Finally, black 
children revealed less affection and general interest in animals, par-
ticularly wildlife, as suggested by significant humanistic, negativistic, 
and naturalistic results. 
Surprisingly few significant urban/rural differences were observed, 
Table 8. Analysis of variance and multiple classification analysis results for 
ethnicity by attitude and knowledge scale 
SigF X Devia. from Sig F :X Devia. from 
score mean after score mean after 
adj. for ind. adj. for ind. 
& cov. & cov. 
variables variables 
Dominionistic .01 Negativistic .00 
White 2.74 -0.25 5.58 -0.16 
Nonwhite 3.83 1.21 7.60 0.79 
Ecologistic .01 Scientistic .18 
White 3.18 0.13 1.80 -0.08 
Nonwhite 2.12 -0.66 2.19 0.39 
Humanistic .02 Utilitarian .01 
White 4.41 0.19 3.13 -0.16 
Nonwhite 3.50 -0.94 4.02 0.78 
Moralistic .39 
White 3.91 0.03 
Nonwhite 3.55 -0.14 
Naturalistic .07 Knowledge .00 
White 6.01 0.05 47.40 1.17 
Nonwhite 5.05 -0.22 31.60 -5.72 
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with the exception of negativistic and knowledge scale results (Table 
9). Rural children were more interested and knowledgeable about ani-
mals, particularly in contrast to children living in the large cities. Few 
major changes occurred among residential groups when controlling for 
age. One exception was a marked increase in knowledge of animals 
among suburban children. 
Table 9. Analysis of variance and multiple classification analysis results for 
population present residence by attitude and knowledge scales 
SigF :X Devia. from Sig F x Devia. from 
score mean after score mean after 
adj. for ind. adj. for ind. 
&cov. & cov. 
variables variables 
Dominionistic .24 Negativistic .04 
Urban 3.04 -0.48 6.75 0.61 
Small city 3.34 1.15 5.85 0.41 
Suburb 3.19 -0.12 6.29 -0.32 
Rural 2.42 -0.15 4.91 -0.68 
Ecologistic .38 Scientistic .23 
Urban 2.71 -0.10 1.78 0.33 
Small city 2.77 -0.53 1.45 -0.13 
Suburb 3.11 0.42 2.06 -0.05 
Rural 3.35 0.10 2.03 -0.15 
Humanistic .84 Utilitarian .69 
Urban 4.15 0.18 3.39 -0.12 
Small city 4.49 -0.01 3.15 0.20 
Suburb 4.42 -0.04 3.44 0.03 
Rural 4.30 -0.15 3.06 -0.04 
Moralistic .43 
Urban 3.92 -0.08 
Small city 4.23 0.30 
Suburb 4.02 0.31 
Rural 3.50 -0.40 
Naturalistic .16 Knowledge .00 
Urban 5.47 -0.49 38.00 -5.96 
Small city 5.72 -0.09 46.90 -1.13 
Suburb 5.79 -0.06 42.90 2.52 
Rural 6.61 0.67 52.30 5.23 
Attitude differences observed across all the demographic groups 
additionally revealed some interesting results, although these will be 
only briefly examined. On the negativistic scale, the highest scores 
were found among 2nd graders, nonwhites, female and urban children, 
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in contrast to the low scores of 8th and 11th grade, rural resident, and 
male children (Figure 2). Ecologistic scores were highest among older 
children, male, and rural residents, in comparison to the low scores of 
2nd graders and nonwhites (Figure 3). On the utilitarian scale, 2nd 
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graders and nonwhites had the highest scores, while the lowest utili-
tarian scores occurred among 11th graders and female children (Figure 4). 
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The extent and influence of various activities involving animals 
will be briefly reviewed. Three-quarters or more of the children par-
ticipated in seven animal-related activities during the previous two-
year period including visiting zoos (93%), owning a pet (87%), fishing 
(87%), learning about animals in schools (83%), feeding birds (82%), 
reading books or magazines about animals (76%), and watching "Wild 
Kingdom" on television (74%). On the other hand, the least frequent 
activities included family livestock raising (21 %), hunting (18%), trap-
ping (13%), and belonging to an animal-related club (8%). 
The attitude and knowledge scores of children who frequently par· 
ticipated in some of these activities were examined. Particularly sur-
prising was the relatively low knowledge scores of children who learned 
about animals in school or who visited zoos (Table 10). Moreover, these 
two groups had the highest negativistic scale scores (Table 11). These 
activities, thus, appeared to exert little positive influence on children. 
Most zoological parks continue to fail to go beyond superficial enter-
tainment toward instilling greater appreciation of animals among chil-
dren, while most learning about animals in school appears to be so di-
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Table 10. Knowledge scale mean scores by selected animal activity groups* 
Ever hunted 
Belong to animal club 
Family raised livestock 
Went outside to look at birds 
Have a pet 
Learned about animals in school 









*Most of these groups include only children who frequently participated in these ac-
tivities. Significance tests were not performed because the groups were not mutually 
exclusive. 
Table 11. Negativistic scale mean scores by selected animal activity groups 
Went to zoo 
Learned about animals in school 
Went outside to look at birds 
Ever fished 
Family raised livestock 
Have a pet 











vorced from direct experience with animals and the natural environ-
ment that little basic knowledge results. 
More encouraging activity results were found among children who 
birdwatched, belonged to animal-related clubs, or hunted. These 
children were generally more appreciative, knowledgeable, and con-
cerned about animals. These results suggest the positive value of 
direct, participatory contact between children and animals. 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the most outstanding result of this exploratory study was 
the indication of varying stages in the evolution of children's percep-
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tions of animals. Each period appears to offer varying opportunities 
for environmental education. The transition from 2nd to 5th grade 
would seem the most opportune time for emphasizing affective/emo-
tional concern for animals. The interval between 5th and 8th grades, 
on the other hand, offers the most promising possibilities for develop-
ing cognitive and factual understanding of animals. Finally, the shift 
from 8th to 11th grades would appear to be the most appropriate per-
iod for fostering ethical and ecological appreciation of animals and the 
natural world. 
Ethnic and urban/rural findings suggest the need for devoting 
more attention to the animal-related perceptions and interests of ur-
ban disadvantaged children. Activity results indicate the value of 
educational programs that emphasize direct contact and experimental 
involvement with animals. 
The results of this exploratory study clearly suggest the impor-
tance of more extensive and in-depth investigation of children's 
perceptions and relationships to animals. The reported findings in-
timate the possibility of exercising meaningful influence on the 
development of a more positive, informed, and benign perspective on 
animals among children. More ambitious and imaginative efforts will 
be required, however, as the eventual well-being of animals and the 
natural world will depend on the future commitment and concern of to-
day's youth. 
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EMPATHY,_ HUMANENESS AND 
ANIMAL WELFARE 
M. W. Fox 
2100 L Street, N. W. 
Washington, D.C. 20037 
Empathy is defined variously as: the intellectual identification 
with or vicarious experiencing of the feelings, thoughts, or attitudes of 
another (Random House Dictionary); the power of projecting one's per-
sonality into and so fully understanding the object of contemplation 
(Oxford Dictionary); and the imaginative projection of one's own con-
sciousness into another being (Webster's Dictionary). 
Sympathy and empathy are distinctly different phenomena. Sym-
pathy is the sharing of another's emotions, especially grief and 
anguish, involving pity and compassion. Empathy (from the Greek 
term meaning affection, and a more recent German term einfuhlung, 
which means "a feeling in"), entails the power of understanding and 
imaginatively entering into another's feelings. While the two are not 
mutually exclusive, empathy implies some level of objective knowl-
edge and therefore a greater accuracy of perception and affect than are 
·seen in sympathy, which, because it is more subjective, may be a less 
accurate and more intuitive way of perceiving and responding to an-
other's emotions. In our relations with animals (as with each other), 
sympathetic concern may or may not be misplaced, while empathetic 
concern, since it includes both objective understanding (of both the 
animal's nature and our ethical responsibilities) and emotional involve-
ment, is likely to be more accurate and, therefore, less often confound-
ed by anthropomorphic projections. 
Empathy is motivateci by concern, the accuracy of that concern (a 
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desert animal doesn't need water even if one is thirsty observing it in 
the Sahara) being a condition of understanding: of rational objective 
("scientific") knowledge. From right understanding, right action, a 
compassion (and responsible stewardship) arises. The sympathetic ex-
periences, feelings, and imaginings (of how one might feel in the 
other's place) that come from empathizing (i.e., the introjections of 
one's projections) become more accurate with experience and rational 
understanding. This is the key to good human relations and the hu-
mane treatment of animals. 
In relation to a person's emotional rapport with an animal, is em-
pathy possible? Sympathetic concern for animals is often judged, 
sometimes correctly, as being a sentimental, anthropomorphic projec-
tion. Sheer subjective sympathy toward an animal, without objective 
understanding of its behavior and needs, can lead to erroneous as-
sumptions as to its well-being, and to misjudgement of others' treat-
ment of animals as being cruel. Empathy is possible when the "feel-
ings, thoughts, or attitudes of another" can be vicariously experienced: 
thus when there is objective knowledge about what an animal's overt 
behavior signifies, and what emotional states, intentions, and expecta-
tions such overt behavior reflects, empathy is possible. Without such 
objective knowledge, we have sympathy and varying degrees of an-
thropomorphization. Understanding and sympathy combined make 
empathy possible. 
Empathy is a perceptual and cognitive phenomenon, not simply an 
anthropomorphic "humanizing" projection: it is analogous to what 
phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty terms lateral coexistential knowl-
edge as distinct from objective, "vertical" (i.e., Cartesian mind over 
body) knowing and perceiving. Dallery (1978) illustrates this mode of 
perception as follows: 
This is not the place to summarize Merleau-Ponty's magisterial 
work, The Phenomenology of Perception (1946). For our purposes, 
it is important to note that perception is described as the com-· 
plex, always open, temporal "access" between world and per-
ceiver. It is neither a causal process rwr a process distinct from 
social relations, speech, or understanding (as it would be if percep-
tion were a "thought of seeing'~. So in perceiving a snake, for ex-
ample, I do not simply receive an impression of a sinuous form 
having a certain mottled pattern; I do not see a cold, indifferent 
fact, or have a bunch of impressions to which I might or might 
not endow some value depending on my feelings; I see the snake, 
which is to say that I see its behavior in an environment proper to 
it and that I "appropriate" the snake's way of being, the snake's 
perception of certain things around it. But I am free to regard the 
snake as an object and admire its beauty, or to loathe its slithering. 
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There is knowledge and feeling inherent in such empathetic per-
ception. Dallery continues: 
To see the animal moving in its environment is already to "care" 
about the anima~ since in a way I put myself in its place. I say it 
is foraging, or mating, or fleeing; I know what it is doing because 
these are analogues of my behavior ... But if beasts have no in-
terior being and are automata, as Descartes held, I cannot "think 
in their place." In fact, I cannot really perceive them. They be-
come real to me only as I add to certain sensations meanings that 
come from my sentiment of intellect. In outline, this is the tenden-
cy of modem thought. Perception is relegated either to blind 
mechanisms (as in skeptical empiricism and objective psychol-
ogy) or to operations of the mind (as in Cartesianism and Kan-
tianism). For Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, this amounts to can-
celing out perception and losing the world (at least losing it in and 
by means of philosophy). Merleau-Ponty then is not speaking 
metaphorically when he charges both camps in the modem tradi-
tion with blindness; he does not mean blindness to things in the 
environment (loss of the ability to see) but blindness to the world 
as lived, the world as open to environments of other beasts, as 
providing the ground of our coexistence of being together. 
This I call simply a lack of empathy, which makes us dehumanize our-
selves by objectifying the world, the causes of which need careful study. 
From the existential phenomenologist's perspective, the dif-
ference between detached objectivity and rational empathy can be 
viewed as follows. Dallery (1978) equates the former with "vertical" 
Cartesian, hierarchical, instrumental, perceptional knowledge and the 
latter with "lateral" coexistential knowledge and perception. So where 
does sympathy fit into this paradigm? Dallery does not answer this 
question. It lies, I believe, in the "lateral" or coexistential dimension 
as the potential bridge for rational empathy and coexistential knowl-
edge. And it is easily inhibited by the "vertical" dimension of Carte-
sian thought and perception. Hence Cartesianism, while not inhibiting 
rational intellectual development, can impair the expression of sym-
pathy which is a prerequisite for the development of rational empathy 
and moral maturity. 
The Cartesian dimension is advantageous to our survival or being 
and the coexistential dimension vital for our becoming. In thinking 
and perceiving in both these objective and trans-subjective dimen-
sions, we literally think and see both ways, a "double-vision" that 
reconciles the dialectical nature of reality and the duality of self and 
other, with the paradoxical wisdom of objective love. Then, and only 
then, is a mature, rationally responsible and empathetic love and 
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understanding of others possible. Both meaning and fulfillment are 
then experienced as a kind of resonance between love and understand-
ing: agape and logos. 
There are those who believe that since the subjective world of 
animals cannot be objectively weighed and measured, it does not exist. 
Furthermore, empathizing seems pointless since animals do not really 
have emotions or an inner subjective mental world, except one govern-
ed by unconscious instincts. This animal-as-machine attitude, termed 
Cartesianism after the philosopher Rene Descartes who gave this at-
titude scientific respectability in the seventeenth century, is not the 
only factor that impairs our ability to empathize. 
The ability to empathize may be inborn as an adaptive component 
of our sociobiology, and as Alice Miller (1981) has shown, lack of 
mature parental love and understanding can severely impair a child's 
empathetic development. 
The experience of parents' empathetic understanding (expressed 
as the ability to deal supportively with the child's suffering, anxieties, 
and growing independence) has a significant influence upon a child's 
ability to love and empathize. Males, in our patriarchal society, may 
well show more cruelty toward animals, or justify the same, because 
they close off empathy more than females when faced with others' 
helplessness and suffering. The more intense, existential anxiety and 
reduced ability to empathize, plus a greater need to assume dominion 
over others (as power and control) in the male of our species may be 
rooted in the male child's greater sense of insecurity and separateness 
from the mother in early life. This is less intense in little girls because 
they have the security and connectedness of maternal gender identity. 
Hence women may be better able to empathize and cope with others' 
suffering, this sex difference being exemplified by the greater nurtur-
ing ability of females that may be more than a culturally determined 
sex-stereotype. The greater the sense of personal security, the less 
need for such distancing defense mechanisms to cope with anxiety as 
rationalization, denial, sublimation, objectification and reaction for-
mation. 
Those adult males who are less "feminine," empathetic and nur-
turing, are not necessarily less sensitive than women. Their apparent 
insensitivity may be attributed to an emotional closing down to vary-
ing degrees when faced with others' helplessness and suffering. This 
awakens their own unbearable feelings of vulnerability, fear of being 
hurt and of losing control or of being controlled. Fear and empathy are 
thus linked, when empathizing evokes the awareness and terror of 
one's own ultimate non-being. The fears of empathy's burdens and of 
losing power and control are the greatest obstacles to man's being and 
becoming humane. To judge such people as being deliberately cruel or 
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intrinsically insensitive is surely unjust, yet this is a common reaction 
in the humane, animal welfare and rights movement. 
Such defensive ideologies as patriarchal dominionism and Carte-
sianism, like machismo, are perhaps reaction formations in the service 
of the ego, especially of the insecure male ego, in this culture, which 
need to be recognized as pathologically maladaptive reaction forma-
tions. 
The ability to empathize is also affected by cultural attitudes and 
values: emotions are put down by instrumental rationalists as being ir-
rational and subjective. Self-serving religious and political ideologies 
also impair the ability to empathize, notably such ideologies as: man's 
God-given dominion (over women, animals and nature); of God being 
only transcendent and not also ominpresent, inhering in all living 
things. Beliefs that animals have an intrinsic right to exist, or are en-
souled, or possess a spark of inherent divinity, have been dismissed as 
"eastern" philosophy and pagan pantheism. Yet respect and compas-
sion toward all of God's creations is an integral part of Christianity 
(especially of Paulist, Gnostic and Essene doctrines). 
The moral foundation of our industrial civilization's relationship 
with animals and nature is clearly flawed by its lack of reverence for all 
life. In order to further the exploitation of animals by the biomedical, 
farming and wildlife ''resource'' industries, such beliefs in man's domi-
nion and in animals having no inherent rights, divinity or capacity to 
suffer emotionally, become essential defenses to rationalize away and 
deny empathetic feelings of compassion, guilt and responsibility. 
There are a number of other reasons why empathy toward animals 
is impaired, leading to their being treated inhumanely or with indif-
ference. First, we lack objective, scientific knowledge, (rather than ap-
plied production-related information) about the behavioral re-
quirements and emotional, subjective world of animals. Farmers, ani-
mal scientists and others involved in livestock production also have lit-
tle or no formal training in ethology. A stockman who knows his ani-
mals, who can "think like a pig," for example, usually does a better job 
than one that lacks this basic and essential knowledge. 
Second, desensitization, a blunting of sensitivity, occurs naturally 
as a defense mechanism when one has to perform various painful pro-
cedures upon animals and must ultimately kill them or send them to 
slaughter. Empathy is thus withdrawn, because the burden of respon-
sible compassion that comes with empathizing with another's suffer-
ing and helplessness awakens one's own sense of vulnerability and 
death awareness, which can be unbearable. Many people seem to con-
fuse empathy with being anthropomorphic probably because they are 
repressing their own true feelings behind a defensive screen of intellec-
tual rationalizations used to justify and protect vested interests in 
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animal exploitation and to alleviate feelings of guilt. Closing off em-
pathy, especially in laboratory animal research (with its scientific "ob-
jectivity") and factory farming and wildlife exploitation (with their ob-
jectification of animals as "stock," "food converters," "resources," 
and "trophies,") ultimately distorts perceptions and objectivity, and 
becomes a primary source of needless animal abuse and suffering. 
Third, the empathetic burden of responsibility is lightened further 
by making economic and other rationalizations to justify certain pro-
cedures: i.e., that suffering is necessary, unavoidable, and justifiable if 
any societal benefits are accrued. 
What may be termed "protective objectification" -the denial of 
others' subjectivity-in order to avoid closeness, responsibility, and 
the burdens of empathy, is another obstacle, exemplified by women be-
ing treated as "sex objects," medical patients as "cases," and animals 
as trophies, pets, research tools, livestock, etc. Many persons in a 
paradoxical and potentially stressful relationship will often mobilize 
the above defenses since emotional involvement can lead euphemisti-
cally to "burn-out": farmers who nurture animals that will be killed; 
animal shelter personnel who are concerned about animal welfare but 
must euthanize them; biomedical researchers and laboratory techni-
cians who care for animals but cause them to suffer and mutilate, kill 
and dissect them; physicians and nurses attending the terminally ill, 
knowing they will soon die. While such persons must be ''realists'' in 
dealing with the paradoxes of life, the difference between a nurturing 
and supportive person and one who is empathetically disconnected is 
the difference between humaneness and indifference, between compas-
sion and inhumanity. The difference is not between intrinsically kind 
and cruel persons, but between those who can bear the burden of em-
pathy and those who fear it. The difference between a humane farm 
and a large "factory" farm, and regular human hospital and a hospice 
for the dying is surely based upon the individual's capacity to em-
pathize and to not protectively shut out the realities of life's suffering 
and the finality of one's own non-being. 
Protective objectification is analogous to Judaic philosopher Mar-
tin Buber's "l-It" relationship. From Buber's perspective (1970), em-
pathy enables us to break out of the objective, detached "l-It" 
mind-set into the trans-subjectively objective realm of "1-Thou." 
The objective and subjective realms of each "It" and "Thou" are 
mutually inclusive: every· entity is a dualistic monad. The subjective, 
intrinsic value or worth of one entity is part of the objective, in-
strumental realm of other interdependent monads (be they atoms or 
living beings), that are bound in relationship (which may be purely 
physical, ecological, social or emotional). In Buber's terms, the subjec-
tive "I" of one monadic entity is the objective "It" of another. But 
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when there is respect for the "1-ness" or subjective realm of another's 
being, and empathetic love and compassionate understanding, the ob-
jective "It" becomes another subjectively resonant, spiritual "Thou." 
A monadic relationship is then made, through respect and love, which 
is, for Man, the emotional, spiritual and ethical manifestation and ex-
perience of a unified field of being. This state of relatedness does not, I 
believe, as Huber suggests, exclude or transcend the "l-It" objective 
duality, but rather enfolds it in love, such that the objective in-
strumental realm is still an intrinsic part of the relationship but does 
not govern it. 
Huber's concept of "1-Thou" embodies the spiritual and political 
principles of reverence for all life, humane stewardship, respect, nur-
turance, "reciprocal maintenance," co-evolution and agape' (as self-
giving love). Objective instrumental rationalism and love are not mu-
tually exclusive, but rather they reconcile, at the conscious, ethical 
level of reality, the dialectical, paradoxical antinomies of life. The ex-
clusion of love from objectivity brings evil and suffering into the 
world, which cause increasing anxiety, which in turn leads to more 
power and control over others or emotional withdrawal, and to more 
evil and suffering. 
The "otherness" of an animal Huber (1970) describes eloquently 
when he strokes a horse at his grandparents' estate: 
I must say that what I experienced in touch with the animal was 
the Other, the immense otherness of the Other, which, however, 
did not remain strange like the otherness of the ox and the ram, 
but rather let me draw near and touch it ... and yet it let me ap-
proach, confided itself to me, placed itself elementally in the rela-
tion of Thou and Thou with me. 
Huber emphasizes that an "1-Thou" rather than an "l-It" rela-
tionship is therefore possible in the absence of a reciprocal observing 
ego, as when one contemplates a rock, or nature, or interacts with an 
animal. It is possible in such moments of openness with the nonhuman 
world to actualize and encounter the spiritual essence of Being that in-
heres in all animate and inanimate forms and for Man, therefore, to 
discover, if not actually bestow meaning and significance, not as objec-
tive knowledge or some projected ideology of animism or panpsychism 
but as a panentheistic gnosis of the divinity or spiritual quality within 
all: an expanding state of pan-relation with the anima mundi, soul of 
the Earth, or God within. 
Huber writes that the unity and living wholeness of a tree is 
manifest to those who say "Thou" and is present when they are pres-
ent. It is they who grant the tree the opportunity to manifest its being, 
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but most often our habitual attitudes, ways of thinking, perceiving 
and relating, deny us such a relationship. In Huber's words: 
Spirit become word, spirit become form-whoever has been 
touched by the spirit and did not close himself off knows to some 
extent of the fundamental fact: neither germinates and grows in 
the human world without having been sown; both issue from en-
counters with the other. 
That most animals are capable of experiencing and expressing af-
fection and of enjoying life in their way, as we do in ours, and like us 
have interests, means that they are emotionally and cognitively, and 
some would say spiritually, little different from us. That we are dif-
ferent in terms of our power of dominion over them does not mean that 
we can ignore the ethical relevance of these similarities. We differ in 
degree and not in kind: we are not superior, but our objectifying of the 
world leads us to believe so as we no longer perceive the unified field of 
all Being. 
Comparative sciences such as zoology, ethology, physiology, and 
psychology, reveal how sapience and sentience-intelligence and con-
scious sensitivity-evolve. The only differences between humans and 
other animals, which create no discontinuity but build upon the phylo-
genetic and ontogenetic sequence, are our powers of self-contem-
plation, creative imagination and verbal conceptualization and com-
munication. The two axes of sapience and sentience reach their highest 
expression phylogenetically and ontogenetically in humans, as 
understanding and compassion, as the will is consciously motivated by 
the subjective force of love and directed by the objective power of 
knowledge. Knowledge applied without love is as self-serving, self-
limiting and destructive as the love of narcissism's ignorance. Em-
pathy, the synthesis of concern and sympathetic understanding of 
others, a quality not lacking in other animals, is the very essence of 
humane being. 
CONCLUSION: HUMANENESS AS LOVE 
Neither legislation nor moral codes can make people empathize 
with animals. Being humane is an attitude of heart and mind, of em-
pathy and understanding, not simply a legal or moral injuction. At 
best, laws and codes guide and constrain human actions, but they do 
not inspire the ability to "love thy neighbor (and fellow creatures) as 
thyself." The one strong point of animal rights philosophy is that it 
draws our attention to the animals' own wants, intrinsic worth and in-
terests. This implies that we and they have something in common: a 
will, a life of one's own, perhaps a soul. This is speaking closer to the 
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heart. Recognition of these qualities in other beings awakens the heart 
of humility and compassion, fundamental tenets of all religious teach-
ings. Being humane thus entails the spiritual recognition and affirma-
tion, through empathy, humility, and compassion, of the divinity and 
sanctity of Self within all beings, within one's own self as well as 
within others. 
The Buddha proclaimed: "One thing only do I teach: suffering and 
cease of suffering. Kindness to all living creatures is the true religion.'' 
Likewise Pantanjali (circa 300 B.C.) gave the first step in yogic 
(religious) discipline as "the avoidance of injury to all living 
creatures," because all creatures were regarded as being part of God's 
creation and therefore sacred and ensouled with a spark of the Divine. 
Humaneness is an expression of mature love that resacralizes na-
ture, and all living things, not animistically but panentheistically in 
accord with the Christian (Paulist, Gnostic and Essene) doctrines of a 
divine omnipresent (as well as transcendent) Creator within all of crea-
tion, which is the basis of Schweitzer's theosophy of reverence for all 
life. 
Empathy is the bridge for unconditional love, a love synonymous 
· with experiencing the world without the domination of personal in-
terests and preconceptions. Such a mature love is therefore revela-
tionary, since it is the perception of the miraculous, of the numinously 
radiant divinity in all. This is the subjective recognition of Self in 
other, and thus of self-realization. 
Through empathy, mature love is possible: such love is nondialec-
tical in its arbitrary, unconditional non-duality of the observer (the 
lover) and the object of one's contemplation (as 1-Thou). And love is 
paradoxical, for instead of losing one's sense of individuality, the sense 
and meaning of self is enhanced. Love transcends the paradoxical 
dualities of the subject-object manifolds of our every day enculturated 
reality, consciousness, and unconscious ego defenses. Love is revolu-
tionary, because through the bridge of empathy, understanding as 
coexistential knowledge, is possible. This is the beginning of self-
realization; of personal and interpersonal development and human 
evolution. 
Gilligan (1983) links empathy with moral maturity. When both in-
tellect and empathy are integrated in our thinking, "it joins the heart 
and the eye in an ethic that ties the activity of thought to the activity 
of care." Without such an integration, purely intellectual, rational 
thinking is objectifying and potentially alienating, since it limits em-
pathetic understanding. A purely sympathetic response is a subjective 
projection and potentially inappropriate, and no less damaging, than a 
purely objective response. Informed sympathy is empathy, expressed 
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as compassionate understanding. Rational empathy is the only basis 
for ethically responsible behavior. 
Insofar as the humane movement is concerned, and humane educa-
tion in particular, to evoke sympathy for mistreated animals (for 
fund-raising purposes or to stimulate students' and supporters' moral 
indignation) is unethical if it is based only upon the sentiment of 
abolishing all suffering and not also upon respect for animals' intrinsic 
worth and recognition of the importance of humane ethics and rever-
ence for all life to our moral development and social change. 
We live in two worlds: the objective and the subjective. When we 
make the two worlds one, and put the inside on the outside, as Jesus 
once said, we will discover the Kingdom of Heaven, or in modern par-
lance, reality as a unified field of being. As animals, we live in our sub-
jectivity, and as rational beings we stand apart from the world in our 
intellectually rational objectivity. In the one is kinship; in the other, 
power: but together we have the possibility of mature, responsible rela-
tionship and planetary stewardship. Apart, we have delusion, oppres-
sion, and destruction, creating the imbalances that we perceive as evil, 
and experience as suffering. By introducing empathy and using power 
and control over life in order to avoid the feelings of vulnerability and 
helplessness in the face of life's burdens of suffering and death, we 
cause even more suffering. The barrier between these two worlds, 
which Buber termed "l-It" and "I-Thou", is not our objectivity, or 
our subjectivity. Both are essential attributes of our being and becom-
ing. But they must become integrated with the unified field of our own 
being that embraces animals and nature, for we are both. To perceive 
and think otherwise is to remain unintegrated, which is the ultimate 
barrier to our self-realization and moral maturity. We, animals and 
Nature are one. In order to change the world, we must first become as 
one with the world (in peace and harmony). And since peace comes 
from within, we must first see to ourselves before we can change the 
world. Then the way of empathy is clear. 
POSTSCRIPT 
Why Do Animal Shelters Kill So Many Pets? 
Psychiatrist M. Scott Peck in A Road Less Travelled draws a very 
pertinent, which some would see as impertinent, correlation between 
the love people have for their pets and the high rate of divorce among 
G.I.'s who lost affection for their VietNam and Korean wives as they 
began to learn English, and assert their no longer dependent and 
subordinate individuality. Puppies and kittens likewise lose their ap-
peal to many as they mature, assert their independence and individ-
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uality. And so like G.I. brides, they are abandoned because, beneath 
the complaints that they are disobedient, too much trouble, or have an-
noying habits and behavioral problems, they are no longer loved. 
The mass destruction of some 13 million unwanted, abandoned, 
and neglected cats and dogs each year in the U.S. must assuredly 
reflect the limitations of an immature, narcissistic love relationship, 
an aspect of the human-companion animal bond which has been gross-
ly neglected by researchers and is not simply a consequence of "un-
thinking and uneducated" owners. Peck defines mature love as "the 
will to extend one's self for the purpose of nurturing one's own and 
another's spiritual growth." In our relationships with captive and 
domesticated animals, this is surely the essence of humane husbandry. 
It is the absence of empathy, compassion and understanding, which 
undergirds all inhumane and unethical relations between people and 
between us and the animals, as they continue to be exploited for sel-
fish, emotional, financial, and other reasons. 
Farmers and biomedical researchers can put their empathy, com-
passion, and understanding of animals on one side for reasons of profit 
and instrumental utility, arguing that the extreme privations of fac-
tory farming and mental and physical suffering of laboratory cats, 
dogs, primates, and other animals, is for the "benefit of society." A 
society that can find anything of greater value than empathy, compas-
sion, and wisdom is perhaps suffering from the pathology of material-
ism and objectivity. The divorced G.I.'s bride was simply the material 
of his narcissistic yearnings; a sexual object. Likewise cats and dogs 
can be status or play objects, or things to fondle or control; and farm 
animals simply biological machines in the computerized technology of 
agribusiness; and laboratory animals mere components of experimen-
tal design and ultimate execution. 
Fortunately not all husbands (G.I.'s) and husbanders (pet owners, 
farmers, and biomedical researchers) relate to other living beings in 
this way. But unfortunately, we must surmise that they are a minori-
ty, for to date they have been relatively silent on matters concerning 
human and animal rights. Or are they the silent majority? It is surely 
time to break the silence, after reflecting upon the monetary value of 
animals, for as Jesus said: "Do not two sparrows sell for a coin of small 
value? Yet not one of them will fall to the ground without your 
Father's knowledge; not one of them goes forgotten before God." (Mat-
thew 10:29; Luke 12:6). 
It is too simplistic to say that people love their pets because pets 
are "nonthreatening others." Perhaps by understanding why so many 
people find it easy to love animals, we may discover ways to help peo-
ple love each other, and not be afraid to love, and those who hate, fear, 
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or are indifferent toward animals, love them also, as significant, rather 
than as nonthreatening, others. 
If love is the union of souls, then the bridge is empathy when such 
non-sentimental love is based upon compassion, respect, and under-
standing. Such love entails an openness of feeling, a degree of 
vulnerability, intolerable in the presence of any human or animal that 
is perceived, correctly or incorrectly, as being threatening. Fear in-
hibits the ability to give and receive love. Likewise, others' expecta-
tions that we feel we must live up to, set up defenses and roles. But 
with animals (and little children) when we have no fear toward them, 
and they have no demanding expectations of us, then we are free to 
love them. 
Mature love is also impaired when the object of one's perception 
and even claimed affection, is exploited to one's own selfish advantage. 
Such exploitation, be it of a spouse or an animal companion (as a 
"pet," or for its pelt, meat, or physiological responses to test drugs), 
objectifies the potential "Thou" of the others' being into an "it" (a sex 
object, a child-substitute, a financial or intellectual gain, etc.). These 
objectifying transformations may seem necessary for our well-being, 
and to a degree they are. But when we transgress ethical boundaries in 
relating to others exploitatively rather than with empathetic under-
standing and respect, we limit our own potential fulfillment from such 
a relationship. This fulfillment is to become human, or even, as Plato 
and Aristotle envisioned, to "become like divinity as much as that is 
within our power." 
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EVILS OF MODERN STABLES* 
James Irvine Lupton 
(1884) 
INTRODUCTION 
Portions of veterinarian James Irvine Lupton's book on horse 
management that deal with the problems of confinement husbandry 
practices have been selected as a significant historical record of hu-
mane concerns that were documented one hundred years ago. While 
the author's descriptive prose may lack scientific "objectivity," it 
does express a common sense morality and the subjective and in-
tuitive observations and conclusions of an experienced veterinarian 
who clearly respects and understands the horse. His words bespeak of 
a bygone era where the care or husbandry of animals was both an art 
and a science, a discipline based upon empathy, compassion and fac-
tual knowledge. How far indeed have we progressed, ethically and 
technologically, in improving the husbandry of domesticated animals, 
such as the horse, since 1884? While conditions may be more sanitary 
and diseases better understood, prevented, and treated, it is a fact that 
stabled horses in 1984 are too often kept under comparable conditions 
of extreme deprivation and show the same behavioral pathologies that 
Lupton so clearly describes. 
M.W. Fox 
Editor 
*From Mayhew's Illustrated Horse Management (1884), revised and improved by 
James Irvine Lupton, M.R.C. V.S., author of several works on veterinary science and 
art. London: Wm. H. Allen & Co., 13, Waterloo Place Pall Mall, S. W. 
156 
THE EVILS WHICH ARE OCCASIONED BY 
MODERN STABLES 
J.I.Lupton 
It does not require any vast expenditure of thought to discover 
that life is action; "to be," is synonymous with "to do": therefore, it is 
a sheer necessity of existence that an animated being must be doing 
something. Such is the primary consequence of existence. Thus, to 
breathe and to move imply one act; since, if the lungs cease to dilate, 
respiration immediately terminates, and, with it, animation comes to 
an end. Yet, it remained for mortal perversity to rebuke the first princi-
ple of established philo_sophy, when stables were built, in which a 
breathing animal was to be treated as it were an inanimate chattel. 
Nature, like a kind mother, is to this day endeavouring to teach 
her wayward children a plain truth, which they may hourly behold en-
forced by visible examples. The wilful brood appears to be in no hurry 
to learn. Man still treats the horse as though he honoured the quad-
ruped by enslaving it; and ennobled a life, by conferring upon the 
animal the title of his servant. He acts as though, by such conduct, suf-
ficient reason were exhibited why he should oblige the creature to re-
sign its instincts and relinquish its desires. 
The equine race, when in a wild state, are gregarious, or con-
gregate in herds. Man captures such a quadruped and places it in a 
stable, built to enforce the extreme of solitary confinement. The plain 
is the natural abode of the herd; on their speed depend both their 
pleasure and their safety. Man ties the domesticated horse to a man-
ger, and pays a groom to enforce absolute stagnation upon innate ac-
tivity. The "panting steed" is the most timid of living beings. Man in-
sists the charger is possessed of extraordinary courage; he declares it 
delights in the tumult of battle; and he esteems it a glorious achieve-
ment to brutally coerce the timorous sensibility. The mild-eyed horse 
is, perhaps, the most simple of all the breathing beauties which adorn a 
wondrous world. Man declares all of the gentle breed have dangerous 
propensities, and are most inherently vicious. 
Before subjugation, the creature fed off the surface of the earth. 
Man builds a house specially designed for the captive, in which the 
corn is placed on a level with the chest, and the hay is stationed as high 
up as the head. The animal is gifted with affections; it longs to gratify 
their promptings; it yearns for something upon which its abundant 
love may gush forth,-a fellow-prisoner-a goat-a dog-a cat-a 
fowl;-no matter what,-so it be some living object, on which may be 
lavished that excess of tenderness which, confined to its own breast, 
renders being miserable. Man esteems it his primary duty to clear the 
stable of all possible companionship; but the creature which would re-
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joice, were it only permitted to worship its enslaver, he rarely ap-
proaches without a loud voice, a harsh word, or a harsher blow, an-
nouncing his presence to the captive. 
The inhabitant of such a prison, a domesticated horse miserably 
drags through a shortened life, under human protection. The nearest 
approach it can make to freedom is its period of labour. It always re-
joices to quit its confinement; but, enfeebled by imprisonment, and 
subservient to man's exactions, it ever gladly returns to the place of 
its sorrow. In proportion as its limbs are finely made, and its actions 
are graceful, is it prized. It is never esteemed for its instincts, or 
credited with intelligence. It lives in so limited a space, that, in com-
parison with the dimensions of its abode, a man in a sentry-box dwells 
in a mansion; or a lion in a cage roams over a domain. A reasonable and 
an intelligent being commands his horse should be fastened to such a 
spot, and supposes that a living organism is to endure the confine-
ment, which does not permit the body to turn round; that animated 
functions are to exist where most ordinary exercises are rendered im-
possible: nevertheless, he anticipates the creature will appear bound-
ing with health, in answer to his requirements. 
To be sure the prisoner, although its head be fastened (a restraint 
not imposed upon the most savage of carnivorous beasts), is permitted 
now to bear upon one leg, and then to change it for the other. It may 
perhaps lie down or stand up, without provoking chastisement. N ei-
ther head nor tail is forbidden a proper degree of motion. But at this 
point all indulgence is exhausted. It is tied to a rope two yards in 
length; but it may not go even to the extent of its tether; neither may it 
move close up to the manger; both acts are equally unpardonable: a 
properly behaved animal should stand quietly in the centre of its com-
partment, and always remain there when not lying down. 
It is beaten, if its head be raised just to peep over the paling, to ex-
change a rub of the nose and to give, as well as accept, a warm stream 
of fragrant breath to and from its nearest fellow-misery. It must taste 
the full flavour of its captivity: no trivial act may distract attention 
from the horror of its position. It must lie down where it stands; and 
stand where it laid down. It must not display the grace and ease of mo-
tion with which it has been endowed; nor must it indulge the kindly 
feelings Providence has gifted it with. If the owner of the horse does 
not recognize the exquisite adaptation of sight, so as to infract the 
minutest particle, and to view the most distant object, the sensibility 
of hearing to which movements are audible, when to the duller percep-
tions of man no sound vibrates on the air; the keenness of scent, which 
can appreciate qualitites in substances which to human sense are 
devoid of odour; the fleetness of motion which was permitted as a pro-
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tection, the ease of which the most perfect machinery has failed to 
rival;-how can he expect his servant to inquire whether such at-
tributes were given by Nature, only to be fastened by the head or to be 
confined within a space in which absolute stagnation must ultimately 
induce bodily incapacity. 
Such a true "Vis inertiae" can alone be varied by the hours of 
labour and the periods of feeding. All pastime is unlawful; the most in-
nocent amusement must be practised silently and in secret. Certain 
animals, however, try to get through the long hours of enforced 
idleness by quietly nibbling at the topmost rail of the manger. Large 
portions of tough wood are often removed after this fashion; and, to 
him who can rightly interpret signs, a thick post bitten away, fibre by 
fibre, will present melancholy evidence of that longing for employ-
ment, which could induce so great a waste of perseverance; for animals 
are naturally great economists of labour. 
Other prisoners will endeavour to cheat the time by licking their 
mangers, apparently in the hope that some stray grain of corn may 
have escaped previous attention. The soft tongue of the horse, passed 
over the hardened surface of the wood, occasions no noise. Often a few 
grains will have lodged in the corners; then the effort to displace these 
affords a long game. Others, from want of something to do, or from fin-
ding impure air and inactivity do not, in accordance with the general 
doctrine, promote equine digestion, learn "to crib;" a few, from the 
operation of the like causes, become perfect as "wind suckers." All 
"speed the weary hours" as they best can; and many heads are turned 
around to discover if it be feeding-time again; not that they are 
hungry, but eating is an occupation, and they sadly wish for some 
employment. 
Certain quadrupeds, under these circumstances, adopt a habit, 
which is the more remarkable, because hours of tedium have generated 
the like indulgence in human beings. Mortals, when compelled to re-
main stationary, and forced to preserve silence, often strive to kill time 
by rocking to and fro, or by "see-sawing" their bodies. Such a pitiable 
excuse for amusement is very common among the little people whose 
undeveloped limbs are perched on high forms, and in whose hands are 
fixed very uninteresting primers, from which the infant mind wanders 
into vacuity during the hours of imprisonment which occur in those 
pleasing places termed "Preparatory Schools." The horse, also, when 
forbidden the pleasures in which Nature formed it to delight, will move 
its head methodically from one side of its stall to the other, and will 
continue thus engaged for hours together. 
So exciting a pastime, most sane people might deem to be harm-
less enough; but by the arqitrary notions of rectitude entertained with-
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in the stable such custom is punished as a vice. A horse which "see-
saws" is said to weave, and weaving is, by grooms, esteemed highly 
culpable, and is usually corrected with the lash. 
Can human perversity conceive a life without a pastime, and vex-
atiously impose this terrible fate upon the creature whose existence is 
devoted to man's service? When in the field, the horse is never idle. 
The only amusement of the simple animal lies in its perpetual occupa-
tion. What a despairing sorrow must therefore afflict such an ex-
istence, when dragging through its time under the fostering care of the 
enslaver. Yet how proudly do some intellectual beings boast of their 
stables and of the ceaseless attention lavished on their studs. What is 
it this assiduity realizes to the creature on which it is expended? 
Stagnation to the active, and solitude to the gregarious. Movement 
draws down punishment, as it were a fault. Any attempt to while away 
the tedious hours is esteemed "a vice"; sensation must be checked, and 
feeling, man insists shall be suppressed. But who, among the millions 
of intellectual masters, sufficiently understands the quadruped, over 
which they all usurp authority, to regard the huge bulk of that en-
durance, as the embodiment of the acutest form of every possible earthly 
misery? 
Perpetual inaction also occasions waste of food: the horse, wanting 
exercise, stares at his provender, but has no appetite; the hay piled up 
before it is nothing more than matter out of place. 
Desire is needed to give value to such abundance; and a non-
reasoning being cannot be expected to prize that which it does not re-
quire. It cannot eat; but it lacks amusement. The hay is before it. In 
sheer idleness, a few stalks are pulled from the rack. Of these, one may 
be leisurely masticated; but the remainder, after having been twisted 
about the lips, are allowed to fall upon the litter. The sport is followed 
up until the rack is emptied; and the creature is a little happier, under a, 
conviction that it has escaped from absolute stagnation. 
The sin, if there be any, certainly must remain with the man who 
piled up the provender before the animal which was without an appetite. 
Simple natures, when entirely disengaged, generally make their 
own employment, and that employment, being intended for a passing 
amusement, commonly consists of what thrifty people designate "mis-
chief." The knowledge, that displeasure will follow upon discovery, 
may spice the proceeding which otherwise might want interest. At all 
events, so it is with children; and it may be thus with animals. When a 
heaped manger is before a satiated quadruped, the impossibility of 
feeding makes the creature meditate upon the uses to which the grain 
can possibly be applied. None can be discovered. The head of the cap-
tive is tied, and the manger is fixed. At length, in carelessness of spirit, 
a mouthful is taken from the heap. The portion cannot be swallowed, 
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so the lips are moved, and, as they part, the corn falls over them upon 
the ground. This may not be a very exciting recreation; but the pri-
soner is restless with repletion. It cannot sleep; and the grain passing 
over the lips, in which equine feeling concentrates, produces a slight 
and a novel sensation. 
Can any man seriously pronounce that an animal, standing in en-
forced solitude and compulsory idleness, is to blame for such conduct? 
Boys, during their school days, when wanting appetite, or having un-
necessary food before them, will not they, in satiety, play with needless 
abundance? Are men to demand that prudence from an animal, which 
we should certainly not anticipate in the young of our own species? Yet 
the child enjoys a certain amount of confidence; and its misdoing is, 
therefore, aggravated by a certain abuse of trust. The horse is confined 
between boards, and enjoys not the smallest personal liberty. These-
verity of captivity argues, that no reliance reposes upon the captive's 
discretion. All responsibility is lost when all freedom of action is 
denied. Yet the poor prisoner is cruelly beaten for playing with food, 
although the true fault rested upon him who was too idle to give the ex-
ercise which would have generated appetite; and was too lazy to pro-
portion the animal's sustenance to the requirments of its situation. 
Another so-named "vice" of the horse is frequently the occasion 
of more serious results than any of the before-mentioned accidents. No 
person has hitherto explained why the skin should be more irritable by 
night than during the daytime. Such, however, is the case with horses, 
as it is with men. A quadruped, in the morning, is often found dis-
figured by the hair being removed from comparatively large surfaces. 
Itchiness has provoked the animal to rub itself against any promi-
nence, or to scratch its body with the toe of its iron shoe; this indul-
gence has caused the blemish. 
Itching and scratching are numbered among the worst "vices" of 
the stable. Such faults, however, are only discovered in their effects; 
the groom never estimates, when flogging an animal for this wickedness, 
how far the abhorred sin may have been produced by stimulating diet, 
by want of exercise, and by impure atmosphere. No! he clothes up the 
body of the animal; shuts every window; stops every cranny; and locks 
the stable door for the night. The last meal being consumed, and the 
quadrupeds not being inclined for sleep, they one and all begin to itch. 
Legs are nibbled; necks are rubbed; and tails are lashed. At length one 
is sensible of an irritation behind the ear. The head is turned toward 
the side; the body is curved to the full extent; and the hind leg brought 
forward. Then, the groom not being present, the toe of the hind shoe 
can touch the part, and the horse luxuriates in a hearty titillation. 
When the head was turned toward the quarters, however, the col-
lar-rope, being attached to the halter, was also stretched in that direc-
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tion. The hind foot having performed its office, a desire is felt to return 
to the natural position. The attempt is made; but this is found to be im-
practicable. The creature strains against the opposing force, but its 
struggles only render its comfortless attitude the more fixed. The 
truth is, that while devoted to the act which allays cuticular irritabili-
ty, the pastern has slipped over the collar-rope. Such a mishap not on-
ly fixes the leg, but fastens the head. With the neck bent and one leg 
disabled, the animal cannot exert half its power; neither can simplicity 
comprehend the source of its unnatural constraint. Long continuance 
of the position becomes painful; alarm seizes upon timidity; the strug-
gles grow desperate; and the poor quadruped, at length, is cast with 
terrible violence upon the straw which had been shaken down for its 
repose. 
The strongest testimony, however, against stables, as such build-
ings are at present erected, is perhaps borne by the animals which inhabit 
those places. The horse is a delicate test, which man would do well to 
attentively observe when he is desirous of ascertaining the healthful-
ness of any locality. Naturally it is all animation and gaiety of spirit. 
But, however much these qualities may be esteemed, such equine 
recommendations will soon fade before the joint influence of impure air 
and close confinement, although you may groom and feed at discre-
tion. The natural period of life is diminished one half, while much more 
than half of the remaining years is rendered useless by age, premature-
ly brought on by inappropriate treatment. 
HUMAN/ANIMAL COMMUNICATION: 
CETACEAN ROLES IN 
HUMAN THERAPEUTIC SITUATIONS 
M. Patricia Hindley* 
Department of Communication 
Simon Fraser University 
Burnaby, B. C. 
Canada, V5A 1S6 
INTRODUCTION 
A review of the literature on the relationship between animal and 
human indicates that whales and dolphins may have a mutually benefi-
cial role to play in human therapeutic situations. Florida researchers 
have discovered that interaction with dolphins has favourably altered 
the behaviour of neurologically impaired people, and of autistic chil-
dren who are usually withdrawn and uncommunicative. 
Explorations with both wild and captive cetaceans may find sug-
gestive direction from extensive research currently being done with 
pets and domestic animals. Growing scientific evidence suggests that 
animals can benefit not only the physically and mentally ill, the lonely 
and the incarcerated, but also the minds and bodies of healthy people 
as well. Research done at, for example, the University of Penn-
sylvania's Center for Interaction of Animals and Society, the Universi-
ty of Minnesota's Center for Study of Human-Animal Relationships 
*Paper presented at the IWC Non-Consumptive Utilization of Cetacean Resources 
Conference, Boston, June 1983. 
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and Environments, the University of Cambridge, and by members of 
the Society for Companion Animal Studies in Paris, indicates marked 
therapeutic benefits from the involvement of animals in a variety of 
human situations. 
DOMESTIC ANIMALS 
In healthy people it has been found that animals act as "social 
lubricants," that is, they facilitate social interactions between owners 
and other people which often result in friendships (Mugford and M'Co-
misky 1974; Messent 1982). They provide companionship, affection 
and tactile contact for people whether they live alone or not. It seems 
to be a reciprocal exchange of affection and contact between human 
and animal. People report greater feelings of self-esteem, of having 
permission to be overtly affectionate, and to openly touch and fondle 
(the latter reported especially by men). They also felt animals allowed 
them to forget themselves and their problems and to engage in playful-
ness. 
Interestingly enough there is little evidence to suggest that more 
than a small minority of people use animals as a substitute for human 
companionship. Rather an animal is seen as an "addition to," albeit an 
important one (Adell-Bath et al., 1979). In one study done by Katcher 
(1981), about 80% of the participants regarded their animals "as a per-
son" and talked to them regularly. The value of a companion who does 
not "talk back" or criticize, seems to be of particular importance in the 
early lives of children. 
Boris Levinson, a pioneer in the field of animal/children bond re-
search, has demonstrated the value of pet animals in child develop-
ment (Levinson 1969, 1972, 1978). Pets, he claims, can be major sources 
of emotional support, acting as friend and confidante, providing a con-
stant source of love and tactile affection. They also enable the child to 
learn how to take responsibility and care for another, they also can pro-
vide disciplinary models. During times of bereavement, loss or similar 
stress, children with animal companions often fare better-the animal 
seems to provide continuity. 
Levinson has also written about the use of animals in psychothera-
py with children. He identifies a pattern in which the child first talks 
only to the dog, ignoring the therapist, then includes the therapist in 
the conversations with the dog, thus eventually able to deal directly 
with the therapist. For disturbed and psychotic children an animal 
may be the only animate object with which they can make contact in 
their struggle to establish positive human relationships again (Searles 
1960). The unquestioning loyalty, total acceptance and uninhibited af-
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fection of the animal seem to be key factors in successful therapy with 
children whose communication with adults has either ceased or be-
come disturbed. Successful work has been done with physically handi-
capped children in West Germany. It was found, for instance, that pet 
horses were very popular. Seated high in the saddle, a wheelchair-
bound child couid for once in her life look down on everyone and "main-
tain a sense of dignity." 
Animals have also been used successfully with adults in mental 
hospitals, especially with those patients for whom all "other available 
therapeutic methods failed to bring about significant improvement" 
(Corson, Corson, and Alexander 1980). The patients were withdrawn, 
uncommunicative, self-centered, almost mute and psychologically 
bedridden. The introduction of an animal saw a gradual but significant 
shift towards self-esteem, responsibility and independence with in-
creased mobility and a reaching out to others. 
Similar success has been achieved by the Corsons, using pets on 
geriatric wards. One elderly man who had not spoken for 26 years, 
spontaneously said "You brought that dog," upon receiving a dog as a 
long-shot part of therapy. He later made friends and became quite an 
accomplished painter of animals. The introduction of birds to geriatric 
wards and to elderly people living alone has had quite remarkable 
positive effects from raising self-esteem, creating group cohesion, 
making friends, to maintaining health (Mugford and M'Comisky 1974). 
The researchers commented on the "surprisingly intimate and presum-
ably rewarding attachment to these unsolicited pet birds.'' The typical 
view of a geriatric ward population as helpless, hopeless, and waiting 
to die becomes quite the opposite as normal healthy responses to life 
dormant in the company of our own kind, are triggered by other species. 
This has also been true at Lima State Hospital in Ohio, a max-
imum security institution housing about 400 patients, including psy-
chopaths and sex offenders. To date nearly 100 patients are involved 
in pet facilitated therapy. The 85% attempted suicide rate in the 
hospital in general dropped to zero seven years ago on those wards in-
volved in pet therapy, and has remained there. The hospital has 20 
aquaria and 160 animals including parrots, gerbils, rabbits, hamsters, 
guinea pigs and deer. While controlled studies need to be done, 
positive indications are the giving of humane and loving care to 
animals and improved social relationships. Similar results have been 
obtained with the use of farm animals and pets in psychotherapy with 
delinquent children in residential schools (Levinson 1972). Again the 
emotional and tactile contact with loving, non-critical animals may 
help diffuse feelings of hostility, alienation and rejection common in 
criminal offenders and anti-social behaviour. 
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EXPERIMENTAL ANIMALS 
Evidence indicates that benefits accruing to us from the ani-
mal/human bond are not only psychosocial but also physiological. It 
has been found that in healthy people blood pressure and pulse rate 
drops when, for example, petting or talking to their animals, or when 
viewing a tank of tropical fish. In contrast blood pressure and heart 
rate increase when talking to other people, reading aloud, but again 
can be reduced if an animal is present in the room (Katcher and Fried-
mann 1980). The same researchers also found that the ownership of a 
pet was the factor most highly correlated with one year survival 
following a heart attack, apart from the physiological severity of the 
disease. Exercise and need for companionship were rejected as the 
main explanations since the group of patients included both married 
and single people, and also owners of small house-bound pets. Rather 
it may be that "dumb as opposed to speaking companions" offer a fuller 
explanation since "the speechless kind of companionship shared with 
pets may provide a source of relaxation that human companions who 
demand talk as the price of companionship may not provide" (Fried-
mann et al., 1980). 
For experimental work done with animals in the laboratory during 
which animals are often subjected to abhorrent levels of pain and 
deprivation, it has been found that similar benefits accrue to the ani-
mal if they are in the presence of a sympathetic human. This is even 
more true if they are in physical contact. Such benefits are reduction of 
anxiety, lowering of blood pressure and heart rate, and increase in cor-
onary blood flow. 
Twenty years ago Gantt conducted research on the "effect of per-
son" or effect of human contact on animals. He found significant varia-
tions in heart rate when an electric shock was administered to a dog's 
foot when the animal was alone and when it was being petted by a per-
son. While being petted the heart rate increase was reduced by half. 
Similarly when the dog received a warning bell signalling the approach 
of shock, heart rate increased dramatically. If a person petted the dog 
during both bell and shock then the increase in heart rate was either 
eliminated or even reduced (Gantt et al., 1966). Clearly, human contact 
had made an enormous difference lending some credence to Darwin's 
belief that petting and contact in animals was an expression of love. 
Such experimental findings suggest that the animal/human bond is as 
important to the animal as it is to the human. 
Other laboratory findings indicate emotional reactions in animals 
which closely parallel human behaviour, making reciprocity in the rela-
tionship even more believable. While much behaviour is species specif-
ic and it is dangerous to generalize to human behaviour, nevertheless, 
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the parallels throw valuable light on the nature of the human/animal 
bond. According to some researchers emotional disorders such as ano-
rexia, depression, neurotic behaviour, perversions, and criminal dis-
orders have been observed in farm animals and pets, all intelligible in 
terms of recent stress or early history (Saul 1962). 
The classic work of Harlow and his colleagues on total deprivation 
of tactile companionship in infant monkeys indicates similar emotional 
reactions to stress. One of the most interesting findings was the con-
stant selection of the cloth surrogate mother during times of anxiety 
and insecurity even though the wire surrogate mother provided milk. 
It seemed that contact comfort was of overwhelming importance. Ex-
periments in which infant monkeys could see but not touch their moth-
ers, produced similar but less intense disturbances and distress. A fur-
ther unexpected finding was that even though the cloth mother was in-
animate, the infant felt such emotional security through warmth and 
body contact alone, that it was able to explore new objects in its sur-
roundings. It was once thought by Harlow that infant monkeys reared 
from birth to six months in total isolation would never exhibit normal 
behaviour. However more recently he reports that if the right kind of 
body contact is provided, the behaviour is reversible (Suomi, Harlow, 
and McKinney 1972). 
For instance, artificially inseminated mothers reared in isolation 
sometimes succumb to the pestering to cling by their determined off-
spring, such that they rear their second born normally. Secondly, 
heated cloth surrogate mothers given to six month old isolates pro-
duces positive social behaviour after a few weeks of intense clinging. 
Similar results are achieved when normal but younger pre-aggressive 
infants are placed in cages with six month old isolates. While the iso-
late withdraws, the normal infant's tendency is to cling. Again body 
contact is influential with the isolate. Another interesting observation 
of animal need for contact was reported by Coelho (1980). He observed 
a baboon in a primate colony adopt a feral kitten. As in the case of the 
human/pet bond the baboon was seen to hold the kitten close, to pet it 
and to use it as a social facilitator in interactions with other baboons. 
Findings therefore show that two main elements in the animal/ 
human bond are trust and touch. In the case of humans as has been 
said, there is ample evidence that a warm trusting and trustworthy 
non-human creature is often a key to health. In the case of both animal 
and human, it seems clear from the data that the addition of touch has 
not only positive and emotional effect on both, but is essential for nor-
mal development. Montagu (1978) reminds us of the general embry-
ological law which says that the earlier a sensory system becomes 
functional, the more fundamental it is likely to be. Since touch is the 
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earliest sensory system to develop, he argues that it must have pro-
found psycho-biological significance for normal behavioural and phys-
ical development. In addition to the evidence of abnormal development 
in animals deprived of touch, there is evidence of similar abnormalities 
in humans. Children raised by parents or others who for reasons of in-
sensitivity, emotional instability, cruelty or belief, withhold contact 
(touching, stroking, fondling) and affection from them, exhibit abnor-
mal psychological development. This may continue into adult life and 
be perpetuated on their own children. It is of interest that battering 
and abusing parents, treated similarly themselves as children, rarely 
report having a pet. 
Montagu also refers to positive results of tactile contact in 
animals. For instance he comments that hand-milked cows give more 
and richer milk than machine-milked cows, that using touch to gentle 
young rats makes them better able to tolerate stressful situations as 
adults, and that dolphins like to be gently stroked. 
CETACEA 
In captivity, social interaction, including tactile contact between 
trainer and dolphin is standard practice and seen to be an important 
factor in bonding the relationship and developing good rapport. We 
know from trainers' and researchers' reports that such bonds can be 
unusually strong-more so than with other animals-and that separa-
tion can result in very stressful experiences for both trainer and 
dolphin (Lilly 1967). 
There seems to be ample evidence now, and in any case it seems 
reasonable to extrapolate from the data on other highly evolved social 
animals (wolves, elephants, primates), that social interaction and tac-
tile contact are of significant importance to many species of cetacea. 
We know, for example, that their skin is a highly refined sensory organ 
of touch and that in groups of whales and dolphins physical contact 
is necessary and frequent. As in the case of other animals, ceta-
cea/human bonding seems to involve a mutual need for touching and 
stroking, and also seems to involve (at least, as observed in captivity) 
mutually strong emotional ties. It is well known that when captured or 
placed in stressful situations, dolphins respond well to human touch. 
Robson has commented that when touched and stroked and spoken to 
soothingly, stranded whales become calm and less stressed. 
Animal/human bond research has in fact included work with cap-
tive dolphins. Henry Truby, one of John Lilly's colleagues, observed 
play interaction between neurologically impaired people and dolphins 
and concluded that they were mutually beneficial. More recently in 
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1978, Truby and Smith, a Florida researcher, started to explore whe-
ther captive dolphins could have a positive effect on the behaviour of 
autistic children. Infantile autism, characterized by delayed and de-
viant language development, severely impaired capacities to relate to 
people and objects, extreme withdrawal and failure to respond to sen-
sory stimuli, is sometimes called a communication disease. Any modi-
cum of success with these children can be regarded as a breakthrough. 
In the Florida study with eight autistic children, all eight showed, 
amongst several behaviour improvements, unusually long attention 
spans. One boy, Michael, an 18 year old, fed fish to dolphins, poured 
water over them and made clicking noises to gain their attention. Not 
only was such interactive play behavior, that is reaching out beyond 
himself, highly unusual, but beyond speaking two words, he had never 
before made efforts at verbal communication. Smith reports not only 
temporary but sustained changes in his behaviour, namely, excitement 
on seeing dolphins, grabbing other people to indicate the dolphins, rec-
ognition of and clicking at dolphins on television and in books, and the 
use of the word "yep" five times in one week in response to questions 
about dolphin visits (Smith 1982). 
There is as yet no available data on the dolphins' reaction to these 
children, but recognizing the intractable nature of this emotional dis-
order and the unusually positive results, interesting speculations 
might be made about the value of cetacea in this kind of work. 
The literature indicates that cetaceans historically have demon-
strated a benign interest towards us, and that, in the face of some of 
our worst atrocities. It further demonstrates a strong emotional pull 
towards cetaceans on the part of humans since the earliest times. Ceta-
ceans have shown interest in us in a variety of ways. There are many 
examples of the lone dolphin establishing strong relationships with 
people in local waters, sometimes selecting particular individuals, 
often children, e.g., Opo and Horace in New Zealand, Donald in Bri-
tain, Jean Louis in France, and Sandy in the Bahamas. Wade Doak has 
collected hundreds of anecdotes from divers, sailors, long distance 
swimmers, surfers, etc., commenting on their dolphin encounters 
-playing, being protected from sharks, guided to safe waters, being 
accompanied, seeking contact, etc. (Doak 1981). Relatively recently 
scientists have become aware of a unique situation on the remote coast 
of Western Australia at Monkey Mia, where for the last 16 years a 
group of dolphins have been visiting the beach to interact with people. 
Fish are fed to the dolphins but there is also a great deal of tactile con-
tact and vocal exchanges. While most scientists are convinced that the 
food reward is quite secondary to the importance of social interaction, 
no controlled studies have yet been carried out. The amount of re-
ported evidence of even whales seeking contact with humans is in-
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creasing, e.g., humpbacks in Hawaii, greys in Mexico, sperm in New 
Zealand, and right whales in Patagonia. 
There seems to be little doubt that tactile contact between humans 
and animals is not only mutually beneficial but also mutually pleas-
urable. Messent (1981) commented that in our society the need for tac-
tile contact and the opportunity to satisfy it may have values we do 
not yet understand. It may well be that it is of paramount importance 
to us because it represents an outward expression of the emotion of 
love. Darwin (1955) in his book The Expression of Emotions in Man 
and Animals shocked the scientific community in 1872 with his claim 
that human expression of emotion, although more differentiated was 
similar if not identical to that in animals. Emotions were expressed in 
all creatures in a manner designed to effectively communicate to 
others what was being felt inside. He stated that the emotion of love 
was an exception to all the general rules in that while it was the most 
powerful of all emotions, it was the only one with no special means of 
expression: 
Although the emotion of love, for instance that of a mother for her 
infant, is one of the strongest of which the mind is capable, it can 
hardly be said to have any proper or peculiar means of expres-
sion .... A strong desire to touch the beloved person is commonly 
felt ... love is expressed by this means more plainly than by any 
other .... With the lower animals we see the same principle of 
pleasure derived from contact in association with love. 
DISCUSSION 
While most of us would agree with Darwin that "the emotion of 
love .. .is one of the strongest of which the mind is capable," we also 
have to wonder why scientists in the twentieth century accepted Dar-
win's theories but almost totally neglected the study of the emotion he 
deemed most important. 
The sensitivity of touch and its relationship to the emotion of love 
certainly raises some questions about both the importance of animals 
in our lives and the nature of animal emotion and consciousness. It 
also raises important questions about cetacea and our relationship 
with them. The history of close encounter with cetacea may not be ac-
cidental if Alistair Hardy is correct that we were once aquatic apes liv-
ing in the shallows in close harmony and possibly close tactile contact 
with coastal cetacea, rather than in the prey/predator relationship as 
with most other animals (Morgan 1982). 
Given the intelligence of dolphins, the innumerable instances of 
sensitive behaviour towards people and their affinity for children, the 
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therapeutic benefit could be quite extraordinary. Particularly so since 
at the present time we do not know very much about the minds of 
other species and in what ways they communicate non-verbally, least 
of all about the big-brained acoustically oriented cetacea. 
At least there now seems to be some shift away from our tradi-
tional arrogant and anthropocentric way of viewing animal behaviour. 
Scientists are considering heretofore heretical ideas about the in-
telligence, culture, language and consciousness of animals (Norris, 
Pribram, Terrace, J.J. Bonner, etc.). Speculation has it that some 
species of whales and dolphins might be able to transmit and interpret 
visual thought patterns. If there is any truth in this then therapeutic 
interaction with severely disturbed people, the blind, the deaf and 
others whose communication patterns are hindered, might be of pri-
mary importance. 
While this author is not in favour of captivity, it nevertheless re-
mains true that permits for capture are still being issued and that a 
number of cetaceans are now in captivity and will likely remain so for 
several more years. These social animals whose need for love and affec-
tion, social interaction and tactile contact may be no less than ours, 
and who have demonstrated over the centuries a desire to interact with 
humans, may benefit equally from therapeutic interactions. Such in-
volvements may well outstrip any psychological benefits currently ac-
cruing from their involvement in cognitive research and entertainment. 
While in some ways it seems less practical to involve wild ceta-
ceans, it may become less so as: (a) the whale sighting tourist industry 
increases; and (b) reports of locations of friendly whales and dolphins 
increases. Again, and this is equally speculative, it may be that those 
amongst us, who for reasons of physical handicap or emotional trau-
ma, chose or are forced to use uncommon modes of communication, 
could find meaningful affective communication with cetacea, as yet in-
decipherable to the rest of us in our logical linear world. 
CONCLUSION 
This evidence of mutual benefit from interaction is hardly surpris-
ing if we pause to think about our biological and evolutionary heritage, 
of the intricate interdependency between human and animal down the 
ages. It appears likely that the human/companion animal bond is of 
great antiquity beginning perhaps with man's capacity to reach out to 
the young of wild animals, culminating about 12,000 years ago in 
domestication of canids. It is clear that animals are still important to 
modern man-not just for material resources, when we consider that 
there are approximately 35 million dogs and 25 million cats in Ameri-
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can households alone. In terms of our psychological development, the 
animal is a universal dream symbol, playing a powerful role, not only 
in our dreams, fantasies, folktales, art and religion, but in our neuroses 
and psychoses. Our children are said to first dream of animals (Levin-
son 1972). 
However, an explanation of the evolution of our attitudes towards 
nature, in general, and animals in particular, reveals a relatively recent 
but ever increasing shift from cooperative interdependence to com-
petitive independence, with an almost complete and arrogant disre-
gard for our biopsychological kinship and needs. Much has been writ-
ten on the demise of species and environments and possibly the planet 
itself under the domination of the human animal (e.g., Leiss 1974). 
While we have "successfully" domesticated nature, bringing it close to 
the brink of total disaster, it could clearly be argued that we have 
severely lost rather than gained in personal contentment, psycholog-
ical stability and social cohesion-witness, for example, the human 
agony in our hospitals, mental institutions and prisons, and the per-
plexities and confusions in ourselves and our everyday lives. 
Human-animal bond research with its rather ironic findings that 
not only do healthy people benefit from such a bond but that in some 
cases animal therapy is the only therapy to give any positive results, 
may help to provoke a much needed return to a respect for and a co-
operation with other species, both wild and domestic. 
Much has been written about species interdependency in terms of 
basic survival needs. Relatively little has been written about the 
possiblility of species interdependency at an emotional level. Involv-
ing cetaceans in therapeutic situations may usefully extend the range 
of human/animal bond research in ways which could be important to 
the mental and physical well being of many species, including humans. 
Considering the impressive results from therapeutic work with pets 
and domestic animals, how much more dramatic might the results of 
such work be with animals whose brain capacity is much close to our 
own? 
We may even come to acknowledge a primary human need to live 
cooperatively with other species. Finally, in the ironic fact of their 
sometimes unique capacity to guide us back to sanity, we may also 
acknowledge their qualitatively equal differences and therefore their 
equal rights to survival. 
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LOGIC AND LIMITS 
OF ANIMAL LIBERATION 
Edward R. Bennett 
Department of Medical Microbiology 
School of Veterinary Medicine 
University of Georgia 
Athens, GA 30605 
INTRODUCTION 
The current interest in treatment towards animals goes beyond 
the focus of isolated instances of brutality and encompasses the advo-
cacy of significant changes in our traditional attitudes toward ani-
mals. In one year (1980) an estimated 2,054,281,000 hogs, beef, lamb, 
and poultry were raised on farms and slaughtered in the U.S.* (Agri-
cultural Statistics 1981), and 1,653,385 laboratory animals were used 
by facilities registered with the United States Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA 197 4). Adding to this the number of related animal indus-
tries such as textiles, farm equipment manufacturing, cosmetics and 
drug industries, restaurants, and groceries, it is easy to appreciate the 
broad spectrum of changes which would result from significant 
changes in our relationship with animals. Since all individuals have an 
interaction with animals, at least by the animal products they choose 
to purchase (or not to purchase), there has been a proliferation of view-
points concerning the treatment of animals. This paper will primarily 
consider Peter Singer's arguments presented in his book, Animal Lib-
*Number in thousands: hogs-97,174; cows and heifers-14,905; steers-16,059; 
bulls-679; sheep and lambs-5,742; total poultry-19,169,722. 
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eration (1975), because it is a popular thesis which is objective and logi-
cally derived. 
DEFINITIONS 
Before considering views about our treatment of animals, it will be 
helpful to define and document several key terms. 
Speciesism 
Speciesism is a term used by Singer (1975) to mean" ... a prejudice 
or attitude of bias toward the interests of members of one's own spe-
cies and against those of members of other species.'' 
Pain 
The common dictionary definition of pain is "a distressing sensa-
tion as of soreness or mental suffering as applied to humans and other 
animals." (Oxford Universal Dictionary 1955). When it is applied to 
lower invertebrates Singer (1975) says "most mollusks are such rudi-
mentary beings that it is difficult to imagine them feeling pain, or hav-
ing other mental states." As a logical philosopher Singer admits that 
it is not yet possible to determine a precise line between organisms 
that feel pain and those that do not, but as an advocate for animal 
liberation, Singer (1975) says that " ... somewhere between a shrimp 
and an oyster seems as good a place to draw the line as any ... " 
Stress 
Stress is often imprecisely used as a catch-all term for unknown 
factors which adversely affect an animal. A precise definition which 
has a physiologically measurable effect has been given by Hans Selye 
(1976). He defines stress as "the state manifested by a specific syn-
drome which consists of all the non-specifically induced changes 
within a biological system." The specific syndrome is called the Gen-
eral Adaptation Syndrome (G.A.S.) and consists of a specified alarm 
reaction, a stage of resistance, and a stage of exhaustion. The alarm 
reaction can be measured physiologically and consists of adrenocorti-
cal enlargement, atrophy of the thymicolymphatic organ and gas-
tro-intestinal ulcers. So stress is the result of nonspecific factors that 
cause the G .A.S. This definition permits us to recognize stress and 
quantify it by measuring the alarm reaction. It is important to note 
that stress can be good or detrimental depending upon how the biologi-
cal systems adapt to the detrimental effects of stress. 
Equal Consideration 
The concept of equal consideration is used by Singer to determine 
the parameters of acceptable treatment. "The basic principle of equali-
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ty does not require equal or identical treatment, it does require equal 
consideration." (Singer 1975). Equal consideration is the result of 
recognizing that the fundamental common capacity between humans 
and animals is the capacity to suffer or feel pleasure. Singer (1975) 
quotes Jeremy Bentham, "The question is not can they (animals) rea-
son? nor can they talk? but, can they suffer?" If equal consideration is 
given, then animals should not be subject to anymore suffering than 
we find permissible in humans. He goes on to state: 
... if we consider it wrong to inflict that much pain on a baby for 
no good reason then we must, unless we are speciesists, consider 
it equally wrong to inflict the same amount of pain on a horse for 
no good reason (Singer 1975, p. 16). 
SINGER'S PHILOSOPHY OF ANIMAL LIBERATION 
Singer (1975) states that animals and humans share the capacity 
to suffer pain or experience pleasure and that this capacity is the defin-
ing element that gives an individual interests: ''The capacity for suf-
fering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests at all ... " 
We can attempt to compare the amount of suffering or pleasure be-
tween species, but Singer (1975) admits that precise comparisons are 
difficult. 
It is probably true that comparisons of suffering between mem-
bers of different species cannot be made precisely, but precision is 
not essential (p. 17). 
Precision is not essential since a great amount of suffering will be 
eliminated even if a change in treatments is limited to comparisons of 
suffering which can be made with certainty. Our treatment of different 
species should not permit them to suffer any more than we allow for 
any one species. "No matter what the nature of the being, the principle 
of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with like suf-
fering" (Singer 1975). In Singer's theory the capacity to feel pain is the 
only factor which should be used to give equal consideration to individ-
uals regardless of species. However, on the subject of killing, he allows 
other factors to influence the principle of equal consideration. He says 
that it is just as wrong to kill animals when under the same conditions, 
we would not kill humans. He makes the claim that: 
Just as most humans are speciesists in their readiness to cause 
pain to animals when they would not cause a similar pain to hu-
mans for the same reason, so most humans are speciesists in their 
readiness to kill animals when they would not kill humans (Singer 
1975, p. 18). 
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But he does allow that factors such as "self-awareness, intelligence, 
the capacity for meaningful relations with others and so on ... may be 
relevant to the question of taking life" (Singer 1975). 
ARGUMENTS 
Since there are many proponents of animal liberation, there are a 
number of arguments which lack logical theory, are based on mis-
conceptions, and allude to anthropomorphism. Several examples can 
be cited in Jonny Frank's (1979) article on factory farming. Frank 
(1979) says that a baby pig " ... suffers abuse just like its mother: 
within a day or two of birth, the young piglet has its ears knotched, its 
teeth clipped, its tail docked, and if male, is castrated as well." He 
never tries to compare the pain (if any) to pain in humans. Is ear 
knotching in the pig more painful thim ear piercing in humans? When 
Frank (1979) states that pigs' teeth are clipped, he does not explain 
that only the sharp tips of these needle teeth are removed (Esminger 
1970). He also fails to say that the reason the sharp teeth are clipped is 
to prevent injury to the other piglets and to the sow's udder (Esminger 
1970). The fact that the piglets show no apparent signs of pain since 
they continue to nurse and fight with littermates (a normal pecking 
order behavior) makes it necessary for Frank (1979) to justify why he 
calls this practice abusive. A similar argument can be made for tail 
docking and castration. 
Frank (1979) gives a romaticized view of a good non-abusive farm 
in his statement that "Only a few small dairy farms conform to the tra-
ditional pastoral scene, permitting the cows to graze in outdoor pas-
tures during good weather." He makes no attempt to objectively eval-
uate the suffering an animal may have in confinement versus pasture. 
The fact that he envisions cattle grazing only in "good weather" 
reveals his affinity for emotion rather than detached reasoning. 
Unbounded by logic Frank goes on to boldly delve into the inner 
psyche of a bovine and claims " ... the separation of the calf from its 
mother causes psychological harm.'' This statement is ''justified'' in a 
footnote: "Mason visited calf barns and calves would attempt to 'suc-
kle a finger, hand, or part of our clothing.' A farmer explained that 
they always do this because 'they want their mothers I guess."' The 
farmer's statement hardly qualifies as expert analysis and does not 
justify the leap from the observation of suckling behavior to the as-
sumption of psychological harm. 
As an advocate of animal liberation, Singer (1975) also occasional-
ly disregards his philosophical objectivity: 
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Flesh taints our meals. Disguise it as we may, the fact remains 
that the centerpiece of our dinner has come to us from the slaugh-
terhouses, dripping blood. Untreated and unrefrigerated, it soon 
begins to putrefy and stink. When we eat it, it sits heavily in our 
stomachs, blocking our digestive process unti~ days later, we 
struggle to excrete it (p. 183). 
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Singer (1975) does not justify how his perception of sauces or creative 
gourmet techniques constitutes a disguise for meat, not to mention the 
many times meat is served plain with decoratively styled vegetables. 
His reference to dripping blood may be symbolic. If not, he makes the 
common mistake of confusing blood with the inter- and extra-cellular 
fluid (not blood) that contains the pigment myoglobin, which reacts 
with oxygen and turns red. Any blood that still remained on the car-
cass would be coagulated by the time it leaves the slaughter house, 
and it would not be dripping. Since the decay to which Singer objects 
also occurs in fruits and vegetables, his comment is not a valid argu-
ment. Finally, to justify the statement that meat blocks our digestive 
system, Singer refers to research which compares the mean transit 
time of food moving through the digestive tract of nonvegetarians 
with that of vegetarians. Although there is speculation about the cor-
relation between the increased transit time and increased incidence of 
colon cancer, the implication of this speculation, if it is correct, would 
not necessarily be that meat is bad but that the diet should contain 
more roughage. 
There are a number of common objections that are made against 
Singer's theory of animal liberation, but the nature of the theory is 
such that most objections can be shown to deny equal consideration on 
the basis of irrational speciesism. The practical application of animal 
liberation would cause significant changes in the ways animals are 
raised on farms (if they are raised at all) and the use of animals in 
research. The objective of farm management like other businesses is to 
produce the maximum product (milk, eggs, meat, fiber) at the mini-
mum cost. The criticism raised by animalliberationists is that equal 
consideration to the interests of animals is not a factor in farm 
management. The common objectives often raised by agricultural in-
terests are: (Singer 1975) 
1. Domestic animals are selectively bred by man for the purpose 
of farming so without agriculture the animals would not exist. 
2. The farm animals were born and raised on a farm and have 
never known other conditions so they do not know what it 
means to live independently. 
3. Conditions on the farm '' ... are no worse than conditions in the 
wild where animals are exposed to cold, hunger and predators." 
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Singer's reply to the first criticism is that "once a being exists, we 
have an obligation to avoid making that being suffer unnecessarily, 
but we have no obligation to nonexistent beings." 
His response to the second criticism is that "animals feel a need to 
exercise, stretch their limbs or wings, groom themselves, and turn 
around, whether or not they have ever lived in conditions that permit 
this." (Singer 1975) 
Singer (1975) answers the third criticism by saying that the choice 
"is not between life on a factory farm and life in the wild, but whether 
animals destined to live on factory farms and then be killed for food 
should be born at all." 
Ewbank (1973) has attempted to classify groups of behavior 
changes that may be caused by intensive confinement management. 
Type !. .. abnormal behavior patterns are associated with pa-
thological changes and obvious economic loss. 
Type II ... abnormal behavioral patterns occurring with little or 
no evidence of economic loss. 
Type III. .. changes are qualitative alterations in otherwise nor-
mal behavioral patterns and are detectable only by systematic 
observation. 
He says that it is difficult to assess the behavioral changes in Types II 
and III but says that Type I problems are "self-evident." Singer 
(1975) would believe that there could be significant changes in our 
treatment of animals even if we only considered the Type I behavior. 
He states: 
Even if we were to prevent this infliction of suffering on animals 
only when it is quite certain that the interests of humans will not 
be affected to anything like the extent that animals are affected, 
we would be forced to make radical changes in our treatment of 
animals ... (p. 17). 
ANIMAL RIGHTS 
The debate about animal rights complicates the issue of animal 
liberation. We can classify two types of rights-legal and moral. We 
may define legal rights as those that society assigns while moral rights 
can be considered as those that society recognizes as inherent. Accord-
ing to Stone as reported by Dichter (1979) " ... there is no generally ac-
cepted standard for legal rights ... " But Stone (Dichter 1979) defines 
four conditions for having legal rights: 
1. need an authoritative body to review and enforce rights, 
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2. must institute legal action at the animals' behest, 
3. court must take injury into account, 
4. relief must run to the benefit of the animal. 
The definition of moral rights may cause more debate. One argu-
ment is that "animals are capable of suffering and of frustration and 
therefore have interests in the same manner that senile persons, in-
fants, and brain damaged people have rights, even though they are in-
tellectually deficient and cannot claim them." (The Futurist 1979) 
Singer (1975) also shares this view when he says "to avoid speciesism, 
we must allow that beings which are similar in all relevant respects 
have a similar right to life-and mere membership in our own bio-
logical species cannot be a morally relevant criterion for this right." 
Michael A. Fox (1978) argues that since there are no" ... attributes 
that all humans without exception share in common ... even the capaci-
ty of humans to experience pain and pleasure falls short of universali-
ty ... ," we should " ... shift our attention instead to capacities that are 
nearly or virtually universal among humans." By doing this we can 
find attributes that humans have and animals do not so Fox (1978) 
concludes " ... that the concept of a moral right to equal treatment 
makes no sense except as applied to humans." 
This argument misses the point of Singer's (1975) argument that 
the criterion is not a universal capacity for pain or pleasure within a 
species but that individuals, regardless of their species, that have the 
same capacity for pain or pleasure, should have equal consideration in 
treatment with respect to this capacity. Singer (1978) says: 
I do not deny that normal human beings may possess capacities 
lacked by both retarded humans and animals. My point is that 
anyone wishing to defend our existing attitudes has to find some 
basis for attributing rights which does apply to all human beings 
but not to other animals. I claim that no such basis exists. 
To avoid this criticism, Fox (1978) adds an essential statement 
that " ... autonomy, which thus entails certain cognitive capacities, is 
necessary (and, together with the capacity to enjoy or suffer, suffi-
cient) for the possession of moral rights." Unfortunately, he does not 
give any justification for this point. "How can the above entailments 
be defended? I cannot give full treatment to this important argument 
here ... " Without providing this justification Fox's theory is in-
complete and fails to challenge Singer's argument. 
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OTHER ARGUMENTS 
We may raise the question about our role in the naturally occur-
ring predator-prey relationship which clearly violates the principle of 
equal consideration. Singer (1975) says we should not interfere because 
" ... judging by our past record, any attempt to change ecological 
systems on a large scale is going to do far more harm than good.'' So 
apparently if there was a way to eliminate the actions of carnivorous 
species without causing major changes in the ecological balance, it 
would be justified. 
A strong argument is to ask what animalliberationists plan to do 
about wild animals which feed on the plant crops. Singer's (1975) 
response is to suggest the hope that ''we may eventually develop 
methods of limiting the numbers of those species whose interests are 
genuinely incompatible with our own." But the main point is that 
Singer's philosophy is utilitarian and permits killing animals, after 
giving equal consideration if there are conflicting interests. N ozick 
(1974) outlines these characteristics of utilitarian theory: 
1. maximize happiness for all living beings, 
2. stringent side constraints on what a human may do to another 
human and 
3. animals may be used or sacrificed for the benefit of other peo-
ple or animals only if those benefits are greater than the loss 
inflicted. 
Singer assumes that those side constraints for human treatment are 
based on the capacity to suffer and should be applied among all indi-
viduals according to their capacity to suffer regardless of the species. 
But we may argue that those side constraints are based on other fac-
tors in addition to suffering. 
As mentioned above Singer (1975) says that the factors such as 
"self-awareness, intelligence, the capacity for meaningful relations 
with others, and so on, are not relevant to the question of inflicting 
pain-since pain is pain, ... these capacities may be relevant to the 
question of taking life.'' The reason that other capacities are permitted 
in the question of killing is because: 
... people hold widely differing views about when it is legitimate 
to kill humans as the continuing debates over abortion and eu-
thanasia attest. Nor have moral philosophers been able to agree 
on exactly what it is that makes it wrong to kill humans, and un-
der what circumstances killing a human being may be justifiable 
(Singer 1975, p. 18). 
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So the argument "pain is pain" cannot be countered by saying killing 
is killing since there are different factors which influence when killing 
may be morally justified in humans. The argument that the capacity 
to suffer is the only criterion to be used in equal consideration because 
"pain is pain," is justified by the assumption that people must hold a 
common view about when it is legitimate to cause pain in humans and 
that moral philosophers must be able to agree when pain is justified. 
Singer does not state this, but it is the logical parallel of his argument 
on killing applied to pain. This is the implied explanation for the state-
ment "pain is pain." This is the fundamental point where we can raise 
strong objections to Singer's theory of animal liberation. 
While Singer's theory is utilitarian with respect to killing animals, 
he assumes that there is a moral concensus on human suffering which 
is based only on the capacity to suffer and is free of other utilitarian 
factors. Singer would allow factors in addition to suffering in the 
debates about abortion or the death penalty since these topics involve 
the question of killing. But in subjects such as slavery or civil rights, 
Singer would hold that the only necessary factor is the amount of suf-
fering. In this respect, Singer's theory is not utilitarian since it 
violates Nozick's (1974) third characteristic of a utilitarian position 
that" ... animals may be used or sacrificed for the benefit of other peo-
ple or animals only if those benefits are greater than the loss inflicted.'' 
It may be that Singer assumes that these other factors are used in 
determining treatment in humans, but he cannot simply give equal 
consideration to other species based only on the capacity to suffer 
because the amount of suffering was not the only factor considered in 
determining the moral standard of treatment in the first place. 
Our treatment of other people is based on many factors, one of 
which is emotional attachment. We see this in animals with maternal 
attachment or rejection, and we observe it in humans by the intuitive 
observation that we are more sensitive to the pain or pleasure of people 
to whom we have closer psychological bonds. Just as we make emo-
tional bonds to certain human individuals, we also make bonds to 
animals and this bond affects our treatment of them. "Although re-
garded as acceptable fare on the continent, eating horse meat is akin to 
cannibalism in Britain" (The Economist 1978). One reason that a 
laboratory animal which may have "a higher degree of self-awareness 
and a greater capacity for meaningful relations with others than a 
severely retarded infant" (Singer 1975), may still be used in research 
rather than the infant, is because there is a greater emotional attach-
ment made to the infant. This theory is not speciesist since it also 
holds that it may be wrong to take someone's pet and use it in an ex-
periment since there is an emotional bond made to the pet animal. Ad-
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mittedly this factor elevates the human species since it always applies 
to humans and it is not always applicable to animals. However, it does 
not make the theory speciesist since it does not imply that only the 
presence or lack of emotional bond should determine treatment. It on-
ly suggests that other factors, in addition to the capacity to suffer, 
should influence our treatment of animals just as it influences treat-
ment of other humans. 
CONCLUSION 
In the debate about animal liberation, it is necessary to define 
terms and focus on philosophically clear arguments which minimize 
casual inaccuracies and are free from emotional embellishment. We 
have considered Singer's theory of animal liberation and can conclude 
that to be acceptable, Singer must allow other factors in addition to 
suffering to directly influence equal consideration. It was argued that 
this can be done without resulting in speciesism. The practical applica-
tion of the theory will still result in significant non-speciesist 
re-evaluation of treatment of animals. 
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ABSTRACT 
Observations of sows and gilts in tethers, stalls, and groups showed 
two distinct types of behaviour: pre-feed behaviour when pigs were 
anticipating food, and after-feed behaviour. Sows and gilts tethered 
for the first time do not show pre-feed excitement, but this develops in 
42 days which suggests that pre-feed behaviour is not stereotype, as 
suggested by the literature, but is a conditioned reflex. 
The question of the importance of after-feeding behaviours which 
are often called stereotypies is examined. The total time occupied by 
these behaviours over 24 hours by tethered sows is 14.5 to 29.0%, by 
tethered gilts 1.4 to 5.6%, by stalled sows 10 to 14%, and 4.2 to 6.3% 
in stalled gilts. 
Grouped animals do not show the same behaviours as the stalled 
and tethered ones. 
Several examples of true stereotypies are described, but not all 
tethered or stalled pigs exhibit chronic bar biting. Changes in the en-
164 J.K. Blackshaw and J.F. McVeigh 
vironment of two of these sows did not alter the fixed stereotype 
behaviour. Each individual seems to have an optimum level of en-
vironmental stimulation which may account for the great differences 
in individual behaviours. 
INTRODUCTION 
Those movements which are combined into rhythmic or complex 
sequences of obscure purpose are described as stereotypies. Hediger 
(1955) described stereotypies in caged zoo animals which included 
weaving to and fro, pacing up and down, and circling. 
Removal of the animal from the cage may cause the stereotypy to 
cease, but this is not always so (Meyer-Holzapfel1968). Novel objects 
may initially reduce the performance of stereotypies in horses but this 
lasts only as long as the object remains novel. In cases where animals 
have been performing the stereotypies for some time the introduction 
of a novel object may actually increase the frequency of the stereotypy 
(Riley-Worthington 1983). 
Some stereotypies may function as an adaptive mechanism and be 
regarded as the attempt of a normal individual to cope with an abnor-
mal environment (Ridley and Baker 1982). This abnormal environment 
may result from conflict or frustration situations, low sensory input 
(boredom state) or very high sensory jnput (e.g. novel objects). 
All these types of situations may contribute at some time to 
stereotypies reported in farm animals, such as bar-biting in tether 
stalled pigs (Fraser 1975) and weaving, wind-sucking, and crib-biting 
in horses (Riley-Worthington 1983). 
Some stereotypies in pigs and horses are performed when food is 
anticipated (Fraser 1975; Riley-Worthington 1983). It has been sug-
gested also that rapidly consumed food and the lack of even, low-
quality, high fibre food to eat at leisure is a major cause of stereotypies 
in herbivores (Kiley-Worthington 1983). 
Dantzer and Mormede (1981) suggested that pituitary-adrenal ac-
tivity is a good indicator of emotional arousal. They looked at a 
chain-pulling stereotypy performed by food deprived pigs who were 
then submitted to an intermittent food delivery schedule (Dantzer et 
al. 1980; Dantzer and Mormede 1983). This chain-pulling activity was 
accompanied by decreased pituitary-adrenal activity which indicates 
a decrease in tension or anxiety. Their data suggests that stereotypies 
enable the animals to decrease excessive arousal, rather than provide 
an extra source of stimulation. 
Horse stereotypies show many characteristics of learned behav-
iour (Kiley-Worthington 1983) which may be evoked by some mild 
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stimulus (head tossing as a result of nasal irritation initially) or learn-
ing by imitation, as in some cases of crib-biting. 
There is no published evidence for this in pigs but this study sug-
gests there is an element of learning involved in the development of 
stereotypies. It also examines the behaviour performed by tethered, 
stalled, and groups of pigs before feeding and after feeding, and com-
ments on the effect of changing the environment on several complex 
sequences of stereotypic behaviour in sows. Comment is also made on 
the notable absence of chronic bar-biting in this herd. 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
The study was carried out in a 55-sow, specific pathogen-free 
herd at the Veterinary Science Farm Piggery, University of Queens-
land (Australia), during 1982-83. The behaviour of the animals (Large 
White x Landrace) in three husbandry systems for sows and gilts was 
examined. 
(i) Stall system providing 1.04 m 2/pig; 
(ii) Neck tether system providing 1.04 m 2/pig; but the 65 em chain 
allows each pig to use 3.0 m 2 of space effectively; 
(iii) Group system of six pigs in a pen (6.24 m 2). 
Flooring was concrete in the stalls, each pig being provided 
with a concrete trough, concrete floor and slats with a metal trough in 
the tethers, and concrete floor and slats in the group pens with floor 
feeding. 
Food was provided twice/day at 0800 to 0830 and 1300 to 
1350 in the form of pellets. 
OBSERVATIONS-EXPERIMENT 1 
Two types of observations were made in each husbandry system: 
(i) Detailed observations each week on 36 tethered sows, 8 tether-
ed gilts, 9 sows in stalls, 10 gilts in stalls, two groups of 6 gilts, and 
five groups of 6 sows each, penned. 
These observations were made from the time of confirmation of 
pregnancy when the pigs were put in the husbandry system until far-
rowing. Detailed observations were made on day 1 and covered the two 
feeding periods. Subsequent observations were done each week and 
covered only one feeding period. Behaviour was recorded from the time 
the pigs anticipated their food (5 to 15 minutes), during the feeding 
period and until the pigs lay down. 
(ii) Surveys of all the pigs in stalls, tethers, and pens with time 
sampling during both the day and night. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
Another section of the experiment was to determine how 
stereotypies develop. The two groups of penned gilts (6 in each group) 
from the previous experiment were used after farrowing as parity 1 
sows and placed in tethers when pregnancy was confirmed. They were 
observed each week before, during and after a feed period to determine 
when or if, stereotypies developed. 
RESULTS 
EXPERIMENT 1 
There were two distinct types of behaviour in stalled, tethered, 
and penned pigs: 
(i) Before-feed behaviour, and 
(ii) After-feed behaviour. 
PENNED SOWS AND GILTS 
The grouped sows (five groups of 6 sows) were only kept together 
for one day over two feeding periods, as the agonistic behaviour (cqn-
flict behaviour involving threats, bites, fights) prevented any other be-. 
haviour patterns from emerging. 
The grouped gilts (two groups of 6 gilts) showed some pre-feed ex-
citement which consisted of crowding and pushing to the fence as the 
food trolley came past. There was no pawing or head waving nor was 
there opportunity for any bar-biting. Agonistic activity which occur-
red over the first 16-minute feed period averaged 4 agonistic in-
cidents/minute. This decreased over the next three months to average 
1.8/minute. 
Pigs showed no true stereotypies after feeding-the first gilt lay 
down within 17-34 minutes after the beginning of feeding and all gilts 
were consistently lying by 76 minutes after feeding. There were ex-
amples of gilts who sat and chewed for up to 20 minutes in the after-
feed period, but this ceased when they lay down. 
STALLS AND TETHERS 
Pre-feed behaviour 
Pre-feed excitement was shown in stalled sows and gilts, and in 
tethered sows and gilts when food was anticipated. These behaviours 
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are similar to those described by Fraser (1975), and are listed in Table 
1a. Day 1 is the day that the pig is put in the husbandry system and 
the frequency of the behaviour is noted over the first feeding period. 
The tethered and stalled sows showed more pre-feed behaviour se-
quences than the tethered and stalled gilts. Agonistic displays were 
not evident in tethered gilts, nor in stalled sows or gilts. The agonistic 
activities in the tethered sows dropped from 4 7% of all sows over the 
first two weeks to one example over the three-month period. 
Table 1a. Pre-feed behaviours (5 to 12 minutes before feeding) and the frequency they 
occurred on the first day that sows and gilts are stalled or tethered. 
Tether Stalls 
Sows (36) Gilts (8) Sows (9) Gilts (10) 
Day 1 
Agonistic Stand for Yell 7 Stand for 
displays 17* feed 5 feed 6 
Paw 3 
Yell 26 Lie until Paw 1 
feed comes 4 Nosing bars 2 
Paw 23 Stand and 
Pull at Froth and chew 1 
Nosing bars 10 tether 1 chew bar 4 
Chew bar 1 
Froth and Stand and 
chew bar 12 chew 1 Poke nose in 
and out front 
Stand and Wave head 7 bar 1 
chew 1 
Poke nose in 
Stand 6 and out front 
bar 6 
Wave head 18 
*frequency of behaviour 
A pig may show more than one behaviour. 
It can be seen (Table 1b) that some of the tethered gilts learned to 
chew the bar, wave their heads, paw and yell during the succeeding 
three-month observation period. However, there were 5 gilts who did 
not show these behaviours and stood up when food was anticipated. 
Bar-biting was observed in 17 tethered sows consistently but was 
interspersed with pawing, yelling and head waving. Some stalled sows 
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Table lb. Pre-feed behaviours observed in tethered and stalled sows and gilts over a 
three-month period. 
Tether Stalls 
Sows (36) Gilts (8) Sows (9) Gilts (10) 
Agonistic Displays 
Yell Stand for feed Yell Stand for feed 
Paw Yell Paw Paw 
Nose bars Paw Nose bars Stand and chew 
Froth and chew Froth and chew Chew bar 
bar Nose bar bar 
Stand and chew Chew bar Poke nose Poke nose in 
in and out of and out of 
Wave head Wave head front bar front bar 
and gilts also bit the bar, but again it was interspersed with other ac-
tivities. 
These behaviours occupied a very small time period over 24 hours. 
It was 1.7 to 2.0% of the time in stalled and tethered sows, 0 to 0.4% in 
tethered gilts and 0 to 0.2% in stalled gilts. 
Fraser (1975) refers to head waving as a stereotype but it is evi-
dent that none of these behaviours are stereotypies when the definition 
is considered. They are sequences which occur, and indeed might be ex-
pected, in animals who are waiting for their hunger to be satisfied. 
AFTER-FEED BEHAVIOUR 
This is one of the periods when stereotypies are reported to occur 
in pigs. The behaviours for stalled sows and gilts and tethered sows 
and gilts until they rest are shown in Table 2. These behaviours occupy 
between 14.5 to 29.0% of a 24-hour period in tethered sows, 10.0 to 
14.0% in stalled sows, 1.4 to 5.6% in tethered gilts and 4.2 to 6.3% in 
stalled gilts. 
There were no examples of chronic bar-biting or the pre-feed 
behaviours of yell, paw, wave head, but there were several examples of 
true stereotypies which were performed continuously by individual 
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Table 2. After-feed behaviours observed in tethered and stalled sows and gilts before 
rest. 
Tether 
Sows (36) Gilts (8) 
Lie Lie 
Lie and chew Lie and chew 
Lick trough Lick trough 
Stand and chew Stand and chew 
Chew trough Rub nose on floor 
Play with chain 
Rub nose on floor 
Rub nose on trough 
Sows (9) 
Lie 
Lie and chew 
Stand and chew 
Lick trough 
Rub nose on 
trough 





Lie and chew 
Stand and chew 
Sit and chew 
Sit 
Lick trough 
pigs until they lay down. These were observed for three months: 
(i) A tethered sow who continually pressed the water nozzle and 
squirted water over the floor in random bursts (45 seconds to 140 
seconds with 3- to 5- second stops in between). 
(ii) A tethered sow who sat poking her tongue in and out. 
(iii) A tethered sow who pushed the water nozzle and licked the 
water in sequences of 27-30 seconds of continuous pressing, then a 
rest period of 2 seconds. This was repeated for an average of 165 
minutes until the pig lay down. 
(iv) A stalled sow who rubbed her nose in an upward direction on 
the two front bars of her stall in a random pattern which also had a 
random time component. 
Kiley-Worthington (1983) points out that in horses there appears 
to be an optimum level of environmental stimulation for each in-
dividual. This seems to be similar to pigs and may account for the 
great differences in individual behaviours. 
An interesting observation was that when the tethered pig who 
continually squirted water had farrowed and was placed in stalls she 
continued this stereotypy. Also the bar rubbing stereotypy described 
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in the stalled sow continued when she was tethered. This indicated 
that a fixed stereotypy is difficult to stop even by a change of environ-
ment. 
The frequencies of the other after-feed behaviours are given in the 
survey results for tethered pigs (Table 3) and stalled pigs (Table 4) 
which were done in the daytime. A survey of tethered and stalled pigs 
over 15 hours (1500- 0645) is shown in Tables 5a and 5b. 
One hour after feeding, stand and chew, followed by stand and lick 
trough, were the most common behaviours. Stand and chew was the 
most common behaviour for two to three hours following feeding, after 
which most pigs were resting. 
Table 3. Behaviour of 30 tethered pigs on three different days (number indicates the 
number of pigs performing the behaviour). 
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 
Behaviour 1hr 5-15 min 3 hr 40 min 1hr 3hr 
before feed before feed after feed after feed after feed 
(0800) (0845) (1240) (1500) (1700) 
Lie only 8 0 8 4 7 
Lie and chew 2 0 6 3 4 
Stand only 3 6 3 0 0 
Stand and chew 8 5 3 9 7 
Stand and lick trough 3 2 3 9 4 
Sit only 2 1 2 2 0 
Sit and chew 0 0 3 2 6 
Stand and poke 
tongue in and out 1 1 1 1 1 
Stand with nose 
pressed on bar 1 0 0 0 
Chew bar 1 0 0 0 
Stand and head wave 1 2 0 0 0 
Stand, wave and paw 0 6 0 0 0 
Stand, wave, 
chew bar 0 3 0 0 0 
Stand and paw 0 4 0 0 0 
Play with chain 0 0 0 0 1 
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Table 4. The behaviour of 18 stalled pigs on day 1, and 15 stalled pigs on day 2 (number 
indicates the number of pigs performing the behaviour). 
Day 1 (18 pigs) Day 2 (15 pigs) 
Behaviour 5-15 min 3hr 4hr 1hr 2hr 3hr 
before feed after feed after feed after feed after feed after feed 
(0845) (1200) (1300) (1500) (1600) (1700) 
Lie only 0 13 9 1 1 14 
Lie and chew 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Stand only 5 0 0 2 0 1 
Stand and chew 0 5 6 9 11 0 
Stand and lick trough 0 0 0 3 2 0 
Sit only 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Sit and chew 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Stand and 
poke tongue 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nose pressed 
on bar 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Chew bar 4 0 0 0 1 0 
Stand head wave 9 0 0 0 0 0 
Stand and paw 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 5a. Behaviours observed in 35 tethered pigs from 1500-0645 hours (15 hr 45 
min); fed at 1430 and all pigs lie from 1830 to 0640. 
Behaviour 1500 1530 1600 1630 1700 1730 1800 1830 0645* 
Lie 3 11 4 16 24 23 33 35 25 
Lie and chew 0 0 2 2 2 4 0 0 0 
Stand 1 10 19 3 3 4 2 0 7 
Stand and chew 1 6 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Stand and lick trough 29 6 0 10 0 0 0 0 3 
Sit 1 1 2 2 5 1 0 0 0 
Sit and chew 0 1 3 2 1 3 0 0 0 
*The husbandman arrived to feed the pigs. 
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Table 5b. Behaviours observed in 11 stalled pigs from 1500-0645 hours; fed at 1430, 
and all pigs rest from 1830 to 0640. 
Behaviour 1500 1530 1600 1630 1700 1730 1800 1830 0645* 
Lie 5 8 5 8 9 9 5 11 6 
Lie and chew 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Stand 3 0 0 3 1 0 4 0 3 
Stand and chew 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Stand and lick trough 2 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sit 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Sit and chew 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
*The husbandman arrived to feed the pigs. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
During the first observations after the parity 1 sows settled into 
their tethers there was not the pre-feed excitement exhibited by the 
older sows. None of them pawed, waved their heads back and forth, or 
yelled. These sows had been penned together until parturition and this 
was their first experience in tethers. 
The sows, by 42 days in tethers, were exhibiting some pre-feed ex-
citement by salivating, waving heads, and pushing their snouts 
through the front bars of the tether-stall. 
After-feed behaviour included rubbing snout along the floor under 
the trough, licking inside the trough and chewing. All sows were lying 
down by 100 minutes after feeding although there were great in-
dividual differences. One sow consistently showed no after-feed 
behaviour and lay down immediately. 
As yet, true stereotype behaviours have not developed in these 
animals, which suggests that an element of learning is involved in 
their development. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Only four examples of true stereotype behaviour appeared which 
might indicate that these individuals have a different tolerance level to 
the other animals. Changes in environment did not alter the complex 
fixed stereotype behaviour in two sows. It is suggested that some 
stereotype behaviour is conditioned. 
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The pre-feed excitement is not stereotype behaviour according to 
the definition, but is a conditioned reflex. Only a few tethered or stall-
ed sows and gilts exhibited chronic bar-biting before or after feeding. 
There remains the question of whether the after feeding behav-
iours observed in most animals are true stereotype behaviours, as de-
scribed in the literature. It seems unlikely that most of them are harm-
ful to the welfare of the animals in this piggery. 
The piggery in this study has several factors which may account 
for the lack of serious stereotypies: 
(i) many students go into the piggery and handle the animals dur-
ing clinical procedures, 
(ii) several ongoing research projects are carried out continuously, 
(iii) the husbandman is interested in the pigs' welfare. 
If stereotypies are due to boredom and lack of stimulation as has 
been suggested, the presence of people may prevent this. 
EDITORS' ADDENDUM 
ANIMAL RIGHTS AND THE NON-THERAPEUTIC 
USE OF DRUGS 
The use of prostaglandins to induce farrowing in pigs (regardless 
of the stage of farrowing at which different sows might be) is an animal 
welfare and rights issue. (I am not opposed to valid veterinary use of 
prostaglandins to help us deal with the reproductive problems of pigs, 
horses, and other animals that might otherwise jeopardize their health 
and well-being.) But it is surely ethically questionable to use pro-
staglandins to make sows in different stages of labor give birth at the 
same time, irregardless of potentially harmful consequences. This is 
done so that expectant sows will give birth during working hours. While 
this is consonant with the economic "efficiencies" of the hog factory 
farm, it certainly is not in accord with the biology and psychology of 
the sow. Judith Blackshaw has clearly demonstrated, in her research 
on sows being given prostaglandins near to delivery, that such treat-
ment intensifies instinctual impulses and needs, which can lead to 
what humanitarians intuit as frustration and distress. The use of an-
tibiotics as feed additives for farm animals and of analgesic drugs to 
enable injured and lame horses to be raced, are other examples of the 
unethical and commercial, as distinct from veterinary, use of drugs in 
animals today, which should be questioned. 
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THE ORIGINS OF EMPATHY 
AND ALTRUISM 
Carolyn Zahn-Waxler, Barbara Hollenbeck and 
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Empathy and altruism are most commonly thought of as forms of 
compassion that human beings express toward one another. However, 
emotions and behaviors reflecting apparent concern for others occur 
within other species and across species as well. Although not without 
controversy, ethologists and sociobiologists (e.g., Wilson 1975) have 
identified many behaviors in other animals and insects that may be 
viewed as prosocial or altruistic (e.g., cooperative efforts of bees, warn-
ing calls of many species, rescue behaviors of whales, certain acts of 
mammalian caregivers toward their young, etc.). There are fewer signs 
of altruism across species. Some animals can be trained to protect, de-
fend and help others (usually humans) in distress. Animal owners 
sometimes indicate that their pets show emotional concern for others. 
In observing parent-child interaction in the home we have seen emo-
tionally distressed pets hovering over persons feigning distress in 
situations where we are measuring the child's capacity for empathy. 
The recent spate of research on animal facilitated therapy attests to 
the capacity of animals to provide comfort to persons suffering from a 
variety of physical and emotional problems. 
Altruism across species is probably most commonly seen, how-
ever, in human behavior toward other animals. Humans are known to 
help, comfort, share witli, protect and defend animals. There have even 
been reports of loss of human life, for example, in the process of rescu-
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ing animals. There is also enormous variation among humans in their 
sensitivity to their own animals, their commitment to principles of 
humane treatment, (Miller 1983) and their concern for preservation of 
wildlife. It is difficult to account for these individual differences in 
human beings' capacities for compassionate versus aggressive, ex-
ploitative attitudes and behaviors toward others, for the origins are 
multiple and complex. 
In a review of the altruism literature, Burleson (in press) concluded 
that comforting activity by humans is most likely to occur or occurs 
more sensitively when the distressed, needy other (a) has a close, car-
ing relationship with the comforter, (b) shows salient signs of distress, 
and (c) is perceived by the comforter as similar to himself or herself. In 
order to facilitate altruism then, it would be important, to identify 
both the attributes we have in common with others (animal as well as 
human) and the factors that promote caring relationships. The earlier 
in development the emotional ties are established, presumably the 
more deeply engrained will be the compassion. The purpose of this 
chapter is to explore these processes in greater detail. 
We will describe theories and research that try to explain the 
development, especially in children, of sensitivity to the needs of 
others. Are children born with empathy? Is it instinctive or learned? 
What kinds of changes do humane feelings and behaviors undergo as 
children develop? How do the environments in which children are 
reared determine whether they will be more or less likely to show con-
cern and to assume responsibility for the welfare of others? We have 
examined these issues in a series of studies of (a) the early origins of 
emotional concern (empathy) and (b) the translation of concerned feel-
ings into altruistic behaviors such as helping, sharing, and comforting. 
Because of an interest in the development of generalized altruism, we 
have studied children's prosocial orientations toward humans and ani-
mals, in many settings and over long intervals of time. We will con-
sider the implications of theories and research findings for humane at-
titudes and treatment. 
Empathy refers to the capacity to feel what another is feeling. Ex-
amples include the sadness felt when tragedy strikes a friend or the 
pleasure vicariously experienced in relation to another's joy. It is, 
then, the sharing of an emotional experience. While it is not restricted 
to the contagion of any particular emotion, the term most commonly 
does refer to the emotional concern aroused by the suffering of another 
living being. This is where our research interest has centered-on the 
development of emotions and behaviors reflecting concern for the wel-
fare of others. Empathy has many functions. It is viewed by some as 
essential to all social interactions and relationships because it informs 
us about the inner world of the other person (Meade 1934). It has been 
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suggested that empathy is critical to the process of insight, for one 
sees oneself through the eyes of the other via empathy (Dymond 1945). 
In some theories of moral development (e.g., Hogan 1973) empathy is a 
necessary component of mature, moral functioning. Empathy may be 
a fundamental motivator in eliciting altruistic and prosocial behaviors 
and inhibiting aggressive ones (Hoffman 1976; Feshbach and Fesh-
bach, in press). And empathy is viewed as a critical condition of effec-
tive therapeutic intervention in psychotherapy (Rogers 1957) and psy-
choanalysis (Olinick 1980). 
Empathy is hypothesized to have both a cognitive and affective 
component, i.e., (a) the emotional experiencing or sensing of the other's 
experience and (b) the intellectual understanding or interpretation of 
what that experience means (Hoffman 1976). In very young children 
and in animals as well, where symbolic capacities are limited, we would 
expect the emotional component of empathy to predominate. In 
theory, both the cognitive and emotional aspects of empathy should 
enhance the likelihood of caring for another in need and hence of assur-
ing humane treatment. And with increases in intellectual abilities and 
competencies throughout childhood, compassionate behavior, too, 
should increase. However, this is not always the case. Another 
person's distress may be so frightening or painful when experienced 
empathically, that it may turn the viewer away from the victim's 
plight. Intense emotional involvement and preoccupation with an-
other's problems may enmesh one in that distress so completely that it 
interferes with appropriate emotional concern and provision of con-
structive help. Further, we may mistakenly project our own emotions 
onto another with whom we think we are empathizing. Finally, 
knowledge of another's needs, emotions, and desires may be used to 
manipulate or control another person, to prey on their vulnerabilities, 
or to intellectualize, and hence deny, the experience. 
Prosocial behaviors, acts that benefit another in need (e.g., help, 
sharing, cooperation, comfort, protection, rescue, and defense) also 
represent complex and diverse processes. They may or may not be the 
behavioral counterparts to feelings of concern. Helping can be an in-
trusive and unwanted act of domination, defense of a victim often con-
tains elements of aggression and anger, sharing may be done with ex-
pectations of reciprocity, comforting may be motivated by guilt or 
righteous indignation, cooperation may be in the services of intent 
ultimately to exploit a partner. These complexities suggest (a) that 
there may be optimal levels of expression of concerned feelings and 
behaviors, and (b) that some types of prosocial behavior are more likely 
than others to reflect altruism or generalized humane behavior. It is 
important to try to distinguish those emotions and behaviors that 
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reflect genuine concern, because this attribute is particularly impor-
tant in assuring humane treatment. 
THEORIES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
EMPATHY AND ALTRUISM 
There are four major theories that have been used to explain the 
development of altruism. They variously emphasize the importance of 
(1) guilt and conscience, (2) cognitive development, (3) instinct, and (4) 
learning and environmental processes, to explain the origins and 
maintenance of prosocial behavior. 
PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY 
In psychoanalytic theory, the concept of identification has been 
used to explain how the values and mores of society become internalized, 
and hence why children become prosocial. The child is believed to be-
come altruistic, to share and cooperate, either because of guilt result-
ing from moral transgressions or through the internalization of ego 
ideals (i.e., positively valued behaviors in others). The concept of pa-
thological altruism also derives from psychoanalytic theory. The em-
phasis is on unconscious, inner forces that drive the behaviors. This 
approach has produced relatively few studies, but it seems reasonable 
to assume that prosocial behaviors (e.g., help sharing and comfort) for 
some persons and on some occasions result from feelings of guilt or an 
overactive conscience. 
COGNITIVE THEORY 
In cognitive-developmental theory which originated with Piaget 
(1932) the emphasis has been on children's social-inferential abilities 
as a prerequisite for prosocial behavior. The young child is viewed as 
egocentric, assuming that others think and feel the same way s/he 
does. A certain level of intellectual growth or maturation thus is neces-
sary before the child becomes capable of understanding another's 
point of view and hence of being altruistic. This approach produced 
many studies in which children's abilities to take others' social roles or 
perspectives and their abilities to reason about moral issues were ex-
amined in relation to prosocial actions. The assumptions were that the 
ability (a) to interpret accurately another's needs or (b) to attain a high 
level (stage) of moral reasoning was necessary for a child to show con-
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cern reflected in actual behavior. The results of these research projects 
are mixed (see reviews by Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler and Chapman 
1983; Shantz 1983) with no strong evidence for the hypothesized con-
nection between social-cognitive capacities and altruistic acts. In 
other words, one can understand the nature of another's distress 
without doing anything about it and one can behave in a caring way 
without highly developed cognitive capacities. 
In both psychoanalytic and cognitive theories, there is a long 
period of early development in which self-concern is presumed to 
predominate: Consideration for others would not be expected from 
children until they were at least five to seven years old. Two other 
theories, ethological/evolutionary and learning theories, do not 
highlight a particular age or stage of development necessary for 
altruism to occur. They are considered in greater detail throughout 
this chapter because of their special relevance to humane education: 
The ethological approach because it provides an evolutionary perspec-
tive and identifies those attributes that we have in common with 
others (human and animal) and the learning approach because it begins 
to identify specific mechanisms by which empathy and altruism can be 
taught and learned. 
LEARNING THEORY 
In learning theory, the emphasis has been more on the overt, 
observable prosocial behavior of the child rather than on reasoning and 
inner motives. In initial formulations, prosocial behavior was presumed 
to be acquired in the same way as other learned behaviors-through 
processes of conditioning reinforcement, and modeling (see Rad-
ke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler, and Chapman 1983). Over time, concep-
tions of learning were expanded to include the influence of other 
socialization processes (e.g., nature of parental discipline; specific in-
struction; institutionalized, cultural norms and so on). For example, 
different cultures and subcultures have quite different norms that are 
communicated to the child about cooperative, individualistic and com-
petitive behaviors and what is appropriate balance between them 
(Madsen and Shapira 1977). Learned norms of responsibility (i.e., that 
it is our duty to help) and norms ofreciprocity (i.e., "I'll help you if you 
help me") are thought to be culturally determined and learned in in-
stitutional settings (school, church, home, etc.). 
The values of society impinge most directly on young children 
through their parent's attitudes and philosophies about moral and 
altruistic behaviors as well as through their specific teaching and 
caregiving practices. Some of these practices include (a) what care-
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givers model or convey in their own behavior about empathy and altru-
ism, (b) what they preach about consideration for others, (c) their 
general nurturance or warmth toward the child and their own empathy 
when the child is distressed, (d) their teaching and control practices, 
when their children cause distress to another (e.g., physical punish-
ment, love withdrawal, explanation and reasoning) (e) the use of praise 
and punishment, (f) the use of attributions (such as "you are mother's 
good helper"), and (g) the creation of environments that promote pro-
social behavior or make caring possible. Generalizations or formulas 
for how to produce a prosocial child are difficult and sometimes hazar-
dous, but the bulk of evidence implicates the following caregiver 
variables as important-the modeling of altruism to others, nur-
turance toward the child, use of reasoning (and firm discipline when 
the child hurts others), direct instruction in how to help, and reinforce-
ment for helping (Eisenberg 1983; Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler and 
Chapman 1983). In later sections we will consider in greater detail how 
some of these variables influence the development of empathy and 
altruism in children. Another approach to the socialization question 
has been taken by investigators who have examined parental and 
societal factors that promote or inhibit aggression rather than pro-
social behavior. A brief overview of these findings indicates that 
parental permissiveness and inconsistency are associated with high 
levels of aggression in their children; also predictive of cruelty in 
childhood are high levels of parental aggression and abusiveness, both 
toward the children and others as well (see Parke and Slaby 1983, for a 
detailed review of this literature). The learning/socialization perspec-
tive holds special promise for humane education because it can iden-
tify processes that may be alterable and hence may enhance the child's 
prosocial tendencies. 
BIOLOGICAL THEORIES 
Ethological/evolutionary approaches, on the other hand, hold pro-
mise for understanding the biological bases of altruism and possibly 
for understanding empathic relationships between humans and ani-
mals. In this view, altruism is built into species and some forms of al-
truism are adaptive for survival. Ethologists emphasize the fact that 
humans like other animals, are born with behavioral and emotional 
tendencies that enhance their own likelihood of survival and hence the 
continuation of the species. Even though human infants are more help-
less than the young of any other mammalian species, they are well 
equipped with reflexes and behaviors of significance for survival (e.g., 
rooting, sucking, clinging, following). The distress cries of infants are 
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present at the moment of birth: They provide for very effective means 
of eliciting attention, sympathy, help, and comfort from adults. In all 
mammals this distress cry or isolation call is a stimulus for caregiving 
and comfort. It served originally to maintain social cohesion by main-
taining maternal-offspring contact. The distress cry of mammals is 
also a constant reminder that animals other than ourselves do have 
feelings and are capable of suffering. 
There are many characteristics that humans have in common with 
other mammals that may contribute to maintenance of social contact 
and hence, possibly, to the development of empathy as well (e.g., social 
play, nursing, separation distress). Distress is a universal emotion ex-
pressed across all mammalian species. Distress is also a stimulus for 
acts of altruism. It has the potential for evoking an emotional, 
possibly empathic, response in some other members of the same spe-
cies. If there is sufficient similarity in expressions of distress across 
different mammalian species, this may be a powerful biological mech-
anism reminding us that some of the distresses and needs of other 
species are similar to our own. This recognition of communality might 
help to promote empathy across species. There is little or no research 
designed to explore humans' reactions to the cries of other animals. In 
one of our studies (Zahn-Waxler, Friedman, and Cummings 1983) pre-
school and elementary school-age children overheard cries of pre-
mature and normal babies. It was not uncommon for children initially 
to mistake the cries, particularly those of the less developed, prema-
ture infants, for cries of animals and birds (sheep, donkeys, cats, goats, 
even kangaroos and turkeys). This did not deter the children from ex-
pressing empathy toward the infants with unusual (animal-like) cries. 
Distress cries, however, should be seen as a necessary but not suffi-
cient condition for eliciting empathy. There are also studies to indicate 
that distress cries elicit aggressive behavior in some caregivers. 
Physical abuse and neglect of distressed offspring have been reported 
in primates as well as humans. 
MacLean (1982) has hypothesized that the capacity of mammals 
for nurturant caregiving toward their (distressed) offspring, in con-
trast to some reptilians who may abandon or eat their young, is the 
evolutionary forerunner to the development of empathy, conscience, 
and a sense of social responsibility. MacLean has attempted to iden-
tify those parts of the brain that are responsible for this caregiving. 
The limbic system is clearly basic for parental care and family affilia-
tion in mammals. But the development of the prefrontal neocortex 
which is a much more recently evolved structure, has contributed to 
further development of the family, especially in primates. The added 
sector of neocortex gives human beings a capacity for foresight, which 
is believed to underlie our striving for the welfare of our own progeny 
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and the progeny of others. Some scientists also have begun to specu-
late about neurochemical and hormonal bases of empathy and altruism 
and the brain circuitry that might be involved (Panksepp, in press). 
RESEARCH ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
GENERALIZED ALTRUISM 
Many of the processes that explain the origins and development of 
·altruism are difficult to study directly. However, it is possible to study 
developmentally young children's responses to other's distress cries 
and hence examine their early capacities for empathy and caregiving. 
Such research has established the importance of both instinct and en-
vironment in the development of sensitivity to another's distress. 
Studies from the early 1900's demonstrated the possibility that even 
newborns may be predisposed to be receptive to distress; they are like-
ly to cry, reflexively when they hear the cries of other babies. It was 
not clear, however, from these studies, whether children cried because 
they were empathic or because they were frightened or because the 
sounds of the crier were aversive and painfuL More recent and ex-
perimentally sophisticated research designs (Simner 1971; Sagi and 
Hoffman 1976) have confirmed that there is special sensitivity to the 
cry, per se, and not just to the noisiness of the cry. 
We have engaged in two kinds of studies of the development of 
altruism and empathy in over 17 5 young children. We have examined 
the origins and transitions (in one to two-and-a-half year olds) in pro-
social patterns over time in natural settings (Zahn-Waxler and Rad-
ke-Yarrow 1982); and we have created different learning environments 
to determine which are most conducive to developing prosocial behav-
ior based on concern for another's welfare (in three to five year olds) 
(Yarrow, Scott and Waxler 1973). In both studies we have been inter-
ested in how children respond to others in distress, because this repre-
sents the set of conditions most likely to evoke emotion (and hence 
possibly empathy and altruism). Both kinds of studies explore condi-
tions that create generalized consideration for the welfare of others 
(i.e., caring for nonfamily as well as family members, for animals as 
well as humans). 
THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND 
SOCIALIZATION OF ALTRUISM 
A longitudinal study of one to two-and-a-half year olds examined 
chilqren's responses to compelling dist:J;ess situations. A sample of 
middle-class mothers was trained by research assistants to make 
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systematic, narrative accounts and to tape record their observation 
reports. The mothers observed events of naturally occurring distress 
(e.g., pain, sadness, anger) that were either caused or witnessed by the 
children. This was done over a period of many months. Standard emo-
tional incidents were also introduced. Each week either the mother or a 
home visitor acted out a distress emotion in the home. These pro-
cedures provided thousands of incidents which were then analyzed to 
determine (a) developmental changes in children's reactions to other's 
distress and (b) parental socialization practices that were more or less 
likely to produce altruism. Several hundred of these incidents involved 
reports of children's feelings and behaviors toward animals. 
There are very distinct age changes in how children react to 
another's distress during the second year of life (Zahn-Waxler and 
Radke-Yarrow 1982). Children almost always are keenly aware of the 
distress and if they consistently do not notice, one wonders what is 
wrong. The youngest children are themselves likely to become dis-
tressed, in ways similar to the reflexive crying of newborns but not 
with such full-blow intensity. Just a little past the first year of life, 
children begin to comfort others in distress. This is a developmental 
landmark; an aversive experience in another person draws out a con-
cerned, approach response from the child. Children's first prosocial 
acts are physical interventions: they pat and hug the victims, rub their 
hurts and so on. Children often begin to seek out guidance, reas-
surance, and information from their mothers when in these situations. 
There is also an explosion of prosocial activity at this time. Children's 
acts of compassion begin to take many different forms: acts of help, 
sharing, comforting, rescue, distraction, defense/protection, verbal 
sympathy, are now present in development. These reactions occur not 
only when children are innocent bystanders to the others' distress 
(e.g., watching mother stub her toe) but also when they have caused 
the harm (e.g., biting sister). The first prosocial interventions are large-
ly, as one might expect, confined to family members. If families have 
pets, the animal sometimes become recipients of the child's first ex-· 
pressions of empathy. We have described the range of prosocial re-
sponses to humans elsewhere (Zahn-Waxler and Radke-Yarrow 1982). 
There is considerable overlap in the ways young children express kind-
ness to animals and people. Table 1 provides illustrations from our 
data of the different kinds of prosocial behaviors that young children 
show to animals. And Table 2 provides examples of child's aggressive 
tendencies toward animals. 
Virtually all of the children studied showed this early capacity for 
concern for the welfare of another being. This uniformity suggests that 
altruism is a biological given, "wired" in and ready for expression 
given sufficient physical, cognitive, and emotional growth. There were 
differences among children in the frequency and emotional intensity of 
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Table 1 
Compassionate Behaviors Toward Animals Shown by One-and-a-Half to Two-and-a-
Hall Year Old Children* 
1. Child throws rubber toy at dog. Mother says, "Oh, you've hurt Bruno, poor Bruno." 
Child reaches over and hugs dog around the neck, then lies down on the hearth with the 
dog. 
2. The dog begins to gasp for breath: Child runs over and smiled at first. Then he looks 
serious and throws himseH on the dog to console him. Mother encourages him to get off. 
Mother comforts the dog by stroking its head and neck, and the child pats too. 
3. Child pulls the dog's foot hard and the dog yelps. Mother says, "Oh, don't pull Suzy's 
foot like that." Child looks serious, touches foot and says "hurt." Mother becomes very 
excited because this is the first time child has used a word that expresses a feeling. She 
says, "Yes, it did hurt, but it doesn't anymore." Child then pats dog's paw very loving-
ly and gently, and hugs the dog. 
4. Cat gets caught in the window well and girl cries with concern. 
5. Dog sneezes and child brings Kleenex to blow its nose. 
6. A dead goldfinch lies on the doorstep. Child points and said, "Birdie, birdie." and 
keeps looking at it with a furrowed brow-kind of sad-like. 
7. The dog comes in making little crying sounds. The child turns around and says very 
sympathetically, "What's the matter, Lady? What's the matter?" 
8. Mother is rough housing with the dog and hits a sore spot. He yelps, the mother tries 
to console and the girl comforts the dog as well. 
9. Child steps on the dog's foot and he gave a snappy growl. Mother grabbed the dog, 
yelled at him and threw him in the basement. Father joined in. Child squawks back at 
parents in a loud harsh tone, i.e., she came to the defense of the dog by scolding her 
parents for yelling at the dog. 
10. Child starts hitting the cat and pulls its tail. Mother moves child away and says, 
"No, we do not do that to cats, not at all. We treat them nicely. We never pull their tails 
and we never kick them." Then child begins to pat and kiss the cat. 
11. Child is eating a snack and tries to share her animal crackers with the dog. 
12. Child pulls dog's ears and dog gives a high little squeak. Mother notes that child 
doesn't seem to realize that those are squeaks of pain. So she has to tell him, "No, don't 
hurt the doggie; be gentle." Then he puts his arms around the dog's neck, puts his 
cheek to the dog's head and is sweet and gentle. (On another occasion like this, the 
mother explains but also slaps the child thus giving a mixed message.) 
*Excerpted from mothers' observational records. 
their altruism. This variability might result, in part, from differences 
in what children are being taught by their parents about respon-
siveness to the needs of others. 
We examined three aspects of child-rearing and socialization that 
might be expected to influence young children's orientations to others 
in distress (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow and King 1979). One con-
cerns the nurturance or warmth of the caregiver and the sensitivity 
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Table 2 
Aggressive or Callous Behaviors Toward Animals Shown by One-and-a-Half to 
Two-and-a-Half Year-Old Children* 
1. Mother calls the dog who won't come and mother says, "That dumb dog!" Child 
mimics mother's tone and says, "Get in here dumb dog." 
2. Father is "real harsh" with the dog and the child, in turn, starts to berate the 
dog-yelling at him in the same kind of tone of voice. 
3. Dog gets into chicken livers. Mother yells loudly, "Get down and get out of here 
dog," smacks him and shoos him out of the kitchen. A few minutes later the dog comes 
back in and the child imitates the mother, waving her arms, yelling at and hitting the 
dog. 
4. Dog chokes and child laughs hilariously. 
5. Child is squeezing a kitten's neck. Mother is worried that he might be able to hurt it. 
So she wraps her hands around the child's neck, to give him the idea of how unpleasant 
it is to have one's neck squeezed. He drops the kitten and she stopped squeezing. 
6. Mother fusses at the dog. Child goes up to the dog, stomps her foot, jabbers to 
him-really trying to tell him off, calling him "Bad" and so on. 
*Excerpted from mother's observational records. 
with which s/he handles the child when the child is distressed. This is 
one kind of index of the parent's empathy toward the child. Also, im-
portant are the parent's teachings and emotional reactions when 
parent and child view someone who is hurt or upset. For example, does 
the parent model altruism to the victim by helping, consoling, and so 
on, does s/he reassure the child, or does s/he ignore the situation entire-
ly? The parent also plays a significant role when the child causes 
distress. Children's acts of aggression (e.g., hitting father, pulling the 
eat's tail) provide further occasions for teaching. Caregivers may use a 
variety of techniques here, sometimes in combination. These include 
for example, (a) power assertion (physical punishment or restraint), (b) 
withdrawal of love (e.g., sending the child to his room or coldly ignor-
ing him), (c) verbal prohibitions ("stop it!"), (d) suggesting a positive, 
alternative behavior ("why don't you pet kitty instead of pulling on 
him?"), (e) reasoning or explanations about the consequences for the 
other ("you make Joey feel bad when you take his toy"; "that hurts 
Blacky when you step on his paw"), (f) perspective-taking, "Remem-
ber what it felt like when your foot got caught?", and (g) ignoring the 
situation. Some of these parental techniques are also illustrated in 
Table 1. 
The content (or substance) of children's prosocial actions often ap-
peared to have been learned (imitated) from the parents' own actions 
(e.g., mother shows child how to pat gently, or put on a Band-Aid). A 
very major parental influence had to do with the ways in which chil-
dren were disciplined for hurting others. Mothers who had the most 
prosocial children used the following techniques: (1) They gave clear 
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explanations about the negative consequences for the victim when the 
child hurt others; (2) they were sometimes moralistic and judgmental 
("it's not nice to bite"; "I don't want to be near you when you act like 
that"); (3) they provided their children with general rules about 
physical aggression toward people and animals ("you must never hurt 
others"); and (4) they firmly prohibited their children from hurting 
others in specific situations and suggested positive, alternative ac-
tions. The children were more likely to make reparation for distresses 
they had caused and to come to the aid of victims they had not them-
selves harmed. Mothers who used this constellation of disciplinary 
techniques also tended to be highly empathic and sensitive to the 
needs of their own children when they themselves experienced dis-
tress. 
The strong relationships between maternal practices and early 
child (prosocial) behaviors suggests that this is a time in the child's life 
when there is special receptivity and sensitivity to environmental in-
fluences, and hence to teachings about kindness toward others. A 
follow-up study of these families five years later showed that those 
children who showed high levels of generalized altruism and remorse 
over hurting others as toddlers were also the more altruistic children 
by the time they entered school (Cummings et. al., in press). Thus, we 
must take seriously the possibility that basic humane attitudes and 
behaviors are laid down in the first years of life and teachings can 
begin then. Young children can be made to understand that animals as 
well as people, have feelings, are receptive to affection, and sometimes 
require consolation. 
Children's imitations of parental behaviors were by no means 
restricted to parents' prosocial actions (e.g., see Table 2). In at least 
half of the families studied, parents showed anger to animals and 
children imitated parent's expressions of anger and disciplinary ac-
tion. This included episodes of shouting at and hitting animals. 
Sometimes we would see the young child embellish the parent's puni-
tive action by yelling and hitting when the parent had just shouted. In 
some families, this appeared to be part of a consistent pattern. For ex-
ample, one mother described an incident in which she yelled at the dog, 
picked hini by the collar and "sort of" threw him down. In her 
words-"! get very violent with him because he really annoys me 
sometimes; I think I even kicked him." She noted that usually when 
she does this her one-year-old becomes frightened or angry too, but 
this time that didn't happen. Perhaps the child was already developing 
defensive coping strategies. We also saw the other extreme-families 
where pets were treated with respect and accorded family status. In 
such homes, children were often unusually responsive to the plights of 
pets. In one family, when the dog sneezed, the two-year-old boy 
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would bring a kleenex to blow its nose, and when the dog hiccupped, 
the child tenderly kissed its nose. When the mother brushed the dog 
and hair came out, the boy interpreted it as a hurt and tried to shield 
the dog from the mother while anxiously attempting to pat the hair 
back on. 
Humane and inhumane orientations of children thus may derive 
from the values fostered and the treatment of animals provided within 
the family. We have identified some of the parental practices that may 
promote compassion and dampen aggression. We found that mothers' 
communications about the need for humane behavior occur most fre-
quently and with special intensity when their young children are 
themselves harming others. However, in another study of preschool 
children we found that young children can also be taught to help when 
they are bystanders to another's distress. An experimental research 
approach was used. Different learning environments were created to 
determine what kind of caregiver practices were most likely to produce 
generalized altruism in bystander circumstances. 
THE TEACHING OF GENERALIZED ALTRUISM 
Four experimental environments were developed to represent con-
figurations of rearing conditions that differed in the adult's nurturant 
relationship with the child, and in how she conveyed her own prosocial 
principles, feelings, and behavior. The children were from middle-class 
and upper-middle-class families. They were assigned to nursery 
school groups in which an adult provided either highly nurturant or 
relatively aloof, matter-of-fact care. These experimental conditions 
took place in 30-minute periods in the nursery school over a period of 
two weeks. Following these "histories of rearing" the adult provided 
one of two kinds of programmed experiences that dealt with prosocial 
content. In type "A" conditions, the adult expressed prosocial prin-
ciples and values in relation to many incidents of distress presented in 
pictures and in miniature play materials (dioramas depicting a child, 
an adult, or an animal in some kind of situation in which help was needed). 
The adult's reactions to these symbolized distresses combined induc-
tive reasoning, positive emotional involvement, modeling of help, and 
provision of information. Thus, she explained, "Look, this little bunny 
is caught in the bush and can't get out. Poor bunny must be scared. I 
am going to help it out of the bush so it can get back to its mother. 
There, that makes the bunny feel better." The child would then have a 
turn at helping. Type "B" conditions included the preceding pro-
cedures, with the important addition of the adult's responding similar-
ly to programmed distresses that involved interaction with real people 
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and animals (e.g., a teacher dropping her pencils, a cat tangled in yarn, 
etc.). These training conditions took place over several weeks. Both 
sets of rearing techniques provided the child with information intended to 
help the child to recognize cues of distress and feelings of the victim; to 
demonstrate ways of helping, and to indicate the consequences of such 
helping for the victim. The ''A'' and ''B'' procedures differed in two im-
portant respects: (1) Principles expressed by the adult in A conditions 
were only at the level of the hypothetical or abstract; in B conditions 
principles were put into practice with real consequences for the 
distressed persons. (2) Prosocial modeling by the adult in B conditions 
involved interaction with the distressed person which gave the adult 
the direct experience of the consequences of her prosocial interven-
tions. High and low nurturant histories were used with each training 
type. These four conditions were intended as a study of configurations 
of rearing conditions as they are practiced in real life by parents and 
experienced by children. All four conditions resulted in more symbolic 
altruism than the control condition where no forms of teaching were 
done. One of the four configurations of rearing conditions produced a 
significantly higher frequency of real helping behavior from the chil-
dren and more verbal expressions of sympathetic feelings than the 
other three conditions. It was an adult with whom the child had a 
history of a nurturant relationship and who provided the child with the 
model of her own caring behavior for others in both symbolic and real 
interactions with those in need. Also, in this condition, the adult's pro-
social interactions involved child, adult and animal victims of distress 
and has clear cognitive and positive affective accompaniments. The 
adult provided the child with information about the victim's ex-
perience, the adult's own feelings, and the consequences of her pro-
social intervention. The same set of rearing conditions that produced 
the highest levels of altruism in these children was similarly effective 
with a group of lower-class children in a replication study (Yarrow, 
Scott and Waxler 1973). 
If we were to generalize from these experimental findings to 
child-rearing in the real world, we would conclude that the parent who 
is altruistic toward others but is cold with his child is not going to have 
much success in developing generalized altruism in his child. Further, 
the parent who conveys his moral values as principles only, but does 
not translate these into real, caring actions, accomplishes a similar 
limited kind of learning in the child. Generalized altruism appears to 
be best learned from parents who both inculcate the principles and 
show real altruism in their everyday interactions. And their practices 
toward their children are consistent with their general altruism. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our research provides substantial evidence of empathy and 
altruism in children at ages well before many theories would have it oc-
cur. The tendencies of young children sometimes to be egocentric, 
dependent, lacking in competence, demanding, narcissistic, and so on, 
have been emphasized in many theories of personality and cognitive 
development. Hence, we have been inclined to ignore their tender, pro-
social side and the fact that they do have considerable social skills. 
Also contributing to an inaccurate view of young children as very 
limited in their empathic capacities are the research methods used. 
Cognitive/developmental studies often rely on interviews of children 
and this puts young children at a particular disadvantage. Often they 
cannot put into words the reasons for their acts of caring, they cannot 
state abstract principles of justice, and they evidence primitive, un-
sophisticated verbal understanding of moral issues. They then become 
labelled as functioning at a low stage of moral development, and are 
stereotyped as hedonistic, exploitative, negativistic, dominionistic, 
and so on in their orientations toward others. These characterizations 
are based on poorly applied understanding of young children's words 
rather than on their deeds and their expressed emotions. 
While some studies report that children become more prosocial 
with age, many other studies of cooperation, comforting, helping, and 
sharing do not show the expected age increase (Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-
Waxler and Chapman 1983). The research situations in which older 
children have been shown to be more likely than younger children to 
manifest prosocial behavior are research situations in which the vic-
tim's plight is portrayed symbolically and children must share with a 
hypothetical other (i.e., as in giving to charity). Older children will 
necessarily be better able to understand such abstractions and repre-
sentations of distress and will have developed greater competencies 
for prosocial behavior that requires these abilities. This does not mean, 
however, that children necessarily develop a greater emotional capaci-
ty for empathy as they grow older. In fact, the opposite sometimes 
may be true for many because they have had more time to learn other 
values and practices, to treat distress as routine, and to have devel-
oped defenses for shutting out their own and others pain. It is reason-
able to assume that children of all ages are capable of learning to be 
kind. The ways in which they learn will differ considerably. This is an 
area where much research is needed to help plan the most effective cur-
ricula for children of different ages. 
Our research is not unique in finding that young children's 
capacities for concerned feelings and behaviors far outstrip their ver-
bal competencies. Increasingly, there are studies that corroborate the 
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occurrence, in the first years of life, of children's understanding of 
others' inner feelings; children's abilities to cooperate, take turns with 
others, and negotiate conflicts, show willingness to share with peers 
and adults, and manifest capabilities for giving help (e.g., Bretherton, 
McNew and Beeghley-Smith 1981; Eckerman, Whatley and Kutz 
1975; Rheingold, Hay and West 1976; Ross and Goldmam 1977; Hay 
and Ross 1982). These findings are not merely an academic issue. They 
influence whether we view young children as altruistic or hedonistic, 
and determine when, if, and how we will attempt to teach them com-
passionate behavior. Our data, and those of others, indicate that train-
ing should begin very early and that it should recognize the child's in-
nate empathic sensitivies. It is commonly recommended that children 
be at least five to six years old before they are allowed to have pets 
because this is when they can first begin to assume some real respon-
sibility. This decision precludes exposure to animals in those impor-
tant early years of life where basic orientations are established. 
The research has specific implications for curricula that are 
designed to develop and encourage empathic and humane behavior in 
young children. The following factors have been found to be impor-
tant: (a) having warm and accepting relationships with the parent/ 
teacher if the learning is to generalize, (b) using training materials that 
realistically portray feelings and distress, (c) giving the child direct ex-
perience with real helping, (d) beginning teaching very early in the 
child's life and making it a fanrlly affair, (e) using explicit explanations 
about feelings and circumstances of the victim, i.e., actively evoking 
empathy in the child, and (f) stating general codes or principles about 
altruism, aggression, and morality, in simple, explicit terms. Many of 
these notions are probably already part of existing curricula and hence 
may represent what is already conventional wisdom to some. To large 
numbers of people, however, it is not common knowledge that em-
pathy and humane behavior can be taught and learned even in the 
earliest years of life. 
To summarize, as early as the second year of life, one can begin to 
teach children the rudiments of a sense of responsibility for other peo-
ple and animals. This teaching task should continue through child-
hood, with an attempt both to retain the child's early empathic pro-
clivities and to be sensitive to the changing cognitive and symbolic 
capacities that occur with development. It is possible to show even 
young children specific ways of helping and caring for others. The ver-
bal messages and the physical demonstrations of appropriate actions 
need to be simple, direct, concrete, consistent, and repeated in a varie-
ty of contexts throughout the early years of life. It is especially impor-
tant with toddlers and preschoolers (and with older children as well) 
that the teaching not always be at an abstract symbolic levels, (i.e., 
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with pictures, stories, teddy bears, etc.) Rather, "hands on" exper-
iences with real animals and persons, with their needs, their discom-
forts, and the specific caretaking they require will be necessary to 
equip children with the knowledge and motivation for responding hu-
manely. 
The mothers' reports in the longitudinal study of altruism provided 
us with many detailed narrative records of family interaction with 
pets. Based on clinical evaluations of these reports we offer the follow-
ing observations and generalizations. Many of the families had pets 
but there was considerable variability in the ways in which animals 
were incorporated into the family and in their specific roles and func-
tions. Parents vary considerably in how much they praise and reward 
children's nurturing of animals and how much teasing they tolerate. 
Some parents find the child's abuse or aggression "cute" while others 
firmly apprise their children of the distress this creates for the animal. 
There are differences (described earlier) in the techniques parents use 
to prevent the child from hurting and encourage the child to be more 
caring. Hence, parents presumably differ in the extent to which they 
believe animals have feelings, are receptive to affection, and require 
comfort. 
Some parents clearly use pets as the scapegoats for other family 
and personal problems: in volatile, angry families, animals are the recip-
ients of displaced aggression, receiving more than their share of 
hostility for minor misdeeds. Some of the parents give mixed mes-
sages to their children about the value of the pets and the children, in 
turn, reflect this ambivalence in their own treatment of animals. Thus, 
they can be seen to alternate between affection and abuse, with little 
awareness of this inconsistency in their treatment. The research 
literature and common sense would lead us to expect that children will 
learn to be caring, or abusive, or indifferent to animals depending on 
whether they see the parent behave in a similar way. It is more com-
plicated, however. Some children may be relatively unresponsive to 
parental teachings and some may react against their parents. One lit-
tle girl, for example, sided with the animal in situations of conflict and 
consistently tried to protect it against parental punishment, some-
times literally putting herself in the middle. This kind of compassion 
(i.e., early adoption of the defender role) thus may have very different 
origins from the compassion based on positive teachings. Even if 
families have pets early in child's life, this does not assure a good 
learning situation. There is considerable variability in early family ex-
periences with animals; children will come to early training and educa-
tion programs with very different attitudes, behavior styles, values, 
and emotional orientations toward animals. These patterns may al-
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ready be pervasive and entrenched. Teaching techniques then will 
have to be adapted to reach each child. 
It is interesting to speculate concerning why domestic cats and 
dogs evolved. Mostly, we take them for granted but they are an 
anomaly in the animal kindgom in terms of (a) their propensity to form 
more intense social attachments outside of their own species (i.e., to 
humans) than within it, and (b) their ability to elicit strong expressions 
of affect from humans. These mutual attachments were thought to 
have evolved originally because ca~s and dogs were useful to human 
physical survival,-in keeping down the rodent population, in protect-
ing, and defending humans, and so on. Yet, even when these needs no 
longer existed, people continued to have pets, perhaps more to fill 
psychological and emotional needs. The extensive recent use of pets as 
"therapists" attest to their remarkable capacity for reducing stress 
and providing companionship, comfort, and pleasure to others (Katch-
er and Beck 1983). We make animals an important part of children's 
lives from infancy onward. As babies they are given stuffed animals of 
all kinds and many of their first experiences with comfort (given and 
received) are with these play objects. The first dreams of children are 
reported to have more animal than human themes. Also, many early 
educational materials make use of animal characters. Some people 
believe that there is a natural, special affinity or empathic bond be-
tween young children and animals (though there is the potential for 
cruelty as well). We have many reasons for giving pets to children. 
Pets provide companionship and comfort, they provide an opportunity 
for less ambivalent emotional relationships, they may help to 
ameliorate family tensions. Some mothers, for example, indicate that 
the child goes to the family's cat or dog for comfort after having been 
disciplined. Animals also provide an opportunity to learn to be respon-
sible for others, to be gentle, and to discipline effectively. Because the 
life span of a pet is often shorter than the periods of childhood and 
adolescence of humans, children's first experiences with suffering, 
death and mourning, issues of mortality and immortality often will be 
in relation to their pets. Thus, animals provide an arena for teaching 
and learning (at both cognitive and emotional levels) about many of 
the major issues and struggles basic to existence. 
Darwin's travels and observations led him to reaffirm, as have 
others before and after him, that man is not the center of the universe. 
Man is connected to a larger web of life. We are a fellow species who 
need to share the earth with other species. Family pets may serve a 
very special purpose of reminding us of this connection between 
human life and animal life and the emotional needs we have in common 
with other animals. 
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Many of the issues that concern us here are conveyed with elo-
quence and insight in de Saint-Exupery's book, The Little Prince 
(1943). The prince, a young boy, travels to many planets, and talks to 
many people in his quest to know about the meaning of life. At last, on 
earth, he learns from a fox what is important. The boy meets a wild fox 
one morning and invites him to play. The fox tells the prince he cannot 
play with him because he is not yet tame. The prince asks what it 
means to tame and the fox replies, "It is an act too often neglected. It 
means to establish ties. Until we establish ties, neither of us is special 
to each other. But if you tame me, then we shall need each other. To me 
you will be unique in all the world. To you, I will be unique in all the 
world,''-' 'You become responsible forever for what you have tamed.'' 
The fox teaches the boy how to tame him and they form a close bond. 
Eventually they must part and the fox is about to cry. The prince 
speculates that it might have been better never to have met because of 
the pain of separation. The fox assures the prince that it is infinitely 
better to have formed the relationship because through the process, 
they have become unique in all the world. It is this complex and poorly 
understood process of relationship formation, whether between people 
or between people and animals, that helps to foster empathy and di-
minish aggression. 
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ABSTRACT 
What we know about whales is sufficient for ascribing to them the 
analogues of human rights, including the fundamental right to be 
treated with respect. Once we recognize their possession of this right, 
it follows that whales are not to be used or exploited by us for the pro-
motion of our ends, however "benign" they may appear. In the case of 
humans, to refrain from killing them is to discharge only a small part 
of our total duties. We must also refrain from exploiting them, whe-
ther "consumptively" or "nonconsumptively." Having come as far as 
we have in our understanding of the moral ties that binds humans and 
whales, we must now go further in our deeds. Just as whales are not 
here for us to kill for our purposes, so they are not here for us ''to 
study," or "to watch," or "to play with." The moral task before us is 
the most difficult. It is to let whales alone. 
*Presented to WHALES ALIVE: A Global Conference on the Nonconsumptive Utiliza-
tion of Cetacean Resources, Boston, MA, 6 June 1983. 
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In 1946 representatives of fourteen governments met in Wash-
ington to sign the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling. This was the meeting that established the International 
Whaling Commission. The declared purpose of the Convention was to 
safeguard the "great natural resources represented by whale stocks" 
in order to "make possible the orderly development of the whaling in-
dustry" (International Whaling Commission 1946). 
Since 1946 attitudes towards whales have changed enormously 
both within the IWC and among the general world population. Public 
opinion surveys have indicated that in most countries, including J a p-
an, opposition to whaling is the majority sentiment. The IWC, andes-
pecially its Scientific Committee, has reflected this shift in opinion, as 
well as playing a role in bringing it about. The Commission has con-
tributed to our knowledge of whales by supporting the collection and 
collation of scientific data. This in turn has focused attention on the 
plight of the planet's largest mammals. In its 1980 Washington con-
ference the IWC even began to explore tentatively the ethical issues in-
volved in killing cetaceans. Today it seems to many that the IWC is as 
involved in protecting whales as in protecting the whaling industry. 
There seem to be at least two sources for this shift in attitudes towards 
whales. 
First, recent research has suggested that whales are remarkably 
intelligent and sensitive creatures. Exactly how sensitive and intelli-
gent, and how exactly these terms are to be applied to whales, is dif-
ficult to say, however. There are serious problems involved in studying 
whales. They live in very different environments than we do. The 
course of their evolutionary history has been very different, and there 
are also significant variations among species. Still, some things are 
known. Whales have extraordinarily large brains. Some have about 30 
billion neurons in their neo-cortex compared to about 10 billion in 
humans. With brain to body ratios that are similar to those of the high-
er primates, their brains are also highly differentiated and exhibit a 
high degree of folding of the cortical surface. For these reasons one of 
the leading researchers in the field, P .J. Morgane, has claimed: 
... only the brain of whales and men have the amount and quality 
of neocortex making both appear at the pinnacle of the animal 
kingdom ... (Frost 1979). 
In addition, whales have extremely rich behavioral repertoires, sophis-
ticated communication systems, and complex forms of social organiza-
tion. Whatever finally may be decided about the exact nature of whale 
intelligence and sensitivity, it has become increasingly clear that 
whales are comparable to the higher primates and perhaps even to hu-
mans. For this reason it has seemed to many that killing whales for 
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their blubber and oil is a moral crime akin or even equivalent to wan· 
ton murder. 
A second reason why attitudes towards whales have changed is 
due to the apparent harmony in which whales live with their environ-
ment. Millions of years before our ancestors came out of the trees 
whales had already evolved to about their present state, and they were 
living lives very much like the ones they live today. For millions of 
years they were clearly the most intelligent beings on the planet. Seen 
from this perspective, we are evolutionary upstarts. In an incredibly 
short period of time we have become masters of the planet. And what 
do we do? We devote ourselves to destroying all other intelligent forms 
of life. But at least we are consistent. We seem just as willing to 
destroy ourselves as well. For people who despair at the havoc humans 
have wrought, whales are role models. They are symbols of how intelli-
gent beings can live joyful, peaceful lives in harmony with their en-
vironment. From this point of view, whales are the teachers, we the 
students, about the things that really matter. 
Whether or not we are willing to fully accept either of these lines of 
thought doesn't really matter. It is clear that we have all come a long 
way since 1946 in our attitudes towards whales. To some degree this 
Conference marks the progress we have made. Instead of talking about 
"maximum sustainable yields" we are now talking about "whales 
alive" and the "nonconsumptive utilization of cetacean resources." 
In the light of the progress we have made it would be nice to say 
that we have gone far enough, that we are on the verge of a new era in 
which we give the whales their due. If this were the case, this Con-
ference would be the occasion for a double celebration: one for the 
whales, and one for us for celebrating them. We shall argue, however, 
that although we have freed ourselves from the worst aspects of the 
anthropocentric ethic, which holds that everything on the planet only 
has value insofar as it has value to us-our ends, our purposes, our in· 
terests-we have not yet fully liberated ourselves from its lingering 
vestiges. 
Not everyone will be willing to accept what we say. But whatever 
beliefs we finally come to, it is important that we be willing from time 
to time to reconsider them, and to scrutinize honestly the fundamental 
presuppositions and commitments on which they are based. We hope 
that this paper will be a contribution to such a reconsideration. 
First we shall argue that what we know about whales is sufficient 
for ascribing to them the analogues of human rights, including a right 
to life, a right that is violated by those whaling practices that we are 
beginning to put behind us. We shall argue further that this right is 
undergirded by a more fundamental right that whales share with hu-
mans: a right to be treated with respect. It is this right which would be 
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violated by allowing, for instance, exploitative benign research on hu-
mans. And it is this right that is violated when we treat whales as "ce-
tacean resources." Next we shall discuss some of the implications of 
our view for the concerns of this Conference. 
WHALE RIGHTS 
To credit whales with a comparatively sophisticated mental life is 
hardly new. It is in the spirit of Darwin who claimed repeatedly that 
conciousness forms a continuum; the mental life of the higher animals 
differs from our own only in degree, not in kind. Any rationally viable 
ethic of how whales ought to be treated must take their mental sophis-
tication into account. And it is the demonstrable failure to do this that 
exposes the grave inadequacy of the "ethic" that allows these animals 
to be viewed and treated as a resource for us, as if they were trees or 
mineral deposits. Just as Bonnie is not a resource for Clyde, nor Clyde 
for Bonnie, so whales are not a resource for us-though of course they 
can be, and almost always are, treated as if this is their ''place in the 
scheme of things.'' That we are, so to speak, on all fours with whales on 
this morally crucial matter will be seen more clearly once we reflect on 
the philosophical underpinnings of why we do, and should, deny that 
human beings are to be viewed and treated as other peoples' resources. 
In our case we avoid this impoverished view by postulating that 
we have a different kind of value. Sometimes this is said to be our 
worth, or our dignity, or our sanctity; sometimes, as in Kant's writ-
ings, the root idea is expressed by saying that human beings exist as 
"ends in themselves." That is to say, people as individuals have their 
own projects and purposes that imbue their lives with meaning. As a 
member of the human community I recognize that others have virtues 
and excellences which they strive to develop more fully. I may not 
share their conception of virtue and of the good, but I recognize that 
they, like me, have legitimate ends which they pursue, which are 
valuable to them, and so if I am to be moral I must treat them as in-
dependent beings with their own excellences-as "ends in 
themselves." Let us here call the kind of independent, nonresource 
value attributed to individual humans inherent value. It is because we 
have such value that we must not be treated in ways that fail to show 
respect for us as individuals, and respect is not shown whenever we are 
treated in ways that assume that our value is reducible to how much 
we answer to or advance the interests of others-as if, that is, we exist 
as a resource for others. Acts and institutions that fail to treat us with 
appropriate respect, from a deceitful promise to slavery, are to be 
morally condemned. Or so it is commonly believed. Were we to grant 
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this much, how could we rationally avoid the same view about the 
value of whales, since they too seem to have their own virtues and ex-
cellences? How could we rationally defend, that is, the view that we 
have this special kind of nonresource value-inherent value-but they 
do not? 
Many possibilities come to mind: Whales lack immortal souls. 
Whales lack moral autonomy and reason. Whales lack the ability to en-
ter into contracts. Whales lack the ability to choose between alterna-
tive life-plans. And so on. Some of these claims are almost certainly 
false. But even if they are granted, for argument's sake, they neither 
singly nor collectively provide a rationally satisfactory basis for affirming 
inherent value in our case while denying it in the case of whales. For 
example, even if it is true that we do, but whales do not, have immortal 
souls, nothing whatever follows concerning the sort of value each of us 
has during our terrestial life. Again, that whales lack the ability to 
recognize the inherent value of others, should this be true, is no better 
reason to deny that they have such value than it would be to say that a 
daffodil cannot be yellow because it lacks the ability to recognize that 
lemons are yellow too. And as for the other sorts of considerations 
mentioned (for example, that whales lack, but humans possess, auto-
nomy and reason), each conveniently overlooks the fact that many 
human beings who we regard as having inherent value-young 
children, the senile, and the mentally enfeebled, for example-are 
similarly deficient. We do not, and we should not, treat these human 
beings as if they exist as a resource for those of us who, as luck has it, 
happen to possess the list of favored attributes under review. To per-
sist in viewing and treating whales, creatures who, it bears emphasiz-
ing, have a mental life of greater sophistication than many human be-
ings, as if they exist as a resource here for us, their value to be 
measured in terms of how much they answer to and advance human in- . 
terests, while denying that the same is true in the case of these 
humans-to persist in doing this is neither rationally nor morally 
defensible. Rationally, we are inconsistent in judging relevantly 
similar cases in dissimilar ways; morally, we are prejudiced because we 
draw moral boundaries on the basis of a biased consideration (namely, 
species membership), a tragic moral failing in the case of our dealings 
with animals that is not unlike other failings, such as racism and sex-
ism, in our dealings with one another. For just as the moral status and 
value of a human being does not turn on such biological considerations 
as race or sex, so the moral status and value of an individual, whether 
human or cetacean, does not turn on the different biological considera-
tion of species membership. 
There is an obvious way around these charges of prejudice and incon-
sistency: give up the belief in our own inherent value. This is an op-
106 D. Jamieson and T. Regan 
tion that will tempt some, but few on reflection will give in. And that is 
a good thing too. For the moral theory we would be obliged to put in 
the place of one that recognizes our independent, nonresource value 
will prove to be weak at the joints, unable to stand up under the weight 
of sustained, fair, and informed criticism (Regan 1983). So we do well 
not to make a shambles of our theoretical understanding of interhu-
man right and wrong in order to avoid recognizing our prejudice and 
inconsistency when it comes to the value of individuals beyond our 
species' borders. We do well, that is, to expand our moral vision rather 
than to close our eyes to our human fallibilities. 
The inherent, nonresource value of a human being is the linchpin of 
the idea that individual human beings have basic moral rights, in-
cluding such rights as the rights to life, to liberty, and to privacy. If 
Jack is to show respect for Jill's inherent value, he is obliged to respect 
her rights; he must not do anything to her that reduces her status in 
the world to that of a mere resource for others. Thus must he not kill 
her, for example, so that he, or his children, or the chronically destitute 
can have more of what they want or need; nor may he limit her freedom 
or invade her privacy just because he or others stand to reap some ben-
efits, whether the benefits be monetary, recreational, or scientific. To 
recognize the inherent value and basic moral rights of a human being is 
to accept the moral inviolability of the individual. Like "No Trespass" 
signs, our basic rights mark off the boundaries of that unique ''moral 
space" which, as individuals, we each occupy. 
These same signs come into view once we accept the inherent, non-
resource value of whales-and, with this, their basic rights. This is not 
to say that they do or must have every right a human being has-the 
right to vote, for example, or the right to attend the church of their 
choice. The basic rights they do have are those they can have. These in-
clude the ones mentioned earlier-rights to liberty, to privacy, to life, 
and to pursue their own wellbeing or happiness, all violated in a flash, 
one might say, when whales are killed for their meat or blubber, their 
oil or bone. But are any of these rights violated when, as many aspire 
to, we view and treat whales as objects that satisfy and advance our 
scientific, recreational, or, in either case, our economic interests? That 
is the central question that remains to be considered. 
WHALE WRONGS 
Let us consider the recreational uses of whales first. One way that 
people use whales for recreational purposes is by observing them in 
their natural habitat. Each winter in California, for example, thou-
sands of people view the gray whale migration. Whales and other ceta-
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ceans are also kept in captivity so that they can be used for recrea-
tional purposes. Aquatic parks like Seaworld and Marineland train 
cetaceans to perform tricks for the pleasure of paying customers. 
In the previous section we said that if whales have rights then 
they must be treated with respect. Their value and dignity does not 
rest on their place in our plans, purposes and projects. From this 
perspective our exploitation of whales for recreational purposes is not 
morally acceptable. They are not nature's toys to be "oohed" and 
"aahed" at by humans. They are not human artifacts made by us to 
fulfill our intentions. They are creatures of inherent value with lives of 
their own and the capacity to lead them in their own ways. To confine 
them in aquatic parks and to make them perform tricks that people 
find amusing is to try to remake them into our own creations. This at-
tempt to appropriate such marvelous and magnificent creatures for 
such trivial purposes, denying them their liberty in the bargain, is 
morally to be condemned. 
The commercial whale-watching industry-often viewed as the 
"benign" substitute for commercial whaling-is similarly unaccepta-
ble, though for a different reason. Whales do not exist as visual com-
modities in an aquatic free market, and the business of taking eager 
paying sightseers into their waters, though nonconsumptive, is ex-
ploitative nonetheless, morally analogous to making a business of con-
ducting sightseeing tours of human beings who either cannot or do not 
give their consent to be exploited by other people in this way. More-
over, just as Grayline Tours of the black ghetto, or the barrio, or· the 
gay community would tend to dehumanize and trivialize those whose 
very lives were being regarded as objects of curiosity and amusement, 
so it is also true in the case of the whales. 
The "nonconsumptive uses" of whales for scientific purposes are 
extremely diverse. They include observing them in aerial surveys, re-
cording their sounds, taking samples of tissues and fluids, and observ-
ing their behavior while held in captivity. Though ''nonconsumptive,'' 
all too often whales are again directly treated as means to our ends. 
They are studied to satisfy our scientific curiosity or to test our scien-
tific theories. Even so apparently harmless an activity as aerial view-
ing for purposes of population estimates should not completely escape 
moral skepticism, if the object is to determine whether a given species 
is at risk of extinction. Such studies foster, and are often in the service 
of, a false understanding of whales-as if, for example, the death of a 
whale matters only when a species is endangered. As with humans, so 
also with whales, it is individuals, not species, who have rights. We 
must take care not to accept that science that smothers the individual 
whale in numbers, graphs, charts, and so on. And we must also free 
ourselves from those enterprises that help perpetuate the general view 
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that whales exist as one or another kind of resource, to be thought of in 
terms of "herds" or "stocks." To the extent that population and mi-
gratory studies are cut from this cloth, to that extent, and for that rea-
son, they are wrong (Jamieson and Regan 1982; Regan 1983). 
In defense of research on captive cetaceans it will be said that we 
overlook the many benefits, both real and potential, that have and will 
accrue for the animals themselves as a result of our scientific under-
standing of them. We have learned something about the maladies of 
cetaceans in captivity and as a result of this we are now better able 
both to prevent and cure them in the case of those animals now in our 
care. Like all benefits, however, the morality of those in question 
depends on the means used to secure them. And no benefits are moral-
ly to be allowed if they are obtained at the price of violating individual 
rights. Because, then, keeping these animals in captivity violates their 
rights, the gains obtained for whales and other cetaceans are ill-got-
ten. To take the rights of an individual whale seriously is to believe 
that individual whales no more exist as a source of benefits for other 
whales than they do for us. 
Two kinds of response might be given to our argument. First, it is 
often said by people who work with whales and dolphins that these 
animals enjoy their interactions with humans, even those in experi-
mental settings. Just as people like observing whales, so whales enjoy 
observing people. If this is correct then perhaps it can be said that in 
many cases whales "consent," in some sense, to be the subjects of 
benign research and to be entertainers in aquatic parks. If this is true 
then such "nonconsumptive uses" do not harm them, or if they do 
harm them, they do not violate their rights. It is difficult to know what to 
make of this claim. We should remember, however, that similar claims 
have often been made about oppressed humans as well as about other 
animals. It was said in defense of slavery that blacks enjoyed picking 
cotton and being taken care of by the master. It was said in defense of 
sexism that women preferred to stay home and do housework, and not 
compete in the cutthroat male world. Frequently today we see televi-
sion commercials depicting happy cows and chickens, more than eager 
to lay down their lives for the sake of our palates. Perhaps these claims 
about the voluntary cooperation of cetaceans are true, but in the light 
of this history we should be highly skeptical. It is extremely doubtful 
that we add anything to the quality of cetacean life by our presence, 
more than doubtful that our absence would be missed by them. 
The second response is that the "nonconsumptive use" of whales 
is important, because the whales themselves are the main beneficiaries 
of increases in our knowledge. This argument takes two forms. 
The first claims that as a matter of realpolitik, whales will be killed 
as long as it is economically profitable to do so. If it can be shown that 
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"nonconsumptive uses" of whales are economically preferable, then 
whaling will cease. There are a number of problems with this argu-
ment. First, it presupposes that "consumptive" and "nonconsump-
tive" uses of whales are mutually exclusive. James E. Scarff has 
argued that this is not the case (Scarff 1980). He cites as an example 
the fact that the Russians kill various numbers of gray whales every 
year in the Artie Ocean, without any apparent effect on the California 
whale-watching industry, even though both industries exploit the 
same species of whale. This suggests that nonconsumptive uses could 
simply add to rather than subtract from our repertoire of cetacean ex-
ploitation. But second, realpolitik is, so to speak, a two-edged sword. 
Even if it can be shown that whaling is an economically inferior use of 
whales relative to "nonconsumptive" uses, that still would not put the 
anti-whaling position on a firm foundation, since to accept the argu-
ment in this form suggests that whaling should continue if it can be 
shown to be the economically optimal use of whales. And while whal-
ing may not be economically optimal now that whale populations are 
so low, there is no guarantee that the economic equation won't change 
in the future. The basic problem with this argument is, then, that it is 
analogous to saying that the reason we ought not to kill derelicts is 
because it is not economically efficient to do so. One would have 
thought the reason against this has nothing whatever to do with dol-
lars and cents; and this is what we have argued is true of whales as well. 
The second form of this argument suggests that the more we learn 
about whales the better able we will be to protect them. This argument 
undoubtedly has merit. We would not be in a position today to argue 
for the rights of whales were it not for the scientific research that has 
been done. And if we could be certain that additional benign research 
would redound to the benefit of the whales, who could oppose it? But 
again, history provides reason for skepticism. Sad though it is to say, 
science has been more often used against animals than for them. In the 
past we mainly have studied animals in order to make them a better 
resource rather than to ensure that they have better lives. By its very 
nature scientific knowledge is public information, and scientists are 
not in a position to control its uses. Sidney Holt has given one such ex-
ample in which the results of benign research involving wolves is now 
being used against them (Global Conference on Non-Consumptive Utili-
zation of Cetacean Resources 1983). Who can have confidence that this 
will not be the case with the whales as well? Even if we are motivated 
to do benign research on whales by the desire to improve their lot, we 
should be skeptical of our ability to do that. We have learned over and 
over again that human intervention in complicated natural systems 
often only makes things worse. Trying to be friends of the whales may 
only be another way of making us their enemies. 
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What we owe the whales is the recognition that they too are the 
bearers of moral rights, worthy of our respect. Once we are willing to 
accept, as we should, the idea that whales have the right not to be killed 
or needlessly harmed, consistency demands that we then acknowledge 
that they also have the right not to be exploited for the promotion of 
our ends, however "benign" they might appear, whether such exploita-
tion is "consumptive" or "nonconsumptive." Having come as far as 
we have in understanding the moral ties that bind humans and whales, 
we must now go further in our deeds. Just as whales are not here for us 
to kill for our purposes, so they are not here for us "to study," or "to 
watch," or "to play with." The moral task before us is the most dif-
ficult because the most hidden and possibly self-sacrificial: It is to let 
whales alone, satisfied with the mere knowledge that these "other na-
tions" continue to roam the vast reaches of the oceans in no small 
measure because of our principled efforts to save and preserve them. 
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